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The system of adversarial trials and the principle of orality in the giving of testimony by 
witnesses does little to encourage the giving of evidence by the most robust witness yet in 
its unaltered form provides the basis upon which many of the decisions in the English 
courts have traditionally been made. There has been a growing recognition that the 
orthodox trial system must be reviewed and a system allowing for the giving of evidence 
by other means constructed within it. The continuing review of how evidence should be 
received to determine a fair outcome does not link the underlying purpose of the principle 
of orality with the numerous circumstances in which oral evidence may be modified for a 
variety of reasons. The impact across both civil and criminal proceedings is considered, and 
the effect of incremental change demonstrated. A model for future dispute resolution and 










The system of adversarial trials and the principle of orality in the giving of testimony by 
witnesses does little to encourage the giving of evidence by the most robust witness, yet, 
in its unaltered form provides the basis upon which many of the decisions in the English 
courts have traditionally been made. There has been a growing recognition that the 
orthodox trial system must be reviewed, and a system allowing for the giving of evidence 
by other means constructed within it. 
 
Lord Devlin’s remark that ‘the centrepiece of the adversary system is the oral trial’,1 
centres on the understanding that the witness should give a factual account from direct 
knowledge, that is capable of being tested. The three-stage process for the giving of 
evidence embedded within the system of criminal justice in an adversarial framework sets 
out the classic example of a formalised mechanism for this process. This comprises of 
evidence-in-chief; cross-examination and re-examination. Each stage of that process 
would normally take place in open court and be the subject of scrutiny by a judge and, 
where appropriate, jury. But even in criminal cases, where the burden of proof to 
demonstrate guilt is appropriately high, is it really necessary or desirable for this always to 
be in person and for the witness to be tested by cross-examination? The perception that 
the process of questioning witnesses in open court is superior is one found in the Anglo-
American common law orthodoxy. This view has been questioned ‘Alleged superiority of 
oral testimony is not universally accepted. Like historians, continental jurisdictions prefer 
documentary sources’.2  
There is a wealth of information setting out the circumstances in which the principle of 
orality may be disregarded or altered to such an extent that its impact is very significantly 
eroded. Differing approaches have been taken dependent on whether the trial process is 
 
 
1 Devlin, P The Judge, OUP 1979  p.54 




taking place in a civil or criminal forum. Significant analysis3 has already been undertaken 
on the reduction in the role played by witnesses giving evidence in the traditional format. 
However, that analysis focuses on specific proceedings rather than considering the validity 
and legitimacy of the principle of orality across all hearings. The contribution of this thesis 
is adding to the continuing review of how evidence should be received to determine a fair 
outcome, by providing a link between the underlying purpose of the principle of orality 
with the numerous circumstances in which oral evidence may be modified for a variety of 
reasons. The reasons for those modifications vary from expediting proceedings to reducing 
cost and, perhaps most importantly, establishing a means by which all categories of 
witness may have their testimony received. This thesis considers that, despite the need for 
appropriate variations in the treatment of evidence between different circumstances, 
many underlying challenges are the same. Receipt of evidence should fall within a 
procedural pallet, containing a range of options as a starting point and the one best suited 
to the particular proceedings selected at the outset. Most importantly, the starting point 
for all circumstances should not necessarily be orality.   
The major original argument drawn through this thesis is to challenge the starting point 
that evidence should be received in the standard Anglo-American trial system in 
accordance with the principle of orality. It is argued that by accepting the pre-eminence of 
a continuing principle of orality, the needs of the administration of justice in the 21st 




3 Access to Justice, Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls Final Report 1996, The Review of Civil Litigation in England 





Approach to the Study: The Research Question 
 ‘To consider if a review of the place of the principle of orality may result in a more 
appropriate model for effective receipt of testimony, together with continuing evolution 
of the trial system in coming years.’ 
 
The research question was formulated having considered existing areas of coverage and 
by developing a framework to investigate those questions against existing literature. The 
key objectives for consideration are: 
 
1. Identification of the original purpose/remit of the principle of orality in modern 
litigation. 
2. The possible consequences of and the extent to which modifications of that 
principle affect the administration of justice. 
3. The basis for the legitimacy of modifications to the principle of orality in both civil 
and criminal proceedings. 
4. The implications for the principle of orality as the most appropriate means for 
defining and safeguarding a fair trial in the context of particular categories of 
witness. 
 
To address these objectives, the following aims were identified:  
 
• To determine the original purpose/remit of the principle of orality. 
• To establish the potential consequences of the modifications of that principle. 
• To identify the approach of the English adversarial trial system and any change to 
the approach over time. 
• To consider the legitimacy and effect of any change in the approach to the principle 
of orality. 
• To identify the continued effectiveness of the principle of orality as the most 
appropriate means for defining and safeguarding a fair trial. 
• To propose continuing review of a model for effective receipt of testimony, 





Developments in the attitude of the legal profession and associated agencies towards 
witnesses have been well documented and the subject of numerous studies and reforms4. 
The research methodology employed seeks to draw together information in relation to 
comment accessed through Ministry of Justice proposals and pilot schemes of alternative 
systems set up by the fair trial unit. Also considered are press releases and Parliamentary 
debates on the continued reforms governing the receipt of evidence. Critical comment 
from the media as well as commentary by interest groups has been considered throughout 
and is drawn together to form conclusions. Review of the existing literature throughout 
the thesis in books and articles identifies gaps in knowledge relating to the rationale for 
the principle of orality as a starting point for all types of proceedings whether civil or 
criminal in nature. Evaluation of the extent to which criticism has been justified and the 
formulation of relevant criteria for the development of an appropriate revised method for 
receipt of testimony is considered. Identification of key developments picked out in 
existing secondary sources (books and journals), and analysis of primary sources on key 
reforms is drawn through. This is to demonstrate that a procedural pallet ought to be 
considered as a more appropriate and effective means by which proceedings may be 
determined.  
 
The conceptual framework onto which theories  concerning the principle of orality would 
fit is formed by taking a systematic approach to those proceedings in both civil and criminal 
litigation falling within mainstream trial systems. To delimit the scope of the research, the 
place of the principle of orality within tribunals and other quasi-judicial proceedings does 
not fall within the boundary of the research question.  
 
The structure of the chapters is such as to look at the general contextual background of 
the principle of orality, followed by consideration of its impact within civil litigation 
(Chapters 1 and 2). Consideration of the impact of the principle of orality on the expert 
witness, whose role it is to provide opinion evidence, rather than factual evidence, 
 
 




provides a link between civil and criminal litigation and is illuminating in providing insight 
on the particular issues arising within the Anglo-American trial system for this specialist 
category of witness. This bridge between fora is crucial in demonstrating the need for 
revision and review of the adversarial trial model and is sparsely dealt with in the literature. 
The overview of both civil and criminal systems is crucial in understanding the issue of 
structural change rather than piecemeal modification as a way forward. This bridge is as 
an underpinning justification in addressing the research question (Chapter 3). Having 
understood the general influence of the principle of orality, its effect on particular 
categories of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses cannot be understated. An enquiry into 
the development of special measures and the continuing research in this area underpins 
any answers found to address the research objectives (Chapter 4). Continuing attempts to 
tackle the issues arising from the need to receive evidence from particular categories of 
witness and strategies to accommodate those witnesses while maintaining fair trial 
procedures is considered to draw the theoretical framework towards a conclusion 
(Chapter 5). Analysis relating to the research questions together with proposals for 
continuing enquiry conclude the thesis (Chapter 6). 
 
 
The System of Adversarial Trials and the Principle of Orality  
 
The principle of orality assumes that all witnesses are capable of speaking up for 
themselves and standing up to the testing nature of cross-examination. In this study, it is 
argued that the principle of orality acts as a constraint on the development of a system 
suitable for the broad range of proceedings undertaken within the trial system for the 
determination of both civil and criminal matters. This study addresses a perceived gap in 
knowledge relating to the place of the principle of orality within the system of litigation.  
 
The courts in England and Wales depart from the principle of orality to such an extent that 
it is argued having it as a starting point does not always best serve the administration of 
justice in the 21st century. The reasons for departure from the use of direct oral testimony 
vary and range from expeditious case management to limiting costs and most importantly 




and intimidated witnesses of fact. It is not contended that receipt of evidence from 
witnesses of fact through direct oral testimony in compliance with the principle of orality 
should be abandoned. Rather, this means of receipt of evidence should fall within a 
procedural pallet containing a range of options as a starting point and the one best suited 
to the particular proceedings selected at the outset.  
 
The principle of orality has resulted in a torturous route to the most appropriate 
procedural mechanism by modification of the receipt of evidence by direct oral testimony 
rather than selecting the most appropriate mechanism as a starting point. To understand 
the pre-eminence of the principle that all witnesses, and in particular witnesses of fact, 
should give their evidence orally in open court Chapter 1 considers the basis for the 
adversarial trial system in England and Wales. It is contended that the deep roots, both 
historical and traditional, of the Anglo-American trial system need to be understood before 
the issues constraining the administration of justice can be addressed. The central premise 
of this research is that the adversarial trial process fails to achieve fairness and that a 
procedural pallet from which the most appropriate mechanism can be drawn would 
achieve a fairer system. This study calls for the development of procedures which do not 
take as their automatic starting point the principle of orality. 
 
 
The Approach of the Civil Courts to Witnesses of Fact  
 
To understand the development of procedures for the receipt of testimony in civil 
proceedings, Chapter 2 will consider the modification of the principle of orality in order to 
achieve the objectives of the very significant reforms planned and implemented 
throughout the 1990s. How civil litigation in England and Wales is conducted changed 
fundamentally from 26 April 1999 on the bringing into force of the Civil Procedure Rules 
1998 (CPR 1998) (SI 1998/3132). These rules embodied the reforms set out by Lord Woolf 
in his report Access to Justice5 which was published in 1996 and provided a broad 
philosophy to tackle the perceived ills of the existing civil litigation system. It had long been 
 
 




considered that the system was too expensive, slow and inaccessible for many of those 
using it to resolve disputes. At the heart of reform was to seek to embed an overriding 
objective to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. The overriding objective of 
the reforms is set out in rule 1.1 of the CPR 1998: 
 
The Overriding Objective 
 
(1) These Rules are a new procedural code with the overriding objective of enabling the 
court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. 
(2) Dealing with a case justly and at proportionate cost includes, so far as is practicable – 
(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing; 
(b) saving expense; 
(c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate – 
(i) to the amount of money involved; 
(ii) to the importance of the case; 
(iii) to the complexity of the issues; and 
(iv) to the financial position of each party; 
(d) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; 
(e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking into 
account the need to allot resources to other cases; and 
(f) enforcing compliance with rules, practice directions and orders. 
 
The overriding objective has worked as a gloss on all aspects of civil procedure, including 
the implementation of the principle of orality. However, the principle of orality remains a 
starting point and justification is seen throughout the civil procedure rules for its 
modification. A central aspect of the civil procedure rules is the allocation of the case to a 
case management track. Several factors influence allocation to a specific track, but 
principally the value of the case is determinative. It appears easier to depart from the 
principle of orality in cases of lower value allocated either to the small claims track or the 
fast track than is the case in the management system reserved for high value cases, known 
as the multi-track. The different approaches taken are justified by reference back to the 




witnesses of fact and demonstrates that the strength of adherence to the principle of 
orality is dependent on the value of the claim.  
 
Departure from the principle of orality is often based on considerations of value. But such 
is the embedded nature of the principle that witnesses of fact give oral evidence, via a 
hybrid method developed for medium value claims falling within the fast track. In this type 
of fast track trial the first part of testimony, examination-in-chief, is contained in a witness 
statement so that witnesses of fact may not normally add to this but, to remain in part 
compliant with the adversarial trial system and the giving of live oral testimony; cross-
examination and re-examination is conducted in the traditional manner with questions 
being asked and live oral testimony received based on the written witness statement. Lord 
Woolf specifically acknowledged the pre-eminence of the principle of orality. The value 
placed on the adversarial trial system, to which the principle belongs, was evident through 
the consultation process leading to the final report.6 It is argued that a procedural starting 
point not constrained by this principle would result in a more transparent and appropriate 
system of civil justice. 
 
 
The Attitude Towards Receipt of Evidence from Experts 
 
The application of the principle of orality differs dependent on whether the witness in 
question is attending court to give a factual version of matters perceived, a witness of fact, 
or to provide an opinion on a matter of expertise outside the normal understanding of the 
court, an expert witness. Traditionally, the principle of orality whereby the witness attends 
court to provide oral testimony applies equally to witnesses of fact and expert witnesses. 
However, that principle has been modified significantly both in civil and criminal 
proceedings. This aspect of the trial process highlights a lack of structure in the approach 
 
 




to trial modification. Similar issues are identified spanning both civil and criminal matters, 
yet modifications focus on issues particular to the matter in question.  
 
In both civil and criminal matters, as is the case with witnesses of fact, the starting point 
with expert witnesses is the application of the principle of orality and the adherence to the 
traditional adversarial trial system. The reasons for departure and modification vary 
dependent on the value and complexity of the case and whether the hearings are of a civil 
or criminal matter. Notably, movement away from the principle of orality in criminal 
proceedings tends to follow reforms tested within the civil environment. This link is a 
means by which a more holistic view of appropriate processes could be developed. It is a 
limited indication that a bridging principle looking at suitability rather than a process of 
modification may be more effective.  The civil procedure rules have been tested and 
updated since their introduction following on from the report of Lord Justice Woolf in 
1998. While the starting point remains the giving of oral testimony, a movement towards 
an inquisitorial style, with the judge determining how the evidence is adduced, can be seen 
developing through civil proceedings and more recently developing through the criminal 
procedure rules.7  
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis reviews the rationale for a hybrid system stemming from 
adherence to the principle of orality. The consultation process leading to Lord Woolf’s final 
report fuelled the subsequent rules with only incremental movement away from the 
principle of orality when the nature of the proceedings required the traditional adversarial 
process to be modified. It will be argued that had the principle of orality been just one 
consideration within a procedural pallet then a more appropriate, and occasionally more 
inquisitorial, style for receipt of expert evidence could have been developed from the 









The Introduction of Special Measures in the Criminal Justice System for the 
Receipt of Oral Testimony 
 
Since the 1980s, there has been a growing recognition that the orthodox trial system must 
be reviewed and a system allowing for the giving of evidence by children and other 
vulnerable witnesses constructed within it. The giving of testimony by witnesses does little 
to encourage the giving of evidence by the most robust witness, let alone those witnesses 
who are children or otherwise vulnerable.  
 
Lord Devlin’s remark that ‘the centrepiece of the adversary system is the oral trial’,8 is key 
when considering the impact of the principle of orality in driving and maintaining the three-
stage process for the giving of evidence embedded within the system of criminal justice. It 
is the adversarial framework which sets out a formalised mechanism for this process 
comprising of evidence-in-chief; cross-examination and re-examination. Each stage of that 
process would normally take place in open court and be the subject of scrutiny by the jury 
in the Crown Court, or the Justices in the Magistrates’ Court. Whether the essence of truth 
finding relies on this process is key. Does it follow that oral evidence ought to be in person 
and for the witness to be tested by cross-examination, which, by its very nature, is 
challenging? The perception that the process of questioning witnesses in open court is 
superior is one found in the Anglo-American common law orthodoxy. By the late 1980s, 
this view was questioned ‘Alleged superiority of oral testimony is not universally accepted. 
Like historians, continental jurisdictions prefer documentary sources’.9  
 
Another barrier to the provision of evidence by children and other vulnerable witnesses is 
the competence threshold and the requirement that sworn testimony is the norm. Again, 
this is a consequence of the principle of orality being a starting point so that evidence must 
be given both orally and on oath. On both counts, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999 provides for a much improved approach. A new test of competence is set out10 
 
 
8 Devlin, P, The Judge, OUP 1979 p.15 
9 McEwan, “J Documentary Hearsay Evidence-Refuge for the Vulnerable Witness?” (1989) Crim LR 629 




together with provision to accept the unsworn evidence of children under 1411 and to allow 
for the receiving of unsworn evidence from adult witnesses who pass the test for 
competence but who do not satisfy the requirement that they show a sufficient 
appreciation of the solemnity of the occasion and the particular responsibility, to tell the 
truth, which is involved in taking the oath.12 
  
The impact of the giving of evidence for numerous witnesses, unfamiliar with the trial 
system, is both difficult and stressful.13 The difficulties faced by vulnerable witnesses 
derive from the alien nature of the court, with the formality of the trial process placing an 
unacceptable burden. Children in particular face a difficult experience in telling their 
stories in a court setting with its unfamiliar terms and confusing questioning. The NSPCC 
conducted research into the experience of child witnesses and concluded “Despite a 
network of policies and procedures intended to facilitate children’s evidence, only a 
handful of young witnesses… gave evidence in anything approaching the optimum 
circumstances. Their experiences revealed a chasm - an implementation gap - between 
policy objectives and actual delivery around the country.”14 
 
Equally, victims of sexual offences face a daunting examination of what would typically be 
private matters. The adversarial system is such that an attack on the credibility of these 
witnesses is commonplace. Questioning will frequently deal with matters of intense 
difficulty in suggesting the witness lacks credibility and seek to question the veracity of a 
witness making deeply distressing allegations. 
 
There have been three areas identified as a cause for additional stress for witnesses who 
have learning disabilities.15 Such witnesses often are not able to recall as readily as others 
and may struggle with recounting facts; secondly, these witnesses will frequently find 
communication hampered and finally, the process of cross-examination, with its testing 
 
 
11 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, section 55 
12 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, section 56 
13 Ellison L, The Adversarial Process and the Vulnerable Witness, OUP 2001  
14 Plotnikoff J and Woodson, R ‘In Their Own Words: The experiences of 50 Young Witnesses in Criminal 
Proceedings’ 2004 




and challenging style, may well result in this category of witness giving answers which are 
perceived as desirable to please the questioner. 
 
Witnesses who have been subjected to brutality and remain intimidated face hurdles in 
the giving of testimony in the orthodox style in open court and only the brave may attempt 
to meet such a challenge. The issues faced by children may have been the driver for change 
owing to the frequency and public nature of such criminal trials. However, in terms of 
brutality and intimidation, the 30-year conflict in Northern Ireland demonstrated the 
impact of the principle of orality when those willing to testify carried a huge risk of reprisal. 
Professor Monica McWilliams is a social scientist concerned with the consolidation of 
human rights following the conclusion of the negotiations between political parties and 
the British government in Belfast in 1998, resulting in the Belfast Good Friday agreement.16 
Professor McWilliams is concerned with the implementation of a Bill of Human Rights to 
ensure the embedding of the peace process17 and in particular to address the issue of the 
departure of the UK from the European Union concerning human rights. The resurgence 
of violence in Northern Ireland remains of grave concern and Professor McWilliams 
commentary, during her participation in BBC Radio 4’s Desert Island Discs,18 demonstrates 
how the principle of orality finds its way into the political and social issues following acts 
of violence in Northern Ireland ‘what was more important is witnesses, there’s a huge 
frustration that people keep saying that the dogs in the street know who’s doing this but 
you can’t have the dogs in the street in courts, you actually need to have strong 
witnesses…You need special measures to protect those witnesses because organised 
gangs can come after you if they know you’re going to stand up in court and give 
evidence…’19 
 
The development of special measures started from the acknowledgement that the court 
experience was unacceptable for children. The variation of the principle of orality from the 
 
 
16 Cm 3883 (1998) 37 ILM 751 
17 Smith A, McWilliams M, Yarnell P ‘Does every cloud have a silver lining?: Brexit, repeal of the Human Rights 
Act and the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights’ (2016) Fordham international law journal, 40 (1) 
18 First broadcast 9 June 2019 




standpoint of the child gave rise to the broad acknowledgement that trials had to be 
different to accommodate a range of needs.  
 
There followed the Pigot Report,20 which made far reaching recommendations to address 
the issues in the giving of evidence by children and other vulnerable witnesses. Special 
measures were brought into the system through the Criminal Justice Act 1991. While the 
legislation now afforded the opportunity of pre-recorded evidence-in-chief, much of the 
Pigot Report remained to be addressed. At all points in the much needed process of 
reform, the starting point of principle of orality set within an adversarial process hampered 
the implementation of a system best suited to the administration of justice. 
 
Part II of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 sought to address remaining 
issues. However, the YJCEA 1999 proved complicated in its structure, and a number of the 
special measures were to be brought in incrementally through a phased programme.21 On 
14th July 2013, over two decades after the Pigot Report sought to bring about reform by 
moving away from the principle of orality in cases of child abuse, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Keir Starmer QC, discussed further interim guidelines on prosecuting cases 
of child sexual abuse. In concluding his comments, the Director of Public Prosecutions 
states: 
 
But most of all, and most importantly, the consultation is now open to the public for 
their views. What I want to avoid is finding out in five or ten years that there are 
shortcomings and weaknesses in the guidelines that could have been identified now, 
so please let me have your views.22 
 
It is evident from these comments that a solution to the traditional adversarial trial system 
in such cases remains a problematic subject fraught with difficulty and the subject of 
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continuing debate. In 2016 Keir Starmer’s successor as DPP, Alison Saunders, continued 
the conversation: 
 
It is without doubt that special measures significantly improve the experience of 
children victims and witnesses at court, and it is our duty to ensure that we 
continue to make special measures applications whenever required. So how do we 
do that?... Since I have been DPP, I have heard some truly excellent examples of 
this in practice - where, for example, children have been interviewed in makeshift 
dens and tents in 'child friendly' interview suites by police and intermediaries, with 
sandpits and toys in the room. The aim is to make them feel as comfortable as 
possible so they are able to give their best evidence.23 
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis analyses this most compelling area for reform of the principle of 
orality and argues that only by a change in mindset towards the nature of criminal 
proceedings in which children, vulnerable, or otherwise intimidated witnesses are involved 
can a system fit for the 21st-century be developed. 
 
 
The Future of the Principle of Orality and Conclusions 
 
Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis consider the future of the principle of orality and seek to 
draw conclusions for its future development. It is necessary to draw the thread of the 
argument, that a different starting point should be considered, rather than continuing with 
modifications and hybrids developing out of the traditional adversarial system, through 







23 https://www.cps.gov.uk/cps/news/children-and-young-people-witnesses-alison-saunders-dpp accessed 11 






In conjunction with the supervisory team, a doctrinal methodology was considered the 
most appropriate for the thesis. The doctrinal approach encompasses a qualitative and 
theoretical approach underpinned by black letter law. This methodology typifies the 
approach to research by lawyers24 and is a core transferable skill for legal professionals. 
This thesis considers the impact of the traditional adversarial framework in a modern day 
practical context. 
The research methodology employed seeks to draw together information in relation to 
comment accessed through Ministry of Justice proposals and pilot schemes of alternative 
systems set up by the fair trial unit. Also considered are press releases and Parliamentary 
debates on the continued reforms governing the receipt of evidence. Critical comment 
from the media and commentary by interest groups has been considered throughout and 
is drawn together to form conclusions. The integration of the black letter approach is 
recognised as a valid means of drawing together the key sources and ensuring a critical 
evaluation throughout the thesis.25 A theoretical critique sits alongside with analysis of 
the law and procedure, gaps are identified and proposals for a structured reform 
examined. The methodology results in a process of identifying and analysing the issues, 
reviewing the integrated literature and drawing conclusions towards answering the 
research question.  
Review of the existing literature throughout the thesis, in books and articles, identifies 
gaps in knowledge relating to the rationale for the principle of orality as a starting point 
for all types of proceedings whether civil or criminal in nature. The integration of the 
literature review allows for a structured approach with links demonstrated and 
considered systematically. An integrated literature review was the most effective means 
of placing the research in the context of the existing literature and secondary sources and 
worked to the best effect given the nature of the subject matter. These gaps enable a 
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critical commentary and facilitate an original contribution through the development of 
the thesis within the framework set out above.  
Through the process of write up the gaps in the current system are identified and links 
between these issues are established driving towards the conclusions set out in Chapter 
6. The integrated literature review demonstrates the literature in each distinct category 
and also demonstrates the absence of content taking a holistic approach across fora. A 
research question on the way forward for both civil and criminal matters, therefore, 
makes an original contribution to this aspect of research in the field of practical litigation.  
Overall an integrated literature review is most suitable. However, in order to demonstrate 
that the contribution lies in the field of practice and professional discourse rather than 
falling within the academic domain a review on the literature on the topic of orality is 
appropriate.  
 
Books in the academic domain by authors such as Bentham,26 Cairns,27 Devlin,28 Donlan,29 
Franks,30 Rock31 and Wigmore32 consider the historical and developing perspective and 
encompass the academic debates which contextualise the origins of the modern litigation 
landscape but do not address the continuing modernisation of the field of professional 
litigation process. 
 
Authors of books falling withing the continuing review of the manner in which orality 
matters to the way forward in the professional field relating to process can be seen in the 
work of Ellison33 who identified the issues relating to the manner in which evidence was 
adduced in the context of sexual offence matters and more broadly in relation to the 
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impact of the continuing system in terms of vulnerable witnesses. The contribution as to 
the effect of a failure to develop best practice sits in this context around treatment of 
vulnerable or intimidated witnesses. 
 
Similarly the contribution in relation to the discourse around direct analysis of orality in 
the process of receiving testimony is placed with those issues addressed by McEwan,34   
Spencer and Lamb.35  
 
Richard Susskind in his recent review of the proposed development of online courts36 
brings the modern litigation field to the fore in considering the idea of process rather than 
place in terms of dispute resolution and the contribution relating to process and its 
suitability for current litigation falls in this practice area. 
 
Articles demonstrate the practical context for the contribution. Birch has written 
extensively on the issues arising from slow change in the practice of receiving testimony.37 
Casmore, Bussey, Davies, Kenan, Maitland Morgan, Hoyano, Cooper and Roberts deal with 
those issues around a failure to develop best practice through adherence to the principle 
of orality.38 Similarly Hamlyn, Phelps, Turtle, Satter, Henderson and Lamb identify matters 
associated with case progression linked to orality.39 
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Ellison continues to refine those issues linked to orality and communication in the modern 
practice of receipt of testimony.40 Morrison , Forester-Jones , Bradshaw , Murphy and 
Myers, continue the review of orality as a means of communication for testimony.41 
 
Considering the issues in relation to expert evidence the contribution falls within process 
considered by Downes, Edmond, Roberts and Genn.42 
  
A focus on the plight of the vulnerable around orality is considered by Plotnikoff, 
Woolfson, Spencer, Stevenson, Sood and Tempkin43 and the contribution ties with this 
area of developing practice and process. 
 
Whilst the official documents referred to in the integrated review have a link with the 
impact of adversarialism those key to the modern litigation landscape demonstrating the 
contribution falls within the conversation surrounding practice and procedure can be seen 
in Lords Woof and Jackson reports44 in terms of civil matters. The development of an on-
line court links closely with the contribution of this thesis in highlighting the constraints 
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around orality.45 In the criminal domain the conversation started by the Pigot report46 links 
with the contribution on the issues arising from the constraints of orality in criminal trials. 
 
In developing this thesis the tutor advice from the outset was to draw upon the preceding 
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CHAPTER 1 - THE RECEIPT OF ORAL TESTIMONY 
 
 
   1.1 Introduction 
 
A crucial element in the story of the development of attitudes towards the English 
adversarial trial system is the traditional view that witnesses lack credibility unless they 
have satisfactorily performed in a live oral rendition of their perception of the events at 
issue in the case: 
 
In an English criminal trial oral evidence is the rule and written evidence the 
exception. Oral evidence comes from the witnesses who are called by each side, so 
that a witness is either for the prosecution or for the defence. The judge has an 
inherent power to call the witness but it is virtually never exercised. All oral evidence 
is given by means of interrogation in public: the witness may sometimes be 
encouraged to 'tell my lord and the jury in your own words' but any attempt at a 
speech is at once curbed.47  
 
The perception that oral testimony is to be preferred is considered throughout and in 
particular in Chapters 4 and 5, when the necessity of modification in criminal trials is 
interrogated.  The question is whether the whole idea of receiving and placing reliance on 
the testimony of a witness through the medium of the traditional Anglo-American trial 
system is misconceived. While numerous modifications of the system are a vital and 
invaluable step towards achieving a more appropriate forum for the receipt of evidence, 
firmly embedded perceptions of the need to ‘test’ witness evidence by this means are a 
cause for debate in achieving progress towards better trial outcomes. This chapter 
demonstrates how the principle of orality gained its pre-eminence in the Anglo-American 
trial system and supports the theory that, rather than being developed as the best tool by 
which the truth can be sought, simply evolved and became the accepted modus operandi. 
The premise of this chapter is to open the debate that, rather than being the best model 
 
 





for all circumstances, the principle of orality became embedded both systematically and 
psychologically as the means by which we ‘test’ the evidence in the adversarial trial system. 
 
The tensions between a traditional adversarial system of justice and a more inquisitorial 
system have resulted in a blending of approaches and the extent to which this has 
produced a properly constructed system of justice is analysed. The issues arising from the 
law of evidence add to the blending of the adversarial and inquisitorial and the continued 
modification of the principle of orality is considered. The matters raised at the outset of 
this thesis set the framework for discussion of a more radical departure from the principle 
of orality as the starting point from which a system of justice should continue to be 
constructed rather than to evolve. The framework of the thesis develops the argument 
and addresses the research questions by considering the following: 
 
1. What is the principle of orality, and how did it develop from a historical context? 
2. What is the effect of the principle of orality in the perception of the English 
adversarial trial system?  
3. Why is its pre-eminence as a starting point for the receipt of evidence so readily 
acknowledged? 
4. The litigious landscape is divided into the civil and criminal forums with very 
different procedural and evidential rules. However, has the principle of orality 
had an impact on reform in both?  
5. Has the drive towards costs limitations clouded a real analysis of the 
appropriateness of using hybrid methods derived from the principle of orality as 
opposed to more appropriate modern means of enquiry? 
6. Given the link between civil and criminal procedural reform, what impact has an 
adherence to the principle of orality had on achieving reform for the most 








1.2 The Principle of Orality in the English Trial 
 
The principle of orality has been pivotal in shaping the rules of trial procedure as they 
developed from common law rules to more formalised procedural rules now set out both 
in the civil and criminal procedure rules.48 It is important to underline that those rules have 
reached their current format through development in the context of an adversarial trial 
system. Historically the giving of direct testimony orally developed through, and lay at the 
foundation of, the common law trial. This means that as a norm witnesses of fact (as 
distinct from those witnesses, such as experts, providing the court with an opinion) should 
personally attend to speak rather than have their evidence received in written format. The 
assumption that this technique offers a credible means of fact-finding is to a large extent 
accepted owing to its historical roots with a large and complex body of rules developed to 
bolster both credibility and reliability within this trial system:  
 
After the Norman conquest, Henry II regularised these nascent proceedings to 
establish greater control over the administration of justice, first in civil trials and 
then in criminal trials. Similarly, the "petit" jury was first essentially a body of 
witnesses, called for their knowledge of local customs or of the parties or facts in 
dispute.49  
 
A witness of fact is called to give an account of those matters in respect of which the 
witness claims direct personal knowledge (often referred to as an eye witness). Reliance 
in testing the eye witness is placed on the opportunity to observe the demeanour of the 
witness and the assuredness with which answers are given to determine the extent to 
which the testimony carries weight in the fact-finding process. The persuasive quality of 
the evidence is thought to be demonstrated by that witness ‘speaking up’.  The unreliability 
inherent in a fact-finding exercise based on the opportunity to observe the demeanour of 
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a witness, rather than to evaluate evidence in a documentary form, is acknowledged by 
academics and judiciary alike: 
 
A witness who gives evidence orally demonstrates, for good or ill, more about his or 
her credibility than a witness whose evidence is given in documentary form. Oral 
evidence is public; written evidence may not be. Oral evidence gives to the trial the 
atmosphere which, though intangible, is often critical to the jury’s estimate of the 
witnesses. By generally restricting the jury to consideration of testimonial evidence 
of its oral form, is thought that the jury’s discussion of the case in the jury room will 
be more open, the exchange of views among jurors will more easily occur than if the 
evidence were given in writing or the jurors were each armed with a written 
transcript of the evidence.50 
 
As to the fact finders, they are most likely to use inferential reasoning to supplement 
the evidence in the case and fill the gaps in it, which may involve the creation of non-
existent facts. Finally, there are the witnesses who, if not telling the truth, will either 
be lying or mistaken. As to the mistakes, there is obviously scope for error, not only 
in their observation of events, but also in their memory of it and in their recounting 
of those events in court. There is also the risk that witnesses may give truthful but 
unreliable evidence of facts which may have been created by parties involved in the 
legal process, a classic example being evidence of false confession produced during 
the interrogation of the suspect.51 
 
Clearly, a great deal of credence is placed on the principle of orality as the ‘centrepiece of 
the adversarial system’.52 Much emphasis is placed on the value of hearing what a witness 
has to say based on that witness’s own perception of events. To evaluate what a witness 
has to say based on the witness’s direct knowledge of events is seen as intrinsically 
superior to comparable evidence produced and evaluated in a documentary form such as 
 
 
50 Butera v DPP [1987] 164 C.L.R. 180 at 189 
51 Keane A, The Modern Law of Evidence, 11th ed., OUP, 2016 




a formal witness statement or affidavit. However, witness statements have now replaced 
direct oral testimony in many situations, this the result of questions being posed as to the 
suitability and necessity of live oral testimony. Perhaps a better approach would be to start 
afresh. Rather than always taking procedure from a modification of the principle that all 
evidence should be delivered from live oral testimony and instead taking a fresh approach 
to achieving the best method of enquiry into those facts remaining in issue at the start of 
the trial.  A reconsideration of the procedure for the receipt of live oral testimony first 
arose in a fundamental re-evaluation of the litigation process in civil procedure by Lord 
Woolf and became known as the ‘Woolf Reforms’.53 The impact of those reforms on the 
continuing evolution of the principle of orality will be considered further in Chapter 2.  
 
Despite the reforms, the principle of orality remains the starting point from which all other 
methods for the receipt of evidence are derived. This thesis will evaluate the rationale for 
this bedrock of the adversarial trial system and seek to formulate a rationale for its 
continuance together with suggesting how its reform may be addressed. Any debate 
should acknowledge the undoubted values of such a long established and tested 
systematic approach provided by a system in which most issues at a trial are decided based 
on what a witness has to say.  This means of determining the truth is long established but 
ought to continue based on its value in bringing about the best result rather than it merely 
being the accepted norm. 
 
The premise of the traditional Anglo-American adversarial trial is that the testing of direct 
testimony from an eye witness should be conducted under prescribed conditions. While 
forums vary in style dependent on the nature of the proceedings, trials share a level of 
austerity and formality designed to place the witness in circumstances in which the 
heightened obligation to speak the truth is very much apparent. This is a process of testing 
the strength of the evidence, which is seen as of greater value in ascertaining the truth 
than to evaluate the same evidence contained in documentary format. This idea of a dread 
 
 





of manufactured evidence is acknowledged in the evolution of testing the witness in a live 
forum: 
 
The common law lived in constant fear of the perjury, fabrication and attempts to 
abuse or pervert the course of justice.54 
 
As part of this process each side will adduce its evidence.  Each witness undergoes a highly 
regulated form of questioning following the sequence examination-in-chief; cross-
examination and re-examination. Through examination-in-chief the party who called a 
witness seeks to draw from that witness evidence to support that party’s case. In criminal 
cases, while the witness will have prepared an earlier statement, the examiner may 
question beyond its scope. While in civil cases, dependent on the appropriate case 
management for the particular cause of action, the witness normally refers to an earlier 
witness statement, following which the witness is tended for the opposing party to 
conduct cross-examination.  
 
This is the stage of testing of the evidence during which the principle of orality is most 
apparent. The opposing party asks testing questions to probe the accuracy and veracity of 
the witness’s answers during examination-in-chief. The cross-examiner also attempts to 
obtain facts relevant and favourable to the cross-examining party. The premise of this 
system is that by subjecting the witness to a process of scrutiny, through examination-in-
chief and cross-examination, the court is more likely to receive an accurate version of 
events than by other means of enquiry. It is this concept more than any other which causes 
us to consider our trial system to be adversarial in nature. That is not to suggest a lack of 
acknowledgement of its flaws or unquestioning acceptance of this model as the most 
appropriate in all circumstances. There are numerous variants of the system but the 
common elements, most notably the principle of orality and associated techniques of 
questioning, result in a system of truth and fact-finding largely set within its confines. It is 
 
 




seen as the ‘centrepiece’55 and a system of interrogation is acknowledged as important in 
constructing a version of events: 
 
interrogation is used not only to unlock factual information that the suspect already 
has, but also in a creative way to bring facts into existence in the form of admissions 
produced and structured by the form and manner of questioning.56 
 
Even though the principle of orality prevails in both civil and criminal trials it is undoubtedly 
considered of great importance that members of the jury are given the opportunity to 
evaluate the witnesses’ certainty and robustness while providing a live oral account under 
oath. This inevitably results in the possibility that collateral matters will come to bear on 
the process of evaluation. Collateral matters, often referred to as side issues, are those 
considerations likely to have a considerable influence on the mind of the average juror. 
Collateral issues are not the live issues lying at the heart of the case but important in that 
they affect the credibility of the witness:  
 
If the answer of a witness is a matter which you would be allowed on your own part 
to prove in evidence. If it has such connection with the issues, that you would be 
allowed to give it in evidence, then it is a matter on which you may contradict him.57  
 
Such collateral issues include witness bias,58 bad character59 (normally the existence of a 
previous conviction relevant to the matter in hand) and physical or mental disability 
affecting the ability of the witness to give reliable evidence: 
 
Human evidence … is subject to many crosscurrents such as partiality, prejudice self-
interest and above all imagination and accuracy. These are matters in which the jury, 
helped by cross examination and common sense, must do their best. But when a 
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witness through physical (which I include mental) disease or abnormality is not 
capable of giving a true or reliable account for the jury, it must surely be allowable 
for medical science to reveal this vital hidden factor to them.60 
 
It follows from this that the principle of orality is not only considered pivotal as a means of 
addressing the issues at hand in a trial but also in evaluating the reliability of the witness 
by means of scrutiny in the presence of the jury. Given jury trials occur in very few civil 
matters this consideration is primarily confined to those matters being tried in a Crown 
Court before a judge and jury. Lord Devlin was erudite on this aspect of the principle of 
orality and its importance in jury trials. The views expressed by Lord Devlin helped to shape 
attitudes towards the system of adversarial trials. Previously accepted and entrenched 
approaches towards a system of fact finding were opened to debate and the possibility of 
more significant reform: 
 
Devlin was a man of the utmost compassion. His much quoted remark ‘Trial by jury 
is the lamp that shows that freedom lives', given in the 1956 Hamlyn Lectures, could 
easily be amended with the substitution of ‘Devlin’ for the word ‘jury’.61 
 
However, on considering the historical justification for the principle of orality as the 
starting point in all trials, not just criminal matters presided over by judge and jury, it is 
right to question its appropriateness in a modern trial system. Lord Devlin acknowledges 
the emergence of the principle of orality from a historical context: 
 
 If today twelve men and women were put into a committee room and told they must 
listen to the evidence and find the facts, they would call for pen and paper, make 
careful notes and some at least of them would want to take a vigorous part in 
questioning the witnesses; they would ask for copies of the depositions and all of the 
documents produced in the case. But trial by jury did not grow up in that atmosphere. 
The parts to be played in it by judge and jury were being worked out when 
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documentary evidence was slight, duplication of documents laborious and a juror’s 
powers of reading and writing very limited. In 1790 in a case where there was a 
question of disputed handwriting, the judge refused to admit evidence the 
comparison of hand; for if he did, he said, the situation of a jury which could neither 
read nor write would be impossible.62 
 
So it is that the jury evolved into its modern incarnation, rather than having been 
constructed to suit the circumstances and venues of a modern age. A feature of the 
adversarial trial is that the jury is left incommunicado to evaluate all the evidence that has 
been presented together with the judicial directions given on matters of law. The principle 
of orality plays a very powerful role in jury deliberations and is most important in criminal 
trials. This is demonstrated by comparison against a significant relaxation of the role of the 
witness giving live oral testimony in the modification found in the civil procedure rules, 
which will be considered further in Chapter 2.  While magistrates differ from juries in terms 
of composition and regulatory control, the fundamental idea that lay members of 
magistrates’ benches require an evaluation of live oral testimony from a witness giving a 
first-hand account of matters they have perceived prevails. This thesis also analyses and 
evaluates the use of live oral testimony in civil proceedings from which the evolution of 
the principle of orality can be seen to have taken a very different course.63 Common to 
both criminal and civil cases is that the principle of orality is the starting point for all 
adversarial proceedings. All reforms and modifications can be traced back to the principle 
of orality. 
 
The role of the jury in the Crown Court sheds a great deal of light on an understanding of 
the importance of direct oral testimony within the adversarial trial system. The 
development of the English jury spanned centuries. Their origins can be traced to Norman 
times. While the modern jury plainly differs in terms of its composition and role from that 
of the historical jury, it is enlightening to appreciate that the legislature or formal 
committee did not create the jury. Rather, it evolved, thereby leading to societal 
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acceptance of its value.64 The importance of the role of the jury in assessing the value to 
give to any evidence, primarily based on the testing of that evidence, by placing the witness 
at the centre of the trial to be questioned can be summed up as follows:  
 
Whether a rope will bear a certain weight and take a certain strain is a question that 
practical men often have to determine by using their judgement based on their 
experience. But they base their judgement on the assumption the rope is what it 
seems to the eye to be and has no concealed defects. It is the business of the 
manufacturer of the rope to test it, strand by strand if necessary, before he sends it 
out to see that it has no flaw; that is a job for an expert. It is the business of the judge 
as the expert who has a mind trained to make examinations of the sort to test the 
chain of evidence for the weak links before he sends it out the jury; in other words, 
it is for him to ascertain whether it has any reliable strength at all and then for the 
jury to determine how strong it is.65 
 
So it is that the role of the jury has grown into its modern form from its historical context. 
However, the jury was created for a very different purpose in allowing the king in Norman 
times to take an oath to serve the crown and so it is from this starting point that the taker 
of the oath could be relied upon as a person of veracity. This then developed into 
something more akin to the modern jury:  
 
It was King Henry II who was directly responsible for turning the jury into an 
instrument for doing justice and Pope Innocent III who was indirectly responsible for 
its development as a peculiarly English institution. Henry II understood well the 
importance of extending the royal jurisdiction as a means of enlarging the royal 
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The place of the principle of orality within the English criminal trial system appears assured. 
The question is whether it may, in certain categories of proceedings, be preferable to start 
with a clean slate allowing for a different procedure, rather than continue to modify the 
principle of orality. Its historical tradition and acceptance as the pre-eminent means of 
ascertaining the truth, insofar as that is possible to determine by any means, is unlikely to 
face radical reform. However, to achieve a fair trial significant modifications have been 
introduced. In civil matters, while the principle of orality has not been abandoned, it has 
been modified to a great extent.  
 
 
1.3 Adversarial v Inquisitorial 
 
There are numerous different trial systems throughout the world and society seeks from 
these various methods to draw the most accurate version of the truth from which to reach 
a decision. In Western society two strands have grown up, the adversarial system 
(traditional Anglo-American trial system) and the inquisitorial system. The latter seeks to 
enquire into the truth and places less reliance on the principle of orality.67 The word 
adversarial denotes adversary and links to the idea of a fight between opposing 
contestants rather than what may be considered a more civilised enquiry. It is far from 
clear that the adversarial system, as opposed to the inquisitorial system, provides a model 
most appropriate for fact finding. Continental Europe favours the inquisitorial model and 
certainly some of its structures and processes have found their way into the modified 
adversarial trial system in England. This is most notable in civil procedure but has also 
resulted in significant modification of the criminal trial process. The adversarial trial system 
is an Anglo-American model and assumes a ‘contest’ between opposing parties. In both 
civil and criminal litigation, there has been a move towards a ‘cards on the table’ approach 
to the litigation process. Modern procedures drive towards an open and fair system of 
advance disclosure and as such there should no longer be ‘trial by ambush’. The question 
to consider is how far modern reforms have moved our system towards an inquisitorial 
 
 




system and whether further reform is necessary. In civil proceedings this has been drawn 
from the findings of Lord Woolf68 and in criminal proceedings perhaps most importantly 
from the seminal report of Judge T. Pigot.69 The Pigot report considered the importance of 
reviewing the principle of orality in criminal proceedings to allow for a fairer system for 
the receipt of evidence from certain categories of witness. This compelling driver for 
change in criminal proceedings will be considered further in Chapter 4. 
 
To evaluate the adversarial trial system it is important to understand its structure. The first 
task of the prosecution in a criminal trial is to adduce sufficient evidence to persuade the 
judge that there is a case to answer. The prosecution will call their witnesses for 
examination-in-chief. As for all parties in litigation, the prosecution as the party calling a 
witness is not permitted to ask leading questions. Cross-examination will follow the 
witness’s evidence-in-chief. The cross-examiner will carefully pick through the testimony 
which the witness has given in evidence-in-chief, since it is assumed that a party who fails 
to dispute a fact in cross-examination has accepted the facts relayed by the witness under 
examination-in-chief. In contrast to the party calling the witness, the cross-examiner may 
use leading questions in an apparent attempt to persuade the witness that he or she is 
either lying or is mistaken. To discredit the testimony, the cross-examiner may also attack 
the character of the witness. Following cross-examination the prosecutor will have an 
opportunity to re-examine the witness. Re-examination will be used to emphasise the 
evidence given and to restore the credibility of the witness if damaged in 
cross-examination.  Once the prosecution has presented sufficient evidence to persuade 
the trial judge that there is a case to answer, the prosecution case is closed and it is not 
normally permissible for the prosecutor to introduce any further evidence. At the end of 
the prosecution case the defence may submit that there is ‘no case to answer’ if there 





68 Access to Justice, Lord Woolf, Master of the Rolls Final Report 1996 
69 Pigot, Judge T Report of the Advisory Group on Video Evidence HMSO 1989 




In determining whether the prosecution has satisfactorily met the requirements for a case 
to answer, the following matters will be considered: 
 
1. There has been evidence to prove the essential elements of the alleged offence, 
and 
2. The prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, is such that a conviction could 
properly be based upon it.71 
 
A similar pattern is adopted in civil trials, with the party bringing the case presenting its 
evidence during the first phase of the trial. The modifications of the civil trial process by 
comparison with the criminal process will be considered in more depth in Chapter 2. 
The defence may then present its evidence (this applies equally in civil matters). The 
defendant in a criminal trial must at this stage decide whether to testify in person. Section 
35 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 provides that inferences may be drawn 
from the failure of the accused to give evidence or if he, without good cause, refuses to 
answer questions. 
 
However, it should be underlined that it is also possible that defence evidence may serve 
to strengthen the prosecution case (or the claimant’s case in a civil matter). Where a 
defendant, or indeed any witness, presents testimony it is evidence for all purposes, and 
not just to support the case of the examiner. For example, a defence witness may admit 
under cross-examination that he fabricated evidence to assist the defence, or any defence 
witness may make damaging admissions while being cross-examined. These characteristics 
point towards an acknowledgement that the English trial system is adversarial in nature. 
Where an inquisitorial style is in play, rather than establishing a particular issue from the 
point of view of one or the other ‘adversaries’, a more neutral enquiry is undertaken.72 
  
An essential feature of the English trial system is judicial control. The judge, within a 
regulated structure, controls matters of admissibility and decides which witnesses may 
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testify and how they may testify. The evidence, including any confession by the accused, 
may be excluded because of some improprieties in how it was obtained, as with all issues 
of admissibility that is a matter of law for the judge to determine. 
 
Before the jury determines the issues, the trial judge must sum up the case. The judge 
must direct the jury on the relevant substantive law and remind jurors of the evidence that 
has been given and explain several evidential matters. A typical direction will begin with 
an explanation as to which side bears the burden of proof and against what standard those 
elements will need to be proved. The judge will generally take the jury through the 
evidence and, importantly, point out any defence which the evidence discloses. The judge 
sums up and then it is left to the jury to decide the facts. In civil cases it is for the judge to 
determine matters of law that arise during the proceedings on hearing submissions from 
the opposing parties. 
 
At the end of the trial, the jury will deliver its verdict, which, unlike many inquisitorial 
systems, need not be accompanied by reasons. In law, the term ‘not guilty’ carries a 
specific legal meaning and essentially means that the prosecution has failed to discharge 
the burden of proof. Similarly, in a civil trial the judge will determine the case having drawn 
conclusions on the factual evidence, combined with a determination of points of law.73 
 
What is it that makes us more likely to believe a version of events? Answering this question 
helps to evaluate the efficacy of the adversarial trial system as opposed to the inquisitorial 
method. The manner of questioning and the skill of the advocate is clearly intrinsic to the 
outcome of the adversarial trial. Whether or not a skilled advocate opposing an 
unrepresented defendant or a litigant in person in civil proceedings, really assists in finding 
the truth is highly questionable. The skilled advocate may win the case, but this in itself 
does not ensure any accuracy in terms of finding the best version of the truth. The 
adversarial system is such that the advocate is concerned only with persuading the court 
 
 





to a particular view rather than having a neutral role in providing information leading to 
the truth. 
 
Clearly, the robustness of the witnesses plays an important part in the outcome of the 
adversarial trial. Is a timid, slightly nervous witness, in reality, any less likely to provide an 
accurate account and to what extent should the demeanour of a witness be a key focus? 
By comparison, the inquisitorial system places less reliance on the performance of the 
witness than the enquiry into the quality of the evidence taken as a whole.  
 
The opposing parties in the adversarial system enjoy almost complete autonomy in 
controlling the information brought before the court. It is a matter for the parties in the 
adversarial trial system to decide on the evidence to present and which witnesses to call. 
A basic premise of a system in which the parties control the evidence brought for the 
court’s consideration is that the witnesses rarely have free reign to give their own versions 
of events to the court. Rather the advocate controls the questions that are asked, and a 
witness may not be given any opportunity to tell the court the version of the events they 
would wish to have heard. Witnesses have no separate legal representation and are 
entirely at the control of the questioner. Given advocates are pursuing the goals of those 
who instruct them rather than assisting the fact-finding process from a neutral stance can 
it really be argued that the most appropriate and relevant information will be uncovered? 
Of course, the importance of the role of the judge in trial outcomes should not be 
underestimated having regard to the influence of the summing up together with judicial 
directions and findings impacting significantly on the outcome. But a system in which all 
the public officials are independent and focused on seeking the truth, places even more 
emphasis on enquiry rather than a contest.    
 
The rules of evidence govern all aspects of the adversarial trial from procedure to content. 







1.4 Perceptions of the Traditional Trial  
 
Logic dictates that absolute certainty of the truth cannot be found through any system, 
whether adversarial or inquisitorial. Enhancing procedural fairness is always a question of 
appropriate compromise. The best that can be sought is a court process that is accepted 
as legitimate in being an acceptable version of the truth acquired from a reconstruction of 
past events. But it is important to review and challenge any assumptions about how that 
challenge is approached, if the legitimacy of current practices is to be argued. 
 
Receipt of live oral testimony, the principle of orality, is perceived as the most compelling 
means by which the reconstruction of past events has occurred in the traditional Anglo-
American adversarial trial system.74 While other forms of evidence are received, 
particularly within the system of the jury trial, hearing what eyewitnesses have to say and 
assessing the testing of that recollection is key to evaluating a version of events which 
amounts to the closest approximation of the truth. It is clearly important in such a system 
that the evidence presented by the party wishing to reconstruct past events to support its 
contention on those matters in issue is as persuasive as possible. A particular level of 
probity will be essential for the party required to discharge the requisite standard of proof. 
The burden of proof falls to be discharged in accordance with the rules applying to any 
given hearing and varies in terms of its standard. This is dependant on the nature of the 
matters in issue and the party required to adduce evidence in respect of any particular 
issue. This burden is at its highest in a criminal trial, and that upmost standard applies only 
to the prosecution. The obligation placed on the prosecution in a criminal trial relates to 
the issue of an accused’s guilt and is set at ‘beyond reasonable doubt’. This is also 
expressed as being ‘satisfied so that you feel sure’ and is set out in the formula suggested 
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If a jury is told that it is their duty to regard the evidence and see that it satisfies them 
so that they can feel sure when they return a verdict of guilty that is much better 
than using the expression reasonable doubt and I hope in future that will be done. 
 
Whatever the manner in which the jury is directed, whether using the formula ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ or with further elaboration provided through judicial explanation, there 
can be no doubt that the persuasive quality of the evidence presented will be pivotal in 
the process of deliberation undertaken by the triers of fact. It is for this reason that the 
perception of the criminal trial is key to understanding the importance of the principle of 
orality. Once this is understood, the way in which it has evolved and been modified to a 
much greater extent in those venues without a jury can be seen more clearly. Other than 
the requirement for the prosecution to discharge the highest burden on the issue of guilt 
all other burdens, whether arising in civil or criminal proceedings, fall to be discharged 
either on a balance of probabilities are simply on the basis that an issue has been raised 
sufficiently well to warrant consideration. This lower standard is the evidential burden and 
often referred to as ‘the duty of passing the judge’ so that it is only required to be sufficient 
to justify its part in the determination of matters in issue. 
 
What is open to question is the rationale for having the principle of orality as the starting 
point from which all techniques of adducing evidence develop. If other means are an 
equally valid route to the discharging of the burden of proof in any given scenario, why not 
make that procedural approach to the receipt of evidence the starting point? 
 
The answer to the embedding of the principle of orality in the traditional system may 
simply be an acceptance of its prevalence rather than any greater logic based on a modern 
system of justice. For the legal system to be viewed as legitimate, it must be accepted as 
producing fair outcomes by its officials and the society it serves. As such, the public and 
professional perception of what makes a trial a valid process is crucial. The assessing of 
evidence in open court is the means by which we accept a just outcome has been achieved.  
It has become embedded thanks to the influence of popular cultural portrayals of the trial 
process and the resultant ‘big reveal’ of the truth, and has a long history in the UK. The 




consideration of a broad swathe of disciplines not least of which is psychology and 
philosophy as much as matters of black letter law. 
 
Eminent writers on the subject such as Jeremy Bentham76 contributed arguments of 
academic gravitas to the rationale for the adversarial trial system. However, a less weighty, 
but perhaps more accessible, understanding of the perception created in the mind of the 
public by the traditional trial process can be found in the images and messages created 
through the modern media from the late 20th century onwards. An insight into the value 
of the principle of orality in the fact-finding process can be seen in television series, such 
as Crown Court broadcast by Granada Television,77 which ‘gripped daytime television 
audiences’ between 1972 and 1985.78 Predating the subsequent era of so-called reality 
television this series was an early insight into the reality of the traditional Anglo-American 
trial system. Given that no trial proceedings are televised in the UK, and very few members 
of the public have attended a trial, the importance of determining a case based on 
eyewitness evidence is drawn largely from media accounts.  
 
Courtroom dramas have always and continue to play an important role in the public 
perception of the UK trial as a just and appropriate means of truth finding. This relatively 
early drama series sought to portray those proceedings accurately in terms of the receipt 
of evidence and in terms of court procedure and personnel. For more than a decade a large 
audience would follow a Crown Court trial in the fictional Fullchester Crown Court. What 
was so innovative and influential on the minds of the British public was the use of real legal 
professionals in the running of proceedings. The fictional cases used actors, so to that 
extent the case would be scripted. However, the production came as close to a replication 
of the reality of trial procedure as possible, by selecting members of the public to act as 
jurors and in all other respects following correct procedure. As such television audiences 
became familiar with the concept of the principle of orality as the key to determining 
disputed issues of fact. Assessing what is said in live oral testimony and evaluating its 
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strength based on the testing of skilled cross-examination became embedded in the 
perception of the public in the modern media age. The series was hugely popular and 
demonstrated an intense public interest in the human drama played out through court 
proceedings. Very few members of the public will have engaged with real cases, but almost 
every member of the public has engaged with the media portrayal of the Anglo-American 
system of justice. This TV series sought to engage the public with the range of difficult 
social issues requiring determination through the court system. The perception at the start 
of the case would often lead to a plot twist through the unravelling of a witness during the 
course of cross-examination. This portrayal of the principle of orality as the means by 
which the truth can be found may well stem from traditional or historic origins but is 
perpetuated in the modern age through current public perception as to its importance. 
The majority of the public would not consider other means of receipt of evidence to be a 
real trial. This idea of what makes a trial fair and affords a realistic reconstruction of past 
events continues to be reinforced through ever-growing media influence. 
 
The nature of the trial beyond the public perception of its importance is affected by a range 
of other factors. Whether civil or criminal in nature, disputed matters must be resolved 
within a reasonable timeframe and at a predictable expense. The time and cost of 
proceedings have resulted in numerous reforms over the last two decades. While those 
reforms stemmed principally from a desire to make access to justice in civil proceedings 
more affordable, and transparent in terms of procedures, a steady increase can be seen in 
reforms and practice rules relating to criminal procedure to the same ends. The civil 
procedure rules79 have since been followed by those of the criminal procedure.80 The rules 
for criminal procedure are notable in following their civil counterparts to achieve more 
expeditious and economic proceedings. The principle of orality does not lend itself to 
expedition or economy in that the playing out of witness testimony drawn through the 
procedural hurdles associated with the trial process, examination-in-chief, cross-
examination and re-examination, require a great deal of court time and expense in 
engaging legal professionals. This elaborate process remains the cornerstone of the trial 
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system despite undoubted human fallibility in the ability to provide an accurate 
recollection of events. Arguably, in many cases, a document-based system of enquiry 
would be preferable. 
 
Given the importance of the jury in the criminal trial process perhaps the perception of the 
average juror and the role they have to play is of equal importance in understanding the 
prevalence of this system of fact reconstruction. It is clear that a direction on the burden 
of proof, in any forum, but in particular in respect of jury trials is crucial to the proper 
functioning of the system of adversarial justice. It has been suggested that jurors should 
be assessed prior to participating in the trial process to ensure that they are appropriate 
in terms of their capacity to understand the system and reach a decision unaffected by 
bias. A study on this aspect of jury participation suggests that the verdict reached by a jury 
can be significantly impaired by bias.81 
 
This research from Anglia Ruskin University published on predicting verdicts using pre-trial 
attitudes and standard of proof is notably published in the British Psychological Society’s 
Legal and Criminological Psychology journal rather than being research undertaken by 
lawyers. The study concludes that the bias of jurors prior to the trial may significantly affect 
the ultimate verdict. This is irrespective of the evidence in the case and is based on 
preconceived ideas, or prejudices, in the minds of a significant proportion of the public. 
This research tends to suggest that hearing about events from a witness giving a live 
account of events may be less compelling than has previously been perceived and supports 
the view that other means of ascertaining facts in issue have equal, if not greater, value. 
 
The research drew its sample from employees of a company in Cambridge with 118 people 
being used in the survey and having a broad age range of 19 to 63. Those involved in the 
survey were asked to consider a particular scenario relating to a fictitious breaking and 
entry. They were provided only with information relating to the offence itself together 
with case details and a judicial direction relating to the burden of proof. 
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Of interest to the validity of the principle of orality as the means by which verdicts are 
delivered was a finding that pre-existing attitudes affecting the mindset of the juror 
influenced just over a third of verdicts. Given that the traditional adversarial trial uses 
direct oral testimony as its bedrock, the study questions the validity of the principle of 
orality as the means by which verdicts are reached. If as many as a third of verdicts are to 
some extent preconceived and influenced by pre-existing prejudice, rather than the 
evidence, the value of listening to eyewitness accounts and testing those accounts through 
the formal constraints of adversarial questioning may be flawed to a more significant 
extent than would be imagined by the vast majority of those considering trial, in its 
traditional sense, a valid means of reaching a decision. 
 
The study suggests a means by which this can be tackled would be pre-trial questionnaires 
to assess the extent to which jurors are capable of properly participating in the trial 
process. 
The jury system in the UK works well, and most of the time the verdict is the right one, but    
inevitably when dealing with human beings, there will be extra-evidential factors that 
affect jurors’ decisions.82 
While the study was undertaken by psychologists, it was reported to practicing lawyers in 
the widely read practice publication ‘The Law Society Gazette’.83 Comments reported from 
readers in the publication reflect opinions of practicing solicitors:  
Dr Lundrigan is of course right but that does not necessarily undermine the value of 
the verdict, nor does it necessarily work against the Defendant. One should not 
forget the affect that juries had in the abolition of the death penalty in the UK. Juries 
rightly reflect attitudes of the public.  
As for the notion of beyond reasonable doubt, that is a very legalistic notion that lay 








concept than Lay Magistrates. Few of them understand what it means and even 
fewer apply it. They are much more likely to find guilt in the face of reasonable doubt 
than any juror and they really ought to know better. Perhaps that is where Dr 
Lundrigan should be focusing her attention. 
An enlightening insight into the view taken by those in everyday legal practice towards the 
value of academic research is also available in response to the study: 
Also, this is not a matter for academics I am afraid, it should be left to practitioners. 
The world they each live in are diametrically opposed. 
Perceptions of both the trial process and its participants will remain the subject of 
continuing debate and affect attitudes towards reform of this traditional system. 
 
1.5 The Law of Evidence 
Many students of the system of litigation, whether civil or criminal, find the rules governing 
procedure complex but none so perplexing as the rules of evidence. Those engaged in 
navigating a transactional system of litigation rarely question the need for the law of 
evidence with its artificial network of rules limiting that which may be considered by the 
court and the procedure by which it will be brought before the court. The rules of evidence 
grew owing to the nature of the adversarial trial system and are far more relaxed in 
inquisitorial systems. Given the parties drive the proceedings within an adversarial 
framework (courts do not initiate any procedure of their own volition), it is seen as 
necessary to have rules restricting the material upon which reliance is placed to prove a 
disputed issue. Historically it has been argued that all information relevant to the case 
ought to be placed before the court for consideration without restraint.84 Modern 
requirements of the right to a fair trial set out in the European Convention on Human 
Rights and enacted in the Human Rights Act 1998 ensure the continuing development of 
 
 




rules to protect the accused and to limit that which the prosecution may adduce to 
discharge the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt.  
It follows that the rules of evidence applicable within civil proceedings are generally more 
inclusionary in nature, whereas those seen in the system of criminal justice tend towards 
being exclusionary. Even in respect of evidence satisfying the rules of admissibility within 
criminal proceedings, it is always possible to argue that the inclusion of a particular piece 
of information is unfair. This is set in section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984 which provides: 
(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the 
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having 
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the 
evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an 
adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to 
admit it. 
(2) Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude   
evidence. 
 
Notably, this provision relates to prosecution evidence only. Given the burden placed on 
the prosecution to adduce evidence at the highest level, to prove guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt, the requirement to demonstrate procedural fairness provides part of the 
explanation for the continued development of evidential rules; this limits that which may 
be considered by the triers of fact in criminal proceedings. This idea of an exclusionary 
discretion has developed alongside the principle of orality so that the way in which a story 
is told differs to a very great extent by comparison with the way the veracity of an account 
is assessed in everyday life in the absence of these restraints. When deciding what to 
believe in any other context, account is taken of everything available that is of relevance 
on the issue. The media does not restrict itself in the way that the courts do, and neither 
do individuals when drawing conclusions based on all the available information. The 
principle of orality provides for the controlled receipt of oral testimony tied up in a web of 




principle of orality without a clear understanding of the rules of evidence applicable in 
both civil and criminal proceedings. Many of those rules are important in a movement 
towards reform. However, the way in which rules central to the receipt of evidence have 
developed differently in the civil and criminal systems explains the much greater erosion 
of the principle in civil cases. Criminal procedure has frequently developed to follow 
reform tested initially within the civil context and an analysis of the importance of the huge 
movement towards reform started by the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules85 in 
1998.  Civil procedures will be considered in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
 
While numerous rules of evidence have an impact on the principle of orality, the rules 
relating to hearsay evidence are particularly important. No other rule of evidence restricts 
to any greater extent that which may be said or written by witnesses in the course of 
providing direct testimony. The rule against hearsay goes to the heart of the principle of 
orality in that the witness giving evidence by means of a factual account must limit that 
account to their own eyewitness perception unless the hearsay rules permit reference 
back to a previous out-of-court statement. The erosion of the principle of orality appears 
to track the reduction in formality associated with the use of hearsay evidence.  
 
A relaxation of the hearsay rule first started in civil proceedings86 and is currently reflected 
in the Civil Evidence Act 1995. The rule against hearsay applies to the use of anything said 
or written outside court to prove the matters stated. The existence of the hearsay rule 
links closely with the principle of orality in that all the evidence falling to be assessed by 
the court must come from that which is brought to the court from a first-hand eyewitness 
account. Once the rule against hearsay became eroded so did the necessity of receiving 
evidence from a live oral account. The extent to which the rule has been eroded within 
civil proceedings demonstrates the effect of a movement towards the receipt of 
documentary evidence, in common with more inquisitorial systems of justice, on the 
principle of orality. The Civil Evidence Act 1995 specifies that evidence shall not be 
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excluded on the grounds that it is hearsay and simply prescribes procedural requirements 
to ensure a fair balance between the parties within a civil dispute.87  
 
In criminal proceedings, the rules governing the receipt of hearsay now follow a pattern 
once applicable in civil proceedings under earlier legislation88 and are set out in the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003.89 However, these provisions went further than ever before in 
criminal litigation. Not only were specific criteria set for the admission of hearsay evidence 
but for the first time a general interests of justice provision was formulated, for the 
introduction of hearsay in addition to the other provisions set out for the receipt of hearsay 
within the legislation.90 Even with the very considerable reform of the hearsay rule, its 
existence places a barrier to the witness giving evidence and preserves the need for direct 
oral testimony given live before the court, with all that is inherent within that process. A 
particularly important consequence of the rule against hearsay is the effect it has on 
vulnerable and intimidated witnesses, who would benefit greatly from receipt of their 
evidence in a hearsay format and thus avoid the trauma of exposure to the court room. 
The necessity to re-evaluate the faith placed in receipt of testimony from a witness by 
presenting it live to the court has been questioned over a number of decades and resulted 
in very significant reform to the principle of orality. The most difficulty experienced in 
coping with open court as a forum for providing evidence is those who are young, 
vulnerable and possibly intimidated. This will be considered as one of the most important 
and compelling arguments relating to the reform and re-evaluation of the principle of 
orality as a starting point for the consideration of evidence, in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
The rules of evidence provide important controls relating to the nature of questioning and 
techniques of advocacy. The dominance of the advocates within the traditional trial system 
results in a suppression of the ability of witnesses to give their own account. Rather, the 
principle of orality results in a very artificial, highly controlled, version of the evidence and 
is arguably not the best means by which witnesses can most effectively tell the truth. 
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Regulating witnesses through the rules of evidence in this way results in the account given 
being selective rather than a warts and all version. The witness is the source of the 
information upon which a decision is based yet the account given is artificially controlled 
and tested in such a way such that the full story can often not be told.  
Evidence must always be relevant to be admissible, however, owing to the rules of 
admissibility, much relevant evidence will find itself excluded. Relevant evidence is that 
which is either probative or disapprobative of some matter which requires proof.91 Given 
that the rules of evidence exclude relevant evidence on the ground of some technical or 
discretionary basis, it is arguably a significant restriction on the possibility of giving an 
accurate account, which is sufficiently complete to allow for a fair decision. As eyewitness 
recollection is so inherently fallible, to further restrict the circumstances and completeness 
of the recollection by reliance on the principle of orality as the main means by which that 
recollection is given must be open to criticism. Numerous academic writers have 
questioned the ability of live oral testimony to correspond with past reality. This has given 
rise to considerable scepticism in the current system of construction of knowledge from 
artificially structured questioning about past events: 
 
the correspondence theory, which aspires to a faithful present application of a past 
reality, promises a goal that remains permanently illusive. At all stages of the legal 
process the necessary conditions provide scope for error in fact finding. In 
consequence, for the purposes of use in a practical but imperfect world, the 
correspondence theory has had to settle for the truth of past events to be treated as 
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Arguably the formulaic approach to the receipt of testimony is open to question on 
numerous grounds. The real justification for an adversarial approach has been questioned, 
and considerable movement towards a more inquisitorial approach has taken place. 
However, for all the reforms seen in both civil and criminal procedure, the starting point 
remains the principle of orality. None of the various reforms across a broad spectrum of 
procedures within the system of adversarial litigation abandons the established approach 
to truth finding entirely. The receipt of first-hand accounts is still the means by which most 
disputes are resolved. Walk into any magistrates’ or county court trial on any day and the 
overwhelming importance of the credibility and persuasive quality of what witnesses have 
to say is apparent.  
 
The real issue is whether this would remain so if the system were to be reconstructed 
without constraint. From the outset, the argument for a review of the appropriateness of 
systems for the receipt of testimony spans both civil and criminal litigation. Currently, 
reforms focus on correction of flaws to enable the flow of proceedings in particular 
circumstances rather than addressing the more fundamental issue of the suitability of the 
process and whether, if starting with a clean sheet, the way forward would be a modified 











There is a tendency in discussions of fairness in trial procedures to focus on the world of 
criminal litigation. That is not to say that civil litigation has been ignored in the very 
considerable era of litigation reform during the early part of the 21st century, but, the 
thrust of that reform has focused on achieving costs savings and optimising efficiency, with 
little attention paid to the place of the principle of orality from the perspective of the 
witness experience. However, much of the fundamental reform of the system of civil 
litigation brought about by the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules 199893 has crept 
into criminal litigation. Any evaluation of the place of the principle of orality within the 
modern litigious environment must consider the development of the system of civil justice 
in order to consider the appropriateness and likely direction of future trial procedures 
properly. Reform established within civil procedure may migrate to criminal litigation 
(considered below). However, the starting point is modification rather than structural 
reform.  
 
This chapter focuses on the current place and of orality in civil litigation, both officially but 
also via its embedding into the training, experiences and, thereby, assumptions and norms 
of the legal profession. This understanding is essential to provide the necessary grounding, 
on which to base more detailed analytical content on that appropriateness of its role and 
a comparison with criminal litigation. Review and analysis of trial procedures across both 
civil and criminal litigation is considered in the context of expert opinion evidence in the 












2.2 The Civil Trial Procedure Prior to the Woolf Reforms 
 
Lord Woolf’s ground breaking report, Access to Justice,94 brought about a permanent 
change to the landscape of civil litigation. The civil procedure rules brought those changes 
into the system and came into operation on 26 April 1999. In order to understand the need 
for such radical reform, consideration of procedure, and in particular the place of the 
principle of orality within civil trials, is required. 
 
As a civil litigator able to remember the era of writs, plaintiffs, interrogatories, discovery, 
pleadings and most importantly the need for sworn evidence in the form of affidavits, for 
even the most straightforward case of modest value, it came as no surprise that such 
radical reform was eventually brought into operation. As an articled clerk new to litigation 
in 1986 being asked by a principal (at that time the system of training solicitors required 
articles of clerkship with a senior solicitor acting in a supervisory capacity as a principal) to 
prepare a note for a client bemused by the system of civil litigation, it was apparent the 
system needed reform.  
 
In particular, there was a need to explain the protracted and costly nature of proceedings. 
Cases in the civil courts were run almost entirely by the parties themselves, rather than 
being closely managed and monitored by the court. This had long been the accepted norm 
and, while hard to explain to the client looking for a solution to a dispute, was largely 
accepted by the world of legal practice. Nothing in civil litigation training at the time 
suggested anything other than a grinding costly process moving towards resolution at trial. 
There was very little to prevent costs spiralling out of control and in many cases exceeding 
the value of the claim itself. The note prepared for the client sought to explain that all 
these procedures were moving inexorably towards the trial process. The determination of 
the dispute, through a judgment drawn from the evidence presented to the court, was the 
focus for all those involved in civil litigation. In respect of all levels of civil litigation, the 
lengthy process of setting out the claim and ultimately moving towards the collation of 
 
 





evidence in the form of affidavits was driven by the place of the principle of orality in the 
trial process. The idea that evidence must be received in sworn format presupposed that 
affidavits would be the only means of ensuring reliable testimony. The system considerably 
inflated costs in that affidavits, prepared by the litigant’s own solicitor, could not be sworn 
by that solicitor and must be sent elsewhere to ensure the veracity of the statements set 
out within the document. This would incur an oath fee in addition to considerable extra 
layers of procedural steps. 
 
The conclusion drawn in the note prepared for the client in the 1980s was that the current 
system of litigation, while understandably perplexing, was driven by the need to present 
oral testimony to be assessed either within a County or High Court trial and must be 
accepted as how a civil dispute would be determined. The note prepared for the client 
expressed regret that the system did not focus more on the value of the claim and 
settlement without the need for such costly and time-consuming procedures. 
 
The trial itself, even when it related to matters of straightforward legal issues and modest 
value, would be heard in full with all witnesses whose evidence could not be agreed in 
attendance. The process was governed by Rules of the Supreme Court (The RSC)  and the 
County Court Rules (CCR).95 The trial process ran in accordance with the principle of orality 
developed through the traditional Anglo-American adversarial trial system. This would 
mean that the party bringing the litigation, at that time known as the plaintiff, would be 
required to present all those witnesses of fact to the court to give an oral account of the 
matters in issue in the case. In true adversarial style, this would be followed by cross-
examination by the opponent’s advocate to undermine the account of the witness and 
highlight inconsistencies in the witness’s first-hand recollection of those matters relevant 
to the issues in dispute.96 Following this, there would be an opportunity to address those 
issues arising in cross-examination, with the party whose witness had been tested in cross-
examination conducting re-examination in an attempt to repair the damage done to the 
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oral testimony. Rather than this system of civil justice having been constructed as the most 
appropriate for the resolution of disputes between private individuals, it had simply 
evolved historically and rested on the premise of the principle of orality as the best means 
by which the truth can be found. Given there was little differentiation between lower and 
higher value cases, this protracted process of oral presentation caused costs to escalate in 
a manner which often became prohibitively expensive. The question leading to Lord 
Woolf’s report was whether access to justice existed for all but the wealthiest litigant. 
 
This system of slow and expensive civil justice continued into the 1990s. The outcome of 
civil litigation, although it could be predicted to some extent through case analysis, 
remained uncertain and was arguably far too adversarial in nature. From the outset clients 
found the procedures impenetrable, the outcome unpredictable and, most difficult of all, 
the cost of litigation was capable of spiralling with no limitation proportionate to the 
importance and value of the claim. Prior to Lord Woolf’s report, access to justice was 
possible only for those of very substantial means or those falling within a very restricted 
group of litigants entitled to civil legal aid. Justice was not being delivered in a way 
acceptable to the majority of litigants, and it was necessary to pursue a radical new policy 
to reduce litigation and forge ahead with a new system of dispute resolution. A rather 
problematic aspect of any reform would be the place of the principle of orality given the 
adversarial nature of the English trial system. Lord Woolf’s proposed reforms did move the 
process of litigation away from the determination of the dispute by reaching trial towards 
a more carefully managed system promoting earlier settlement: 
Pre-action protocols. These are intended to build on and increase the benefits of 
early but well-informed settlements which genuinely satisfy both parties to a 
dispute. The purposes of such protocols are:  
(a) to focus the attention of litigants on the desirability of resolving disputes without 
litigation;  
(b) to enable them to obtain the information they reasonably need in order to enter 
into an appropriate settlement; or  
(c) to make an appropriate offer (of a kind which can have costs consequences if 




(d) if a pre-action settlement is not achievable, to lay the ground for expeditious 
conduct of proceedings.97  
However, the principle of orality was not in itself tackled. The civil procedure rules amend 
and adjust the principle of orality rather than starting with a clean sheet, as was the case 
with so many aspects of civil litigation in the wake of the Woolf report. 
 
 
2.3 A New Era of ‘The Overriding Objective’ and the Pursuit of Optimum 
Efficiency (Woolf and Jackson) 
Civil litigation was reviewed by Lord Woolf, with the introduction of wide-ranging reform 
coming into effect on 26 April 1999.98 The implementation of Lord Woolf’s reforms was 
undertaken through the development of the civil procedure rules. The rules sought to 
translate the philosophy of the report, Access to Justice, into a hard and fast system of civil 
procedure. Lord Woolf’s report acknowledged the difficulties existing in civil litigation and 
sought to address the expense, slow pace and inaccessible nature of the previous system. 
However, while the adversarial nature of civil litigation was addressed in an attempt to 
improve access to justice, the principle of orality was not reviewed afresh. The civil 
procedure rules instead modify the principle of orality rather than question its 
appropriateness within this modernised system.  
One of the most important aspects of the Woolf reforms was the new concept of the 
overriding objective acting as a reference point for the overall conduct of civil litigation. 
The overriding objective sets out an expectation for the conduct of civil dispute resolution 
and is to be applied prior to the issue of proceedings and throughout all stages of the 
litigation process to a final determination. The principle of orality must be considered in 
the light of the overriding objective as the length and cost of proceedings could no longer 
be disregarded, and the process of receiving oral evidence continue unhindered by the 
value and complexity of the case. The effect of the overriding objective contained in CPR 1 
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should not be underestimated. It provides a springboard into the rules and sets a new 
framework in place. In an attempt to provide procedures which could be accessed by users 
of the civil justice system the overriding objective was formulated to act as a gloss on all 
aspects of civil procedure including the place of the principle of orality within the system. 
The tenor of the overriding objective is clear: 
(1) These Rules are a new procedural code with the overriding objective of enabling 
the court to deal with cases justly and at proportionate cost. 
(2) Dealing with a case justly and at proportionate cost includes, so far as is 
practicable  
(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing; 
(b) saving expense; 
(c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate – 
(i) to the amount of money involved; 
(ii) to the importance of the case; 
(iii) to the complexity of the issues; and 
(iv) to the financial position of each party; 
(d) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; 
(e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking 
into account the need to allot resources to other cases; and 
(f) enforcing compliance with rules, practice directions and orders. 
 
The effect of CPR 1 needs to be considered in practical terms. In order to deal with cases 
justly, the court ought not to deny litigants access to the system simply because of a slight 
technical error. In its purest form, the adversarial trial system sought to exploit the 
technical slips of opponents rather than to seek a just resolution of the claim. Following 




the wrong court ought not to result in that claim being shut out but rather the claim should 
be transferred to the appropriate venue.99 
 
A rather difficult concept is that of the parties being on an equal footing. Litigants 
frequently command different resources. Given the lack of access to government funding 
for civil litigation, some litigants will be able to afford more expensive lawyers than others. 
This is key to the principle of orality, given the preparation required to move towards a 
successful trial. Competent specialist litigation lawyers will best prepare all the preparation 
leading up to that point. However, the concept of being on an equal footing set out in CPR 
1 does not extend to preventing one party from instructing lawyers who would be beyond 
the means of the opposing party.100  
 
In order to deal with cases expeditiously and fairly while saving expense, the court has very 
extensive powers of case management which will be considered below. The court's 
approach to the avoidance of litigation continuing for an indefinite period was 
demonstrated in Adnan v Securicor Custodial Services Ltd.101 In that case, a request to 
delay the consideration of damages until the end of the claimant’s period of hospitalisation 
was refused and marked the effect of the overriding objective on what had previously been 
a point for frequent protraction of the adversarial trial system. 
 
The idea of proportionality within CPR 1 focuses on the value and complexity of the claim 
and links very closely with active case management and the control of costs. The 
continuing focus on case management and the control of costs is considered in more detail 
at section 2.6 below. This determined drive towards optimum efficiency and the pursuit of 
proportionality to allow for a reasonably affordable system of civil justice rested on a shift 
towards judicial control and a reduction in the adversarial nature of litigation. In its purest 
form, the adversarial trial system drives towards a judgment based on the receipt of oral 
evidence no matter the cost involved. A less adversarial approach requiring a 
 
 
99 Cala Homes (South) Ltd v. Chichester District Council [1999] The Times, 15 October 1999 
100 Maltez v. Lewis [1999] The Times, 4 May 1999 




proportionate response to resolving issues in dispute moves away from the goal of 
obtaining a judgment at any cost. Costs need to be predicted in advance if the concept of 
proportionality is to be effective and as such, must link closely to the value and complexity 
of the claim. This concept has had a very significant impact on the principle of orality in 
that it has been necessary to modify it to achieve proportionality within civil trials, rather 
than letting oral evidence take as long as is necessary as had been the norm in the 
traditional civil trial framework. The real difficulty is justifying why the principle of orality 
was modified to such a great extent that it has become almost unrecognisable in certain 
categories of civil trial. Rather than modifying the principle of orality, the question to be 
considered is whether it was necessary to have it as the starting point?  
 
Perhaps it would have been preferable, and feasible, to construct a more appropriate 
means for the determination of disputed issues without the need to receive evidence from 
witnesses of fact in live oral form. The extent to which the principle of orality remains intact 
depends largely on the value of the claim. If the receipt of oral evidence is the accepted 
means of deciding which version of facts to prefer is it any less important to achieve that 
aim in cases of lower value? The outcome of litigation for private individuals pursuing a 
claim of around £20,000 may be just as important, if not more so, than a corporate dispute 
running at around £100,000. The private individual will have a curtailed version of the 
traditional civil trial, whereas the corporate litigation will play out in full. Research has yet 
to be undertaken as to the effect of the reduced receipt of oral testimony. Still, if it remains 
for higher value claims, it must surely be considered preferable. If the abridged version of 
civil trials is just as effective, why not use it for all matters? 
 
In the implementation of the Woolf reforms, significant steps have been taken to ensure 
the system of civil litigation is tightly controlled. However, no re-evaluation of the necessity 
for the principle of orality within the system of civil justice was undertaken. How the 
principle of orality has been modified to meet the requirements of the new system is 
considered within the case management system seen as so important in the Woolf report: 
 
In Chapters 6 and 8 of my interim report I described the introduction of judicial case 




Ultimate responsibility for the control of litigation must move from the litigants and 
their legal advisers to the court. The reaction to this key message in my interim report 
has been extremely supportive.102 
 
The place of the principle of orality in civil trials remains an unresolved question. Given the 
extent of its modification in particular categories of civil claim to achieve cost savings, is 
the receipt of first hand oral testimony the best way to deal with the determination of 
disputed matters of fact at all? 
 
In some areas of civil litigation costs are disproportionate and impede access to 
justice. I therefore propose a coherent package of interlocking reforms, designed to 
control costs and promote access to justice.103 
 
Lord Justice Jackson set out the premise upon which the next tranche of civil justice 
reforms would be recommended in his final report published December 2009 and brought 
into force on 1 April 2013.104 
 
The fine detail of the reforms implemented following Lord Justice Jackson’s 
recommendations is outside the scope of this thesis. Its broad impact on the place of the 
principle of orality requires consideration. In consolidating the Woolf reforms, Lord Justice 
Jackson sought to improve access to justice through the control of costs with new 
budgeting requirements and the wholesale reform of civil funding arrangements. The 
Jackson review did not question the success of the Woolf reforms but sought to build on 
those reforms to further ensure the conduct of litigation would be consistent and 
proportionate: 
 
It was a review that was not intended to question the shifting judicial philosophy in 
civil litigation affected by the overriding objective, which was acknowledged and 
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endorsed by the House of Lords in Three Rivers105 it was to identify why and how it 
had not properly taken effect and how that failure could be remedied106 
 
While the entire focus of the Jackson review was to ensure the control of costs the 
resultant reforms entrenched the importance of case management and the modification 
of the principle of orality depending on the value and complexity of the claim. Whether or 
not continuance with the principle of orality as the starting point for the determination of 
disputed matters of fact was the best way forward fell outside the scope of these reforms. 
The new provisions do, however, have a very significant impact on the continued use of 
the principle of orality in civil trials for many litigants seeking to access justice within this 
revised funding landscape. 
 
However, the Master of the Rolls in his speech107 addressing district judges does consider 
the effect of proportionality and the management of costs on the traditional approach to 
securing justice: 
 
In such circumstances it is easy to see why, not least given the long heritage we have 
of striving to the secure justice on the merits in each case and intuitive understanding 
that doing justice is to reach a decision on the merits, mistaken assumptions took 
hold. This was compounded by the failure to make explicit in the overriding objective 
that it includes a duty to manage cases so that no more than proportionate costs are 
incurred…108 
 
Plainly, given accepted reforms and continuing government policy, the principle of orality 
will continue to be modified to ensure compliance with the overriding objective in its 
limitation of costs in accordance with the importance now placed on the concept of 
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2.4 The Continuing Development of the Civil Procedure Rules  
 
The Civil Procedure Rules are a form of delegated legislation made under the Civil 
Procedure Act 1997. In providing one unified body of rules, the Civil Procedure Rules do 
not seek to answer absolutely every procedural question which may arise. They are 
designed to ensure that ‘the civil justice system is accessible fair and efficient’.109 The rules 
have developed at such a rapid pace as to have evolved into a relatively comprehensive 
set of requirements, providing almost complete governance of all aspects of civil litigation 
in the County Court, High Court and the Court of Appeal.  
 
The rules are broken down into 83 parts, each governing an aspect of civil procedure from 
the overriding objective at the outset to the enforcement of judgments at the conclusion 
of the process. The way in which the rules are broken down into small procedural steps is 
supplemented to a very considerable extent by the linked practice directions.110 Without 
the practice directions, it would be difficult to interpret the rules, and the inclusion of 
practice directions was a deliberate policy to ensure that the rules themselves did not 
become overly cumbersome. By transferring the complexity and detail into the practice 
directions, the principles and policy could be more readily digestible by those accessing 
the system of civil justice. Despite the separation of the rules into specific aspects of civil 
litigation from the outset, the rapid nature of their development has still proved testing 
for both practitioners and other court users. One of the range of cultural changes brought 
about by the civil procedure rules is the regularity of significant updating. Updates are 
brought in by the Civil Procedure Rule Committee which is an advisory non-departmental 
public body.111 
 
In terms of the principle of orality, the continuing updates of the civil procedure rules have 
a particularly  significant impact on its place in the system of civil justice. By 2019 the civil 
procedure rules reached their 109th update112 averaging between four and five fairly 
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complex updates annually. Many of those updates affect trial procedures and bring about 
very significant modifications of how evidence is received. 
 
At a variety of stages in the litigation process, the continuing update of the rules modifies 
and shapes the principle of orality to fit the policy-making trends of the Civil Procedure 
Rule Committee. This revises the rules in order to comply with reforms brought in both the 
continuance of the Woolf report reviews and the very significant cost management 
controls brought about in the implementation of the Jackson report. From the outset of 
the civil procedure rules affidavits were largely replaced by witness statements, thereby 
reducing the cost and time involved in the preparation of sworn statements. As with all 
aspects of civil procedure, the structure and content of witness statements is prescribed 
by those rules with a practice direction113 constraining how the witness puts forward 
matters of direct oral testimony. It will be seen in the following analysis of case 
management and the impact of track allocation to the principle of orality that the 
significance of this is profound.  
 
No longer does the witness give evidence for the first time at a live hearing but is to a 
significant extent tied by the very prescriptive content of the practice direction. It is hard 
to imagine a witness being unaffected by those constraints in the delivery of their version 
of factual matters. Inevitably to comply with the requirements of the practice direction 
lawyers must construct the witness statement. However, the witness statement ought to 
contain the evidence which that person would be allowed to give orally.114 It is hard to see 
how the principle of orality is not so significantly affected as to be almost unrecognisable 
in a system where that which would have been given in live oral testimony is translated 
within the constraints of a practice direction via a litigation practitioner to form an 
admissible witness statement. However, the witness’s own words should still prevail. It is 
difficult to envisage how this can be achieved in all cases when the principle of orality has 
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In Alex Lawrie Factors Ltd v Morgan, Morgan and Turner115 this point was put to the test 
in a decision by the Court of Appeal confirming that the purpose of a witness statement 
was to allow the witness to put forward what they would have said in oral testimony, that 
it ought to appear in the document in their own words. The relevant evidence was the 
evidence the witness would actually say within the traditional version of the principle of 
orality, allowing for the giving of direct oral testimony live rather than in advance within a 
witness statement. The Court of Appeal confirmed that it was not for the lawyer to 
construct the evidence but for the witness to put forward those matters upon which they 
would readily be able to speak in cross-examination. The problem, in this case, arose from 
the use of sophisticated legal language unlikely to emanate from a witness of fact. The 
example illustrates significant dangers when lawyers construct witness statements and put 
forward matters patently outside the scope of the normal witness of facts knowledge or 
ability. The real difficulty lies with the modification of the principle of orality, given that it 
is preserved to the extent that witness evidence is still seen as prevalent but very 
significantly eroded in the requirements of the civil procedure rules to formulate witness 
statements within prescribed technical boundaries.  
 
While the control of witnesses is a hallmark of adversarial proceedings, the conduct of civil 
litigation has moved to a level of prescription for the receipt of oral testimony not seen 
prior to the Woolf reforms. The drive towards ever greater efficiency and the control of 
costs has resulted in a restructuring of the principle of orality dependent on the value and 
complexity of the case. The pursuit of case management, together with the optimising of 












2.5 Case Management and the Effect of Track Allocation on the Principle of 
Orality 
 
Judicial case management is at the fore of the revised system of civil litigation following 
the introduction of the civil procedure rules. Of all aspects of civil litigation, the control of 
procedure with the underlying objective of costs reduction has been the greatest shift from 
the system in existence prior to 26 April 1999. It is not just a judicial power to manage 
cases but a duty that is now at the heart of the system. No longer is it for the litigants to 
control the pace of litigation, it is an obligation of the court to ensure proper management 
of the system. Judicial case management is woven throughout the procedures within the 
civil justice system and is very clearly set out in the first part of the civil procedure rules 
1998: 
(1) The court must further the overriding objective by actively managing cases. 
(2) Active case management includes – 
(a) encouraging the parties to co-operate with each other in the conduct of the 
proceedings; 
(b) identifying the issues at an early stage; 
(c) deciding promptly which issues need full investigation and trial and 
accordingly disposing summarily of the others; 
(d) deciding the order in which issues are to be resolved; 
(e) encouraging the parties to use an alternative dispute 
resolution(GL)procedure if the court considers that appropriate and facilitating 
the use of such procedure; 
(f) helping the parties to settle the whole or part of the case; 
(g) fixing timetables or otherwise controlling the progress of the case; 
(h) considering whether the likely benefits of taking a particular step justify the 




(i) dealing with as many aspects of the case as it can on the same occasion; 
(j) dealing with the case without the parties needing to attend at court; 
(k) making use of technology; and 
(l) giving directions to ensure that the trial of a case proceeds quickly and 
efficiently116 
 
The drive for efficient case management is now taking precedence over the pursuit of 
justice for the individual. This has been openly acknowledged by the Master of the Rolls, 
Lord Dyson in his 2013 speech to the Judicial College: 
 
As I have said, one of the problems that has undermined the efficacy of case 
management has been too great a desire to err on the side of individual justice 
without any real consideration of the effect that has on the justice system’s ability to 
secure effective access to justice for all court-users. The Court of Appeal has been as 
guilty of this error as any other court. That the Court of Appeal could in 2011 in Swain-
Mason & Others v Mills & Reeve LLP [2011] 1 WLR 2735 comment that early, robust, 
decisions by the Court of Appeal that emphasised the need to take account of the 
needs of all court-users and not just those of the immediate parties had been lost 
from view makes the point. The revised rule 3.9, by referring back to the overriding 
objective, is intended to ensure that such issues cannot become lost again post-
April.117 
 
Following on from the implementation of the measures brought about after the Jackson 
report, an ever-tightening system of case management allocates cases to a specific track 
for the purpose of determining the level of court time and costs that may be incurred in 
the resolution of the civil dispute. Not only has it become important to predict costs 
through cost budgeting118 but the extent to which the principle of orality requires 
 
 
116  Court’s duty to manage cases CPR 1.4 
117 Lord Dyson MR District Judge's annual seminar Judicial College, 22nd March 2013 at paragraph 22 




modification is determined by allocation to a specific case management track. While there 
are other considerations,119 relating to matters such as complexity of the issues, the case 
management rules rest on the amount of the claim and seek to reduce procedures in cases 
of lower value. So, for a claim worth under £10,000 it is doubtful that the litigants will get 
their ‘day in court’ as such claims are allocated to the small claims track.  
 
The small claims track is designed to provide a procedure which is swift, inexpensive and 
lacks the input of lawyers. Given that ordinarily little in the way of costs can be recovered, 
the participation of lawyers in the process is minimal. The small claims hearing will not 
follow the strict rules of the adversarial trial system and can frequently result in a decision 
based mainly on documents. Oral evidence may be received but without the formality of 
the usual questioning seen in the adversarial trial system. The rules of evidence are largely 
inapplicable, and the district Judge running the procedure may modify the receipt of 
evidence to suit the circumstances of the claim.120 This departure from the principle of 
orality is striking in its almost complete abandonment of strict formality in lower value 
claims. If this approach is sufficiently robust to determine a claim, which for many will be 
a very significant sum, then the continued adherence to the principle of orality for the 
remainder of civil justice deserves greater consideration. 
 
For those claims falling between £10,000 and £25,000, the fast track case management 
system will normally apply.121 This is the most interesting hybrid when looking at the place 
of the principle of orality within the revised system of civil justice following on from the 
reforms brought about by the reports of Woolf and Jackson. A strict timetable is applied 
to fast track trials to enable completion within one court day. The examination of witnesses 
is normally limited to 90 minutes for each party. To enable this time efficient approach to 
the receipt of oral testimony, examination-in-chief is dispensed with and replaced by the 
witness statements. Those witness statements will have been prepared following highly 
prescriptive provisions (considered earlier) and stand as if they were the oral testimony of 
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the witnesses appearing at the trial. However, unlike the small claims track, witnesses still 
attend and experience immediate cross-examination without having initially given their 
own first-hand account to the court. This is a rather perplexing procedure for all but the 
most seasoned professional witness. To face a challenge to testimony given much earlier 
in the form of a prescribed technical statement without having the opportunity to reiterate 
a verbal account is disconcerting for most witnesses of fact. This modification of the 
principle of orality is to ensure optimum efficiency in restricting the use of court time to a 
day and thereby adhere to the requirements of proportionality in terms both of the use of 
court resources and the cost budgets being followed by the parties. Whereas a case valued 
up to £10,000 may seem of real importance to many court users restricted to the small 
claims track, surely a claim of up to £25,000 will have a very significant impact on most of 
those allocated to the fast track case management system. For those cases valued at over 
£25,000, it is possible within the civil justice system to keep the principle of orality intact.  
 
The traditional adversarial trial system prevails for such higher value claims with the full 
extent of the principle of orality applying to the determination of disputed matters. If in 
higher value claims the principle of orality remains the appropriate means for determining 
disputed facts, is it really appropriate to receive evidence in such a truncated form for the 
remainder of lower value civil trials? Arguably it is just as important for the consumer of 
modest means to have individual justice as the corporate litigant. While the control of 
costs is fundamental to allowing access to justice might it not be more appropriate to 
reconsider the principle of orality as a means of determining disputed issues afresh rather 
than having a system of modified oral testimony based on the value of the claim? 
 
2.6 At All Costs  
 
It can be seen that the principle of orality in civil proceedings has been modified to a very 
great extent, dependent on the value of the claim. The issue of costs in civil litigation has 
developed as a dominating factor in the civil process, without regard to the effect on the 




rather than the principle of orality are at the fore of every consideration at all stages of the 
process of civil dispute resolution. 
 
This can be demonstrated by consideration of the rules relating to the basis of assessment 
set out in CPR 44.4. It is crucially important to those engaged in the resolution of civil 
disputes that the cost of so doing does not outweigh the benefits of seeking access to civil 
relief. There is little point in pursuing a claim and obtaining a judgment only for it to be 
nullified by a failure to recover the costs involved in the procedure. Most costs are assessed 
on the standard basis, and this means that the litigants can expect to receive only those 
costs that are proportionate,122 irrespective of whether they were reasonably or 
necessarily incurred. The requirement to consider proportionality as the most important 
factor in the assessment of costs on the standard basis was brought into effect for cases 
commenced after 1 April 2013,123 before which only those costs which were unreasonably 
incurred or which were unreasonable in amount would be allowable.  
 
Rule 44.3 (5) determines whether the test for proportionality has been met within the 
litigation process. Inter-alia the value of the claim must be considered so that even where 
hearing what a witness has to say may well be the determining factor if the cost of so doing 
appears to the court to be disproportionate having regard to the value of the claim the 
principle of orality needs either to be abandoned or paid for by the party placing reliance 
on it. Consider the circumstances in which an oral contract is for a sum of approximately 
£15,000 and relates to a design and build project for a conservatory extension to a private 
residential home. It would not be unusual in such circumstances for an initial estimate to 
be supplied by a builder with further, fairly complex and detailed, specifications developing 
as the work progresses. Should a dispute arise at the conclusion of the project the words 
spoken as part of the oral contract would be crucial in determining both a claim from a 
builder and a defence and potential counterclaim on the part of the residential 
homeowner. However, should detailed oral testimony be required having regard to the 
 
 





value of the claim it is most likely the trial would proceed in the fast track124 and as such 
the principle of orality would already have been restricted to a process of live cross-
examination only. Even this restricted analysis of the veracity of each party’s version of 
oral contractual terms will not be met in costs unless considered proportionate within the 
meaning of part 44 of the Civil Procedure Rules together with its associated practice 
direction.125 So it follows that in a case at a value of considerable significance to a small 
building concern and a private residential homeowner, the principle of orality, which must 
surely be at the heart of resolving a dispute as to the oral terms of the contract, would 
both be modified and potentially disallowed as disproportionate to the cost of 
proceedings. By comparison, a well-drawn contract between large commercial parties 
resulting in a dispute at a value of approximately £30,000 would allow for the playing out 
of the principle of orality and for its associated costs to be met under the normal costs 
order following on from a multi-track trial.  
 
If the dispute is of smaller value the process by which the truth is determined would be 
very significantly constrained to the point at which the principle of orality has been 
modified to the extent of replacing examination-in-chief with documentary evidence or 
disallowed altogether on the basis of the current costs rules. Notably, a claim of higher 
value would allow for the full trial process and the receipt of oral testimony in accordance 
with the traditional view of the principle of orality as the means by which the veracity of 
oral accounts can be scrutinised. It is hard to justify the continued use of oral testimony in 
the traditional format if the curtailed version in claims of lower value, but of high 
importance to the litigants, purports to determine a fair resolution of disputed facts. The 
place of the principle of orality appears to have been lost amongst calls for the strict 
control of costs: 
 
Proportionality trumps necessity.   The Final Report recommended that the effect of 
the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lownds v Home Office [2002] EWCA Civ 365; [2002] 
1 WLR 2450 should be reversed.  Rule 44.3 (2) achieves this by providing that in an 
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assessment on the standard basis: “the court will … only allow costs which are 
proportionate to the matter in issue.  Costs which are disproportionate in amount 
may be disallowed or reduced even if they were reasonably or necessarily 
incurred.126 
 
Civil litigation reforms have focused on the management of costs with seemingly less focus 
on the place of the principle of orality in civil trials: 
 
An innovation.  Costs management is a novel discipline, which was proposed in 
Chapter 40 of the Final Report.  Most civil litigation is a form of business project in 
which the parties invest substantial sums in order to achieve a just outcome.  Even 
justice must have a price.  It is not rational to spend £1,000 to recover a £100 debt, 
however strong and virtuous your claim.127  
 
The affordability of civil litigation is clearly something which needs to be managed but what 
also needs to be considered is whether the means by which disputed matters are 
adjudicated upon ought to differ dependent on the value of the claim. What is needed is 
an honest rethink of why we receive oral testimony in its traditional format for higher value 
claims, more likely to be corporate and government litigants, yet not for lower value claims 
more likely to involve private individuals and small businesses. A fundamental review of 
the principle of orality and its place in truth finding in a civil forum may well assist the 
overall objective of cost saving,128 while providing a more logical format for the receipt of 
a factual account which is consistent across all claims. Rather than a variant upon a 
traditional format dependent on whether the case management is for small claims, the 
fast track or the multi-track an innovative approach not constrained by the ancient 
formalities of the traditional Anglo-American trial system may well prove more cost 
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2.7 Evidence in Civil Proceedings  
 
The effect of receiving opinion evidence from expert witnesses is integral to the place of 
the principle of orality within civil jurisdiction. It will be considered separately in Chapter 3 
of this dissertation.  
 
At the heart of the principle of orality is the idea that we test evidence in order to decide 
which version of events is to be preferred in reaching an adjudication on a disputed matter 
of fact. As considered above, the cost associated with receipt of evidence in that format is 
considerable and often disproportionate to the value of claim. Unless agreed by the 
parties, receipt of the evidence in documentary format is not permissible. Still, receipt of 
evidence in documentary format amounting to hearsay will, by comparison, normally be 
admissible subject to compliance with procedural steps.129 The use of hearsay evidence 
has developed in such a way that its use in civil proceedings has expanded considerably.130  
 
The way in which receipt of hearsay evidence has been modified from the earlier 
legislation is particularly notable when considered in conjunction with hearsay evidence 
used in criminal proceedings.131 The circumstances in which hearsay evidence was once 
received in civil proceedings through earlier, largely defunct, legislation has been followed 
in terms of its principles into the current rules governing admissibility in criminal 
proceedings and will be considered in subsequent chapters.132 However, the use of 
hearsay evidence is a clear departure from the principle of orality in that no live testing of 
oral testimony takes place with the witness of fact, giving an account in documentary 
format. Given this departure from the principle of orality and the tendency to see the 
migration of the principles applying in civil proceedings towards the criminal forum, an 
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Section 1 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 provides that in civil proceedings evidence shall 
not be excluded on the ground that it is hearsay.  It will still be necessary to distinguish first 
hand from multiple hearsay, but both are now equally admissible under section 1(2)(b).  
The reason that the degree of hearsay is still relevant is that it may affect weight,133 and as 
such links back directly to the principle of orality in that live oral testimony tends to carry 
greater persuasive force unless there is a good reason why evidence is brought in hearsay 
format and remains capable of testing.     
 
Hearsay includes oral hearsay through any number of intermediaries and documentary 
hearsay where human perceptions are recorded in a document. 
 
The overall consequence of the Act is that there is no prohibition on the inclusion of 
hearsay in civil proceedings only certain procedural requirements which must be complied 
with.134 This results in the possibility of inclusion of hearsay evidence in expert reports, 
statements of case and witness statements. 
 
The Act provides several safeguards against the risks of unfairness resulting from the 
abolition of the hearsay rule in civil proceedings. 
 
The first safeguard is provided in Section 2 of the Act which provides that any party 
proposing to adduce hearsay evidence in civil proceedings shall give notice of that fact and 
on request provide particulars relating to the evidence that it is reasonable and practicable 
in the circumstances to provide. 
 
The parties may agree to either exclude or waive the notice requirements provided by 
Section 2. If a party fails to comply with the notice provisions contained within Section 2, 
the court does not have any power to exclude hearsay evidence as a consequence of that 
failure.  The sanction is possible costs orders and an adverse effect on the weight to be 
given to the evidence.  
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The procedural requirements are set out in part 33 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
Fundamentally, this means that if the witnesses is being called, notice requirements are 
met by serving the witness statement. If the party placing reliance on the testimony is not 
calling the witness notice requirements are met by serving the witness statement and 
informing the other party that the witness will not be present with reasons. In all other 
cases, notice requirements are met by serving a notice identifying the hearsay; stating it 
will be relied on and giving reasons for not calling the witness. 
 
The second safeguard is provided in Section 3 of the Act, which provides rules allowing the 
party on whom notice is served to bring the witness to court for cross-examination. This is 
an interesting addition to the previous provisions in that it allows for a partial preservation 
of the principle of orality. It is akin to the process used in fast track trials in allowing 
examination-in-chief to be replaced by a documentary format but retaining the possibility 
of cross-examination within the traditional format for testing evidence. Given that hearsay 
evidence is normally used only in circumstances where the witness is unavailable, owing 
possibly to illness or geographical location, the retention of the possibility of cross-
examination is an interesting hybrid that is unlikely to be used in most practical 
circumstances. However, seeing this process as a safeguard against the improper use of 
hearsay evidence again demonstrates the importance within the traditional trial process 
of the possibility of falling back to the principle of orality as a means by which the veracity 
of statements is tested. 
 
The third safeguard is provided in Section 4, which gives provision as to weight factors. 
 
Section 4 provides that in estimating the weight to be given to hearsay evidence, the court 
shall have regard to any circumstances from which any inferences can reasonably be drawn 
as to the reliability, or otherwise, of the evidence. 
 
The rationale for this third safeguard is to emphasis the need for the court to be vigilant in 
testing the reliability of hearsay evidence.  It is also hoped that this safeguard will 




“hiding” dubious witnesses or concealing weaknesses by the use of large amounts of 
hearsay evidence. It is just these matters which the more traditional method of 
questioning in open court during live oral testimony seeks to address. It is notable that in 
any move away from the principle of orality as how the parties draw out inconsistencies 
and highlight inadequacies in their opponent’s evidence a safeguard is written in to 
preserve, in so far as it is possible in documentary format, its traditional purpose of 
determining the most likely source of the truth. To this end, a ‘check list’ of factors is 
provided at Section 4 (2) of the Act as follows:   
(2)  Regard may be had, in particular, to the following -    
(a) whether it would have been reasonable and practicable for the party by 
whom the evidence was adduced to have produced the maker of the original 
statement as a witness;  
(b) whether the original statement was made contemporaneously with the 
occurrence or existence of the matters stated;  
(c) whether the evidence involves multiple hearsay;  
(d) whether any person involved had any motive to conceal or misrepresent 
matters;  
(e) whether the original statement was an edited account, or was made in 
collaboration with another or for a particular purpose;  
(f) whether the circumstances in which the evidence is adduced as hearsay 
are such as to suggest an attempt to prevent proper evaluation of its weight.  
 
The fourth safeguard is provided at Section 5 of the Act, which makes provision as regards 





Section 5(1) of the Act provides that if it can be shown that the maker of a hearsay 
statement would not have been competent to testify then the statement shall not be 
admitted. 
 
Section 5(2) of the Act relates to credibility.  Where the maker of the original hearsay 
statement is not called as a witness the act permits the credibility of his statement to be 
underminded by calling evidence: 
 
(1) Whether before or after the tendered statement, that he has made another 
statement inconsistent with it; 
 
(2) To attack his credit, provided that this could have been done if he had given 
evidence. 
 
These provisions go some way towards identifying and preserving the means of 
scrutinising disputed factual evidence which had otherwise been the preserve of the 
principle of orality. It is clear from the provisions enabling the use of hearsay evidence in 
civil proceedings that the legislative draughtsmen had regard to the principle of orality in 
the drawing up of a sequence of safeguards. The provisions in Section 4 relating to the 
weight that may be accorded to evidence in a hearsay format clearly acknowledge that the 
persuasive quality of evidence may well be undermined by a departure from the principle 
of orality. As such Section 4 of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 provides statutory guidance to 
determine the value of hearsay evidence when the principle of orality is absent as a means 
by which veracity can be assessed. This series of safeguards acknowledges that a departure 
from scrutiny through live oral testimony may reduce the persuasive quality of testimony.  
 
The value accorded to the receipt of evidence capable of appropriate testing is plain in the 
factors considered necessary as safeguards when evidence is adduced in a hearsay format. 
The rationale for the continued receipt of evidence through live oral testimony in the 
traditional Anglo-American adversarial trial system ought not to be forgotten in the 
inexorable drive towards the control of costs. If there is to be a departure from the 




by which veracity can be assessed has been put in place. This may well be perfectly 
acceptable. However, the justifications appear to be costs driven rather than through the 
construction of a rationale driving towards the fair administration of justice.  
 
An interesting development in the process of reforming the receipt of oral testimony can 
be seen in opinion evidence given by expert witnesses. Both in civil and criminal 
proceedings, the court will more readily receive expert evidence in documentary format. 
The place of expert testimony and the principle of orality will be considered in Chapter 3. 
 
 
2.8 Categories of Witness in Civil Proceedings  
 
The principle of orality and its impact upon individuals appearing as witnesses has long 
been a cause for concern resulting in the very significant reforms considered in detail in 
Chapters 4 and 5. However, while witnesses may experience some considerable degree of 
difficulty in attending civil trials, no equivalent provisions have been enacted. Guidance 
can be drawn from many sources including the Civil Procedure Rules and practice guidance 
notes produced both by the Advocacy Training Council135 and the Law Society.136 Still, no 
specific comparable provision has been enacted to support witnesses who are vulnerable 
or intimidated within the civil litigation environment. Part of the difficulty is that civil 
litigation covers such a wide range of matters, many of which are unlikely to involve 
vulnerable witnesses and parties in civil procedure. While the wide range of commercial 
and corporate matters could potentially include such witnesses, there are inevitably fewer 
trials demanding the range of special measures seen in criminal trials. As there is no 
definition of vulnerable or intimidated witnesses in civil trials in the same way as is the 
case for criminal trials,137 guidance for those professionals engaged in civil trials, during 
which the receipt of oral testimony will need to be undertaken by witnesses who 
experience difficulty with communication for a variety of reasons, will need to draw 
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guidance from other comparable sources. Civil Procedure Rule and Practice Direction 21 
does recognise protected parties as requiring additional procedural safeguards, but this 
does not include the manner in which oral testimony is received at trial. Moreover, 
pursuant to CPR Part 32.2: 
‘Evidence of witnesses – general rule 
32.2 
(1) The general rule is that any fact which needs to be proved by the evidence 
of witnesses is to be proved – 
(a) at trial, by their oral evidence given in public;’ 
 
The requirement that evidence should be given orally and in public emphasises the 
continuing prevalence of the principle of orality in civil matters. Some softening of the role 
is afforded by CPR 32.3, which permits the giving of evidence by video link. However, there 
are no prescribed categories of witness permitted to utilise this provision, and each case 
would be considered on its merits.  
 
The Advocacy Training Council recognises this lack of provision within civil proceedings in 
the provision of a guidance toolkit,138 designed to assist all those practitioners (advocates, 
solicitors and other representatives and judges) coming into contact with witnesses who 
plainly are all potentially could be vulnerable. The guide itself acknowledges the difficulty 
given the lack of formalised provision in the civil trial landscape: 
 
There is clearly a need for more informed support for vulnerable witnesses in the 
civil justice system, particularly adults who are at risk of being triggered to self-harm, 
attempt and/or commit suicide either before, during and/or after the legal process.    
 
 




There is also a need for the provision of training for advocates, representatives and 
judges, particularly those who spend comparatively less time in contested 
hearings.139 
 
Civil cases involving vulnerable witnesses and parties plainly do occur, and the effect of the 
principle of orality combined with the lack of the formal provision of special measures need 
to be addressed. In Kimathi and others v Foreign and Commonwealth Office,140 some 
witnesses were unable to travel owing to health and other vulnerabilities. At the case 
management stage, while the general rule that the witness should give their evidence orally 
and in public was acknowledged the overriding objective at CPR 1 was also considered in 
that the court should deal with the case 'justly'.  
 
The pre-eminence the principle of orality can be seen in the Kimathi case: 
(i) It is desirable that the Claimants give their evidence in person to the Judge. Video 
link evidence is not as ideal as having the witness physically present in Court. 
(ii) Given the Claimants’ personal circumstances, an unfamiliar situation such as 
video link may possibly affect the cogency of their evidence. 
(iii) In an ideal world it would be desirable for the normal trial process to take place 
within a court room. (The Claimants directed my attention to certain studies in their 
skeleton argument – though I was not taken to them in oral submissions – as to 
disadvantages in video link such as apparent reduction in sincerity of a witness, a 
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Whereas there are other illustrations concerning European cases and family matters, 
mainstream civil litigation appears to be bound by the principle of orality, without having 
evolved a complete strategy to deal with its effects. Chapter 6 of this thesis considers a 
more radical departure towards an online court and the impact of more innovative, fresh 
procedures rather than modification as a way forward. The principles of expediency driven 
by cost and limited court resources are considered above and tie with the issues for 
consideration in Chapter 3 in relation to experts. This chapter expands the review of the 
















The application of the principle of orality differs dependent on whether the witness in 
question is attending court to give a factual version of matters perceived (a witness of fact) 
or to provide an opinion on a matter of expertise outside the normal understanding of the 
court (an expert witness). Traditionally, the principle of orality whereby the witness 
attends court in order to provide oral testimony applies equally to witnesses of fact and 
expert witnesses. However, that principle has been modified significantly both in civil and 
criminal proceedings.  
 
As is the case with witnesses of fact, the starting point with expert witnesses is the 
application of the principle of orality and the adherence to the traditional adversarial trial 
system. The reasons for departure and modification vary dependent on the value and 
complexity of the case and whether the hearings are of a civil or criminal matter. Notably, 
movement away from the principle of orality in criminal proceedings tends to follow on 
from reforms tested within the civil environment. The civil procedure rules have been 
tested and updated since their introduction following on from the report of Lord Justice 
Woolf in 1998. While the starting point remains the giving of oral testimony, a movement 
towards an inquisitorial style with the judge determining how the evidence is adduced can 
be seen developing through civil proceedings and more recently developing through the 
criminal procedure rules.142  
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis reviews the rationale for a hybrid system stemming from 
adherence to the principle of orality. The consultation process leading to Lord Woolf’s final 
report fuelled the subsequent rules with only incremental movement away from the 
principle of orality when the nature of the proceedings required the traditional adversarial 
 
 





process to be modified. It will be argued that had the principle of orality been just one 
consideration within a procedural pallet then a more appropriate and occasionally more 
inquisitorial style for receipt of expert evidence could have been developed from the 
outset without the necessity of an evolution arising out of a difficult starting point. 
 
 
3.2 The Receipt of Expert Evidence in Civil Litigation 
 
Lord Woolf’s report, Access to Justice143 not only brought about a fundamental change to 
the procedural framework of civil litigation from the perspective of the witness of fact but 
also those experts providing evidence of opinion. Lord Justice Jackson144 continued to 
erode the principle of orality in the far-reaching proposals made to address the costs 
implications of the use of experts in civil matters. He proposed that the civil procedure 
rules should be used as a tool to control costs and that the judiciary should implement the 
provisions to this effect.145 Lord Justice Jackson focused heavily on the costs likely to be 
incurred by the use of experts rather than the place experts had previously played in the 
partisan adversarial trial system. This sought to put the impact of the costs incurred in the 
use of experts firmly at the fore. The party wishing to adduce expert evidence is now 
required to provide an estimate of the costs associated with the instruction of an expert 
in seeking the permission of the court to proceed. In terms of a departure from the 
principle of orality the revised provisions are a bold move towards judicial control in the 
inquisitorial style: 
 
Court’s power to restrict expert evidence 
35.4 
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(2) When parties apply for permission they must provide an estimate of the costs of 
the proposed expert evidence and identify – 
(a) the field in which expert evidence is required and the issues which the 
expert evidence will address; and 
(b) where practicable, the name of the proposed expert. 
(3) If permission is granted it shall be in relation only to the expert named or the field 
identified under paragraph (2). The order granting permission may specify the issues 
which the expert evidence should address.146 
 
 
3.3 The Place of Experts in the Litigious Environment 
 
To appreciate the different approach taken by the civil litigation rules, it is necessary to set 
into context the different evidential status of expert witnesses. 
 
The whole premise of the principle of orality would appear to be that unless oral testimony 
is tested in open court, its veracity cannot be acknowledged. However, that test of veracity 
has been treated very differently in the context of expert evidence. From the outset of the 
litigation process experts are treated quite differently from witnesses of fact. Expert 
evidence may only be received if it falls into that category of opinion evidence which allows 
admissibility for areas of specific technicality. It is this different categorisation of testimony 
which has led to such a different view of expert evidence with an interesting departure 
from the principle of orality not seen on the receipt of evidence from witnesses of fact. As 
with the receipt of evidence on a hearsay basis, the receipt of expert evidence falls under 
a specific evidential rule which marks this evidence as entirely different. As such the rules 
governing its receipt have developed separately, and in many ways more appropriately, 
than a hybrid of the principle of orality seen for other categories of witness. The evidential 







receipt of opinion evidence. This means that disputed questions of fact are determined by 
the triers of fact (normally a judge alone in civil litigation and magistrates or a jury in 
criminal litigation) by an assessment of the oral evidence of witnesses together with real 
or documentary evidence and the drawing of conclusions based on the cumulative weight 
of that evidence. However, opinion evidence is excluded from those matters which may 
be considered by the triers of fact, meaning that all witnesses must normally confine 
themselves to a factual account. The most important exception to this rule against the 
introduction of evidence of opinion is when the court cannot itself form an opinion owing 
to the specialist knowledge required to draw a conclusion: 
 
‘Their duty is to furnish the judge… with the necessary scientific criteria for testing 
the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the judge… to form his own 
independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in 
evidence. The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested, 
becomes a factor (and often an important factor) for consideration along with the 
whole other evidence in the case, but the decision is for the judge’147 
 
In civil litigation the development of the civil procedure rules sought to reduce the partisan 
nature of the provision of expert evidence to the court and develop a more inquisitorial 
style for the use of experts. As such, the Civil Procedure Rules place stronger obligation on 
experts to provide independent evidence to the court rather than evidence which is 
presented in a way biased towards those who instruct them. This is enshrined in Civil 
Procedure Rule 35.3: 
 
1. It is the duty of experts to help the court on matters within their expertise. 
2. This duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom experts have 








Another aspect of the use of expert evidence is that, while the civil procedure rules require 
an independent approach to be taken and for the evidence provided to be primarily of 
assistance to the court, the privileged nature of the experts report preserves the partisan 
approach. This is rather at odds with the understanding that the principle of orality may 
safely be modified on the receipt of expert evidence because the veracity of those experts 
can more readily be assumed. In fact, given that experts reports remain the subject of legal 
professional privilege, it is questionable whether the veracity of such opinion evidence can 
be accepted in a way that witnesses of fact cannot.  
 
The principle of legal professional privilege allows the party who instructs an expert to 
withhold the content of any report both from the other party to the case and the court. 
Disclosure and inspection of a privileged document cannot be ordered so long as the party 
instructing the expert does not intend to rely on it at trial.148 On the basis that the 
instructing party does not intend to utilise the expert to support its argument on disputed 
matters, it may seem that the place of experts in the litigation process as one of 
independent advisors with the overriding obligation to assist the court remains sound. 
However, there is nothing to prevent a party sifting through the range of available experts 
until one is found to support an otherwise unsupported opinion in favour of that party’s 
case. So, while an expert sourced in that way remains under the obligation placed on all 
experts to assist the court, the selection process has remained secret and protected from 
view by legal professional privilege. It therefore follows that the assumption the evidence 
of experts can more readily be relied on ought always to be considered in the context of 
legal professional privilege which allows parties to hide and disregard previously instructed 
experts whose opinion does not support their position. 
The bringing into effect of such a wide-ranging review of civil litigation by Lord Woolf in 
1998 and the subsequent implementation of those reforms set a new landscape for the 
receipt of expert evidence. The more recent implementation of the reforms brought about 
by Lord Justice Jackson149 acknowledged the unsustainable cost of civil litigation. It sought 
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to take a radical approach to address this barrier to participation in litigation. Whereas it 
can be seen that the manner in which oral evidence is received from witnesses of fact has 
been significantly modified in pursuit of costs reduction, Lord Justice Jackson made more 
radical proposals in respect of expert evidence in the litigation process. Considering that 
the starting point in hearing from all witnesses remains the principle of orality, the receipt 
of evidence from experts has been revised in a way which sees the most significant 
reconstruction of the traditional Anglo-American adversarial trial system and is perhaps 
indicative of the possibilities available to move away from the principle of orality to 
consider something more appropriate as a means by which the triers of facts weigh 
evidence.  
In his report, Lord Justice Jackson identified the prohibitively expensive costs associated 
with use of experts in the civil litigation forum.150 As considered above, given the 
adversarial style of civil litigation and the partisan nature of the instruction of experts, the 
reality of the production of an objective report is questionable. The subsequent testimony 
given to the court would be based on that report, and although there is a clear obligation 
in the civil procedure rules to provide an objective account, the transparency of the 
process remained questionable. Lord Justice Jackson in his final report did not propose a 
change to the manner in which expert evidence will be received for all categories of expert 
but proposed that in appropriate cases a new style of testimony could be considered. This 
new style of testimony drew on the success of a system used in Australian courts for the 
receipt of concurrent evidence, and his report proposed the use of a pilot to determine 
the viability of such a system in the UK.151 
The technique of receiving concurrent evidence has become known amongst lawyers as 
‘hot tubbing’ and was considered in Australia following on from the U.K.’s consideration of 
the place for experts going back to Lord Woolf’s interim report:152 
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expert witnesses used to be genuinely independent experts. Men of outstanding 
eminence in their field. Today they are in practice hired guns. There is a new breed 
of litigation hangers on, whose main expertise is to craft reports which will conceal 
anything that might be to the disadvantage of their clients. 
This problem was equally prevalent in Australia and as such the Australian litigation system 
sought to address the perceived bias in the use of experts.153 
An insightful interview was given by New South Wales Supreme Court Judge Peter 
McClellan to Australian radio network ABC on 5 May 2009.154 During the interview, Peter 
McClellan made it clear that his preference was to avoid the term, in common parlance, as 
‘hot tubbing’ but to stick to the more accurate technical description of concurrent 
evidence. It is clear from the interview that Peter McClellan was concerned with the clarity 
of evidence received by the judge and the quality of those professionals providing that 
evidence. Peter McClellan identified a particular problem in those highly qualified in a 
technical field being unwilling to participate in the adversarial trial process owing to its 
perceived unfairness and bias. It was considered more likely that high calibre experts 
would participate if they were given a clear role in guiding the court. A means of achieving 
this would be by the use of concurrent evidence so that all those experts instructed in the 
matter could be brought together to assist the court rather than to take a partisan 
approach. 
While this may seem a perfectly common-sense approach, it demonstrates the possibility 
of radical departures from the principle of orality to achieve a more just procedural 
approach. The Australian system appeared to be more willing to take a fresh look at how 
evidence is best received rather than being constrained by traditional ties. The traditional 
adversarial trial system results in experts giving the testimony on an individual basis and 
undergoing the normal adversarial process of examination-in-chief, cross-examination and 
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re-examination. Under the traditional system of the experts instructed in the matter may 
not be heard some considerable time and will certainly have their evidence entirely 
separate from those who preceded them in the accepted norm of the adversarial trial. By 
stark contrast, those giving expert evidence on a concurrent basis can not only engage in 
open debate and assist one another in the drawing of proper conclusions but may also 
challenge one another on the spot. This may allow the court to draw a clearer conclusion 
with the assistance of appropriate technical advice rather than partisan expert opinion: 
Experts are not generally trained in assessing adjudicated upon differing views within 
their discipline. However, that is the expertise of judges and members of courts and 
tribunal is. They have no baggage. Even expert tribunal members will often only have 
sufficient expertise to better understand the dispute because their expertise will be 
related to the discipline generally rather than the particular aspect been placed 
under the microscope. Expert tribunal members who do fully understand the expert 
issues will be better able, by training and experience, to put aside any concluded 
views and take a fresh look.155 
Such a radical approach to the abandonment of the principle of orality could have far 
reaching implications if it were to be adopted more broadly in both civil and criminal 
litigation. The considerable difficulties faced by vulnerable and intimidated witnesses in 
criminal proceedings will be addressed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. While the use of 
concurrent expert evidence currently applies only to specialist civil trials it demonstrates 
the possibility of moving away from the principle of orality and arguably supports the idea 
that such radical moves ought to be considered in the criminal forum. 
Following on from the Australian experience a pilot utilising concurrent evidence from 
experts was undertaken in Manchester Chancery Court. A review of this pilot was 
undertaken by Dame Hazel Jenn156 and sets out the way in which the Australian experience 
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has been utilised. The way in which evidence was received depended on the particular case 
and retained the starting point of the preparation of reports on behalf the parties in the 
normal way. Experts would proceed on the basis of a joint statement summarising matters 
and identifying areas of disagreement. Following an agreed agenda the experts would 
appear in court to give sworn evidence concurrently, with the judge participating in a much 
more inquisitorial style of engagement with the experts to gain insight through more open 
forum with greater participation from those with specialist knowledge.157 
A cause of concern in any departure from the principle of orality would be a perception 
that a completely fresh approach would risk the protection afforded by such a long-
established principles. Arguably a fresh approach is what is needed in a whole variety of 
cases moving through the litigious process. The comfort provided by the system 
established and the time before living memory is not easy to discard. It would not be 
sensible to discard a system which is effective and proven but a failure to consider fresh 
approaches risks continuing with inappropriate techniques for the introduction of 
evidence. In terms of effective decision-making, the bold departure from the principle of 
orality in Australia and its subsequent pilot in Manchester appears to have been mixed: 
On the question of whether the procedure offered a process that was as rigorous as 
sequential evidence with traditional cross-examination, views seemed to be more 
varied and this again reflects a difference of view amongst barristers and solicitors 
and experts. One judge thought there was little difference between this procedure 
and the normal approach, while another thought that some elements of the 
procedure had been more rigorous.158 
Of particular concern in departing from the principle of orality is the adequacy of any test 
of veracity. It is largely on this basis that justifications are given for a lack of radical reform 
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The experts are supposed to be objective. Maybe concurrent evidence does improve 
objectivity because the expert is answering questions put by the judge rather than 
hostile questions of counsel. I try to keep my questions neutral because I may have 
formed a provisional view.159 
The lack of an unequivocal success in any radical departure from the principle of orality 
does not mean it ought not to be considered. Notwithstanding this, this chapter considers 
the specific issues arising in respect of expert evidence the issues addressed are 
transferable to the pressing issues relating to the effect of the principle of orality on those 
witnesses of fact who are vulnerable. New approaches should be considered and lessons 
learned. Lord Justice Jackson’s review of civil litigation was highly controversial but did 
attempt a fresh approach: 
One of the lessons of the pilot studies is that new procedures take time to settle in. 
During the early months the inconvenience, stress and muddle of adapting to the 
changes may make both practitioners and judges questioned the wisdom of the 
reforms. But that is not the right time to judge the reforms. It is only possible to form 
a considered view once the changes have been in place for a period and both judges 
and practitioners have grown accustomed to them.160 
 
3.4 The Continuing Development of the Use of Experts in the Criminal 
Procedure Rules  
 
The provisions of the civil procedure rules governing the use of expert evidence161 make 
plain the obligation of the expert to assist the court as a duty overriding the obligation to 
the party from whom instructions are received. However, issues relating to efficiency and 
cost are driving change in criminal matters and this affects all aspects of the process, 
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criminal procedure is becoming increasingly dominated by managerialist concerns. 
Intolerance to litigant control is motivated by the desire to increase efficiency and 
reduce cost162  
 
The inherent difficulty associated with this having regard to the potential to support those 
who pay rather than proceed on entirely impartial basis has been considered above. As in 
civil proceedings, the Criminal Procedure Rules 2013163 embed an obligation to assist the 
Court in achieving the overriding objective in the giving of an opinion which is objective, 
unbiased and reviewed so that on the giving of oral testimony the expert must be providing 
an up-to-date account having notified to the court of the parties if the opinion set out in 
the original report has been revised.164 Despite the embedding of obligations with the 
criminal procedure rules, the fallibility of the system was recognised resulting in the 
publication of the Law Commission report Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in 
England and Wales.165  
 
A focus of particular concern in the publication of the acknowledgement of the issues 
relating to the reliability of the expert evidence provided in criminal trials in the current 
adversarial system with its reliance on the principle of orality. The process of scrutiny 
undertaken to test witnesses of fact applies equally to experts but given the place of the 
expert in the decision-making process the reliability of that evidence as the basis for 
drawing conclusions on technical matters is crucial. The testing of this type of opinion 
evidence requires scrutiny of the place of the testimony within “a body of knowledge or 
experience which is sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body 
of knowledge or experience”166 commission in its introduction to the report acknowledges 
the failures of the principle of orality in cases leading to serious miscarriages of justice. In 
the cases considered,167 the failure of the traditional Anglo-American trial system to 
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expose the inadequacies of the expert evidence led to a conviction for murder based on 
unreliable in a print evidence (Dallagher), grossly misleading statistical evidence resulting 
in the wrongful conviction of a mother following the death of her infants (Clark) and an 
inappropriately dogmatic opinion resulting in the subsequently quashed conviction of a 
mother for the murder of her sons (Cannings): 
 
The commission acknowledged the need for special rules governing expert evidence 
owing to the particularly privileged position such witnesses hold: 
expert witnesses stand in the very privileged position of being able to provide the 
jury with opinion evidence on matters within their area of expertise outside most 
juror’s knowledge and experience. Moreover, following the demise of the so-called 
ultimate issue rule, expert witnesses can even provide opinion evidence on the 
disputed issues the jury have been empanelled to resolve.168 
 
The particular issues arising from the traditional Anglo-American trial system with its 
reliance on the principle of orality and the historical reliance on the principle of orality as 
the means by which veracity is determined is acknowledged, but not challenged, in the 
report: 
 
Jury, comprised as it is of laypersons, may not be properly equipped in terms of 
education or experience to be able to address the reliability of technical or complex 
expert opinion evidence particular evidence the scientific nature. This being the case, 
there is a real danger the jury’s may simply defer to the opinion of the specialist who 
has been called to provide expert evidence, or the jury’s may focus on perceived 
pointers to reliability (such as the expert’s demeanour or professional status).169 
 
The central proposal of the report is a new reliability-based admissibility test for expert 
opinion evidence. As part of this reliability test the report suggests guidance for exclusion 
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of expert evidence on the grounds of its lack of sufficient reliability. So here is an example 
of the revision of the principle of orality. At no point in the report is the fundamental 
premise that reliance on the principle of orality as the starting point for the receipt of 
expert evidence, in common with evidence from witnesses of fact, flawed but rather a 
series of measures to meet its inadequacies is proposed. The difficulties with the law 
commission proposals, particularly having regard to the ability of the judiciary to 
determine reliability, are acknowledged: 
 
Even if we leave aside concerns about judicial competence in scientific matters, the 
Commission's sufficient reliability test seems to require trial judges to undertake a 
relatively complex task. It involves weighing, among other things, the probative value 
of the other evidence adduced, the importance of the expert evidence in the context 
of the case, the extent of scientific research and data supporting the opinion as well 
as the nature and strength of the opinion that is proffered. The problem with this is 
that the perceived centrality of an opinion to the prosecution case --along with any 
defence response, such as calling a rebuttal expert--may mediate the rigour of 
admissibility standards.170 
 
The problems associated with receipt of evidence from experts who are paid by one party 
but who must avoid partisan opinion has been recognised in common law171 and 
specifically commented upon in the Law Commission’s report. Evidentiary reliability 
relating to expert opinion evidence must meet a minimum threshold and, while this has 
been recognised at common law,172 the Law Commission felt that the reliability 
requirement in the common law admissibility test was not sufficiently robust173 and that 
further statutory guidance would provide an appropriate safeguard. These issues arise 
from the principle of orality and rather than considering whether it will be appropriate to 
have an entirely court-appointed system of expert evidence the Law Commission 
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restricted itself to modifications of the principle of orality rather than considering a 
fundamental review of its appropriateness in such circumstances. 
 
The difficulty of the place of experts within the traditional Anglo-American adversarial trial 
system was considered previously when the Science and Technology Committee of the 
House of Commons made a proposal in Forensic Science on Trial.174 The suggestion made 
at the time to utilise specially trained judges sitting without a jury for the most complex 
matters, while considered as a proposal in the criminal Justice Bill 2002, was only brought 
into effect for the most complex of fraud matters. Clearly this issue has been long 
recognised yet reform is piecemeal and hindered by the continuing prevalence of the 
principle of orality as the linchpin of the system. Arguably a more inquisitorial system, at 
least in respect of the receipt of expert testimony, would address the issue of disputes 
between experts and conflicting interpretations of their findings. To some extent the ‘hot 
tubbing’ idea of the giving of concurrent evidence by experts would move towards a more 
inquisitorial style but would not deal with the partisan nature of initial instruction. 
 
In National justice Cia Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd, The Ikarian Reefer175 
Creswell J provided guidance on the receipt of expert evidence which was summarised as 
follows: 
 
1.  Expert evidence presented to the court should be seen to be the independent 
product of the expert uninfluenced as to the form or content by the exigencies 
of litigation.  
2. An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the court by way of 
objected unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise. An expert 
witness in the High Court should never assume the role of advocate. 
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3. An expert witness should state the facts assumptions on which his opinion is 
based. He should not omit to consider material facts which detract from his 
concluded opinion.  
4. Experts should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his 
expertise.  
5. If an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because he considers that 
insufficient data are available and this must be stated with an indication that the 
opinion is no more than a provisional one. 
6.  If after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes as fuel material matters, 
such changes or of view should be communicated to the side without delay and 
when appropriate to the court.176 
 
The above guidance seeks to address the inherent issues associated with receipt of expert 
evidence within the adversarial trial system yet there does not appear to be a more 
fundamental review to consider the possibility of a more appropriate means for assessing 
technical matters. In fact, the government’s response to Law Commission report Expert 
Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales177 demonstrates continuing 
reluctance to address the more pressing issues associated with the legacy of the principle 
of orality, and a predominantly costs driven response. The Ministry of Justice published a 
response to the Law Commission’s report on 21 November 2013178 which is notable in its 
dismissive brevity at 14 pages of the 219 page original Law Commission report. In essence, 
the government’s response was to note the cost associated with a root and branch reform 
and a preference for a more straightforward and cost effective amendment part 33 of the 
criminal procedure rules governing the use of expert evidence.179 Prior to the 
government’s response the efficacy of the far more radical legislative proposals set out in 
the Law Commission’s report was reviewed in Edmond and Roberts The Law Commission's 
Report on Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings [2011] Crim LR 844: 
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If the accusatorial trial does not routinely identify and expose problems then 
practice seems to be substantially displaced from longstanding, and 
cherished, criminal justice principles. If the limitations with incriminating 
expert opinion evidence are not identified and explained and fully understood 
then risks of unfairness and the corruption of proof will be borne by those 
accused of criminal activity.180 
 
No heed appeared to have been taken of these concerns and the principle of orality set 
within the partisan system continued with only modest updating to the procedural code. 
 
The most recent update of the code applicable to giving of expert testimony in criminal 
proceedings can be seen in Rule 19 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 and its associated 
Practice Direction updated in April 2016. The Practice Direction seeks to deal with the 
reliability associated with the use of experts and provides:181 
 
 
Content of expert’s report  
19.4. Where rule 19.3(3) applies, an expert’s report must—  
(a) give details of the expert’s qualifications, relevant experience and 
accreditation;  
(b) give details of any literature or other information which the expert has 
relied on in making the report;  
(c) contain a statement setting out the substance of all facts given to the 
expert which are material to the opinions expressed in the report, or upon 
which those opinions are based;  
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(d) make clear which of the facts stated in the report are within the expert’s 
own knowledge;  
(e) say who carried out any examination, measurement, test or experiment 
which the expert has used for the report and—  
(i) give the qualifications, relevant experience and accreditation of 
that person,  
(ii) say whether or not the examination, measurement, test or 
experiment was carried out under the expert’s supervision, and  
(iii) summarise the findings on which the expert relies;  
(f) where there is a range of opinion on the matters dealt with in the report—  
(i) summarise the range of opinion, and  
(ii) give reasons for the expert’s own opinion;  
(g) if the expert is not able to give an opinion without qualification, state the 
qualification;  
(h) include such information as the court may need to decide whether the 
expert’s opinion is sufficiently reliable to be admissible as evidence;  
(i) contain a summary of the conclusions reached;  
(j) contain a statement that the expert understands an expert’s duty to the 
court, and has complied and will continue to comply with that duty; and  
(k) contain the same declaration of truth as a witness statement.  
 
By the implementation of the 2016 Practice Direction, the Criminal Procedure Rules 
Committee sought to address the issue relating to the difficulty of reliability concerning 
expert evidence following the judgement in R v Dlugosz and others in which the Court of 
Appeal acknowledged:182  
 
It is essential to recall the principle which is applicable namely determining 
the issue of admissibility, the court must be satisfied that there is sufficiently 
 
 




reliable scientific basis for the evidence to be admitted. If there is then the 
court leaves the opposing views to be tested before the jury.183 
 
The Criminal Practice direction goes further to embed the importance of a robust approach 
to an assessment of reliability. While the importance of assessing reliability has been 
recognised in cases such as R v H184 in which the need for greater care in the use of experts 
was acknowledged: 
 
More rigorous approach on the part of advocates and caused the handling of 
expert evidence.185 
 
The 2016 Criminal Practice Direction seeks to acknowledge the concern relating to the 
reliability of expert witnesses and requires that the court should be ‘astute to identifying 
potential flaws in such opinion which detract from its reliability.’186 Matters such as the 
scrutiny placed upon the hypothesis, based on an unjustifiable assumption, the reliance 
on techniques or methods may be appropriate and improper reliance on an inference or 
conclusion are embedded in the practice direction to improve reliability. However, the 
possibility of adopting more radical measures such as the possibility of the use of 
concurrent expert evidence in a so-called ‘hot tubbing’187 which would more radically 
address issues of reliability rather than continue to seek to address the inadequacies of the 
principle of orality and the innate partisan nature of the giving of opinion evidence from 
those whose expertise is sought from a particular party. 
 
The Criminal Practice Directions: amendment No.8188 came into force on 1 April 2019 and 
seeks to allay the disquiet around miscarriages of justice by adding three sections to assist 
the court and provide clarification to experts as to their disclosure obligations. The 
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updated Criminal Practice Direction189 requires an assessment of key factors as part of 
determining the reliability of expert opinion. The introduction of the three new sections 
serves to highlight the extent to which all aspects of the expert’s credentials should be 
considered: 
 
To assist in the assessment described above, CrimPR 19.3(3)(c) requires a party who 
introduces expert evidence to give notice of anything of which that party is aware 
which might reasonably be thought capable of undermining the reliability of the 
expert’s opinion, or detracting from the credibility or impartiality of the expert.190 
 
The Practice Directions then proceeds to delineate those matters that should be disclosed 
by the expert: 
 
Examples of matters that should be disclosed pursuant to those rules include (this is 
not a comprehensive list), both in relation to the expert and in relation to any 
corporation or other body with which the expert works, as an employee or in any 
other capacity:  
(a) any fee arrangement under which the amount or payment of the 
expert’s fees is in any way dependent on the outcome of the case (see also 
the declaration required by paragraph 19B.1 of these directions);  
(b) any conflict of interest of any kind, other than a potential conflict 
disclosed in the expert’s report (see also the declaration required by 
paragraph 19B.1 of these directions);  
(c) adverse judicial comment;  
(d) any case in which an appeal has been allowed by reason of a deficiency 
in the expert’s evidence;  
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(e) any adverse finding, disciplinary proceedings or other criticism by a 
professional, regulatory or registration body or authority, including the 
Forensic Science Regulator;  
(f) any such adverse finding or disciplinary proceedings against, or other 
such criticism of, others associated with the corporation or other body with 
which the expert works which calls into question the quality of that 
corporation's or body's work generally;  
(g) conviction of a criminal offence in circumstances that suggest:  
(i) a lack of respect for, or understanding of, the interests of the 
criminal justice system (for example, perjury; acts perverting or 
tending to pervert the course of public justice 
(ii) dishonesty (for example, theft or fraud), or  
(iii) a lack of personal integrity (for example, corruption or a sexual 
offence);  
(h) lack of an accreditation or other commitment to prescribed standards 
where that might be expected;  
(i) a history of failure or poor performance in quality or proficiency 
assessments;  
(j) a history of lax or inadequate scientific methods;  
(k) a history of failure to observe recognised standards in the expert’s area 
of expertise;  
(l) a history of failure to adhere to the standards expected of an expert 
witness in the criminal justice system.191  
 
The matters listed include serious issues relating to personal or professional conduct and 
integrity, including of the organisation to which the expert is affiliated. 
 
Shortly before the introduction of these new additions to the practice direction such 
matters were considered in R v Pabon,192 which centred around the complex issue of 
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LIBOR (The London Inter-Bank Offered Rate) and the question of fraud in relation to 
those employed at Barclays Bank PLC. An expert (Professor Rowe) was employed and 
failed on scrutiny by the judge in the giving of evidence: 
 
Put bluntly, Rowe signally failed to comply with his basic duties as an expert. As will 
already be apparent, he signed declarations of truth and of understanding his 
disclosure duties, knowing that he had failed to comply with these obligations 
alternatively, at best, recklessly. He obscured the role Mr O'Kane had played in 
preparing his report. On the material available to us, he did not inform the SFO, or 
the Court, of the limits of his expertise. He strayed into areas in his evidence (in 
particular, STIR trading) when it was beyond his expertise (or, most charitably, at 
the outer edge of his expertise) – a matter glaringly revealed by his need to consult 
Ms Biddle, Mr Zapties and Mr Van Overstraeten. In this regard, he was no more 
than (in Bingham LJ's words) an “enthusiastic amateur”. He flouted the Judge's 
admonition not to discuss his evidence while he was still in the witness box. We 
take a grave view of Rowe's conduct; questions of sanction are not for us, so we say 
no more of sanction but highlight his failings here for the consideration of others.193 
 
The failings of this expert would clearly fall into the realms of the newly introduced list 
above. The question must surely remain that in such circumstances how likely is it that an 
expert would declare such levels of inadequacy and impropriety. A footnote to the 
judgment is telling as to the flaws in the use of expert evidence using the traditional 
system with reliance of the principle of orality to uncover such issues: 
 
The instruction of Rowe turned into an embarrassing debacle for the SFO, all the 
more so, given the high-profile nature of these cases and notwithstanding that, in 
the event, it has had no impact on the outcome in this case. We pressed Mr Hines 
as to whether there was an internal report, dealing with lessons learnt. We 
subsequently received a helpful letter from the SFO's General Counsel, dated 27th 
 
 




November 2017, stating that there was no such document but that there had been 
extensive internal discussions resulting in the conclusion “…that Rowe's conduct 
resulted from a failure of integrity on his part rather than a failure of SFO policies or 
procedures”. The SFO undertook to look again at the matter to see whether there 
was any way in which it could reinforce expert witnesses' awareness of their 




Following from Chapter 2, issues considered in this chapter demonstrate the absence of a 
consensus bridging both civil and criminal litigation in terms of policy. Considerable 
reforms, embedded both in the civil procedure rules and the criminal procedure rules, and 
associated practice directions go a long way to fixing the issues associated with the 
principle of orality and the inherent dangers identified within the current system. 
However, there appears to be no question of challenging the pre-eminence of the principle 
of orality as the starting point for receipt of evidence from experts but rather to reduce its 
impact by significant and continuing reform. It is of note that a number of the reforms 
identified in this thesis affect procedure in both the civil and criminal courts. The use of 
expert testimony creates similar difficulties across both civil and criminal litigation, but the 
amendments to procedural rules seek to address particular concerns arising in each. The 
amendments to civil and criminal litigation are similar but not the same. This in itself 
creates a more complex structural framework than might be the case if the 












CHAPTER 4 - THE INTRODUCTION OF SPECIAL MEASURES IN THE 





The system of adversarial trials and the principle of orality in the giving of testimony by 
witnesses is often perceived as a stressful and intimidating experience for adults and a 
truly traumatising and daunting experience for those witnesses who are vulnerable or 
intimidated. From the 1980s onwards there has been incremental change acknowledging 
the almost insurmountable hurdles faced by many witnesses in the process of giving 
evidence and an acceptance that such hurdles place an unacceptable barrier to those most 
in need of support and protection.195  
 
Lord Devlin’s remark that ‘the centrepiece of the adversary system is the oral trial’196 
centres on the understanding that the witness should give a factual account from direct 
knowledge, capable of being tested. The three-stage process for the giving of evidence 
embedded within the system of criminal justice in an adversarial framework sets out a 
formalised mechanism for this process. That is the system of testing comprising of 
evidence-in-chief; cross-examination and re-examination. Each stage of that process 
would traditionally take place in open court and be the subject of scrutiny by the jury in 
the Crown Court, the Justices in the Magistrates’ Court or the Judge in a civil trial. The 
question posed is why as a starting point across a variety of litigious forums it is seen as 
appropriate to achieve fact finding by calling a witness in person and for the witness to be 
tested by cross-examination, which, by its very nature, is challenging? Cleary, the 
challenging of disputed evidence must be facilitated. But this perception that the process 
of questioning witnesses in open court is superior has been open to scrutiny and 
modification in a variety of processes. It has perhaps caused the greatest difficulty in the 
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criminal trial system when the witness is a child or is otherwise vulnerable or intimidated. 
By the late 1980s, this system of testing witnesses was questioned ‘Alleged superiority of 
oral testimony is not universally accepted. Like historians, continental jurisdictions prefer 
documentary sources.’197  
 
 
4.2  The Special Measures 
 
An aspect of the principle of orality not considered earlier is the requirement that in order 
even to have their testimony considered all witnesses must meet a minimum competence 
threshold. As with other aspects of the principle of orality improvements through reform 
have been brought about by amendments and adjustments rather than a fresh approach 
to whether it is the appropriate means by which such matters should be considered. The 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 provides for a much improved approach, and 
the adjustments made do forge a way through the previous constraints arising from the 
strict application of the principle of orality. A new test of competence is set out198 together 
with provision to accept the unsworn evidence of children under 14199 and to allow for the 
receiving of unsworn evidence from adult witnesses who pass the test for competence but 
who do not satisfy the requirement that they show a sufficient appreciation of the 
solemnity of the occasion and the particular responsibility to tell the truth which is involved 
in taking the oath:200 
 
Whilst the test of competence is improved and modernised this does nothing to 
alleviate the impact of the giving of evidence. The experience for numerous 
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This aspect of trial process should be borne in mind when considering special measures. 
It will be considered in more detail in relation to the developing landscape of trials in 
Chapter 5. 
 
The difficulties faced by vulnerable witnesses derive from the alien nature of the court with 
the formality of the trial process placing an unacceptable burden. Children in particular 
face a difficult experience in telling their stories in a court setting with its unfamiliar terms 
and confusing questioning, even with the assistance of video links and other supportive 
reforms. This chapter demonstrates the special measures and the resultant modifications 
to the principle of orality, but even so, the experience remains daunting. The NSPCC 
researched the experience of child witnesses and concluded “Despite a network of policies 
and procedures intended to facilitate children’s evidence, only a handful of young 
witnesses… gave evidence in anything approaching the optimum circumstances. Their 
experiences revealed a chasm - an implementation gap - between policy objectives and 
actual delivery around the country.”202 
 
Equally, victims of sexual offences face daunting examination of what would normally be 
private matters. The adversarial system is such that an attack on the credibility of these 
witnesses is commonplace. Questioning will frequently deal with matters of intense 
difficulty in suggesting the witness lacks credibility and seek to question the veracity of a 
witness making deeply distressing allegations. 
 
The principle of orality assumes that all witnesses are capable of speaking up for 
themselves and standing up to the testing nature of cross-examination. There have been 
three areas identified as a cause for additional stress for witnesses who have learning 
disabilities.203 Such witnesses often are not able to recall as readily as others and may 
struggle with recounting facts; secondly, these witnesses will frequently find 
communication hampered and finally the process of cross-examination, with its testing 
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and challenging style, may well result in this category of witness giving answers which are 
perceived as desirable to please the questioner. 
 
Witnesses who have been subjected to brutality and remain intimidated face hurdles in 
the giving of testimony in the orthodox style in open court and only the brave may attempt 
to meet such a challenge. 
 
Early measures to address these clear issues in the administration of criminal justice 
appeared in the Criminal Justice Act 1988. The provision allowing evidence to be given by 
live television link204 for children in cases involving sexual or violent offences was a step in 
the right direction. 
 
There followed the seminal report of the advisory group, known as the Pigot Report,205 
which sought to address the difficulties faced by children and vulnerable witnesses in the 
trial process. Right from the outset, the clear problem of ensuring the defendant had a 
continued right to test evidence through cross-examination proved an obstacle. The 
advisory group considered the methods available to deal with such cases swiftly and to do 
so in such a way as to keep the child witness away from the formality of the courtroom 
where appropriate. The recommendations arising from the Pigot report included provision 
that in cases involving sex or violence evidence should be given by way of a television link 
and that the first stage of the process, evidence-in-chief, should be pre-recorded. It was 
also envisaged that cross-examination should be conducted away from the court setting 
resulting in the removal of the need for a child to appear in court. However, these 
recommendations were not fully implemented with only a partial introduction of the 
recommendations in the Criminal Justice Act 1991.206 The reasons for  a lack of full 
implementation can be seen as a continuing undermining of the reforms and serves to 
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highlight the impact of starting the process with the principle of orality rather than taking 
a bold approach to a more appropriate system: 
 
However, in 1990, the government adopted the "half-Pigot" scheme, which 
permitted the pre-recording of the evidence-in-chief but not the cross-examination. 
Forensic interviews were to be conducted in accordance with detailed guidance laid 
out in the Memorandum of Good Practice for Video-recorded Interviews,12 which 
was later replaced by the Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) Guidance.13 These video-
recordings were to be played as the evidence-in-chief if trials ensued, but children 
were still required to appear at trial to be cross-examined. Parliament later 
authorised pre-trial cross-examination as a special measure in s.28 of the Youth 
Justice and Criminal Evidence Act in 1999, but implementation was suspended due 
to concerns regarding the required procedural changes, the available technology, the 
cost, the rights of the defendant, and the possible need to recall child witnesses when 
further information became available.207 
 
Although the legislation now afforded the opportunity of pre-recorded evidence-in-chief 
much of the Pigot report remained to be addressed. 
The failure of the legislation to implement key recommendations was considered by a 
member of the Pigot Group Jenifer Tempkin. Her concerns centred on the considered view 
of the Pigot Committee that the child should, insofar as possible, be kept away from the 
court in criminal proceedings. The Pigot group expressed the view that children should give 
evidence at a preliminary stage in circumstances where they could feel comfortable with 
only the judge and advocates for each party present. The lack of preliminary hearings in 
the measures brought forward was met with a considerable degree of concern:  
 
The Government's rejection of the idea of the preliminary hearing has been greeted 
with dismay by psychiatrists, social workers, police and crown prosecutors who 
 
 





regularly deal with child abuse cases. Child witnesses in sexual abuse trials are all too 
often put through the mill and doubly traumatised.208 
 
The continued concerns in the inadequacies of the system were recognised, and a Home 
Office interdepartmental working group was set up in 1997. The group honoured a 
manifesto pledge of the new Labour administration to protect vulnerable witnesses and 
enable them to achieve the best evidence in court proceedings. This group went on to 
publish its report ‘Speaking Up for Justice’ by the summer of 1988.209 The membership of 
the group was drawn from a wide range of disciplines including, inter-alia, the Crown 
Prosecution Service, the Home Office and Victim Support groups. The group’s total of 78 
recommendations resulted in the measures set out to address the needs of children and 
other vulnerable and intimidated witnesses in Part II of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999. In particular the complex, and rather unwieldy, regime of special 
measures sought to deal with the main recommendations arising from the Speaking up for 
Justice Report and brought about the most radical reforms to date in the developments 
towards a system of criminal justice which recognises the need to support those witnesses 
who are capable of providing good evidence but are severely impeded by a range of 
difficulties in testifying. 
 
While the YJCEA 1999 received royal assent in July 1999, many of the measures were to be 
brought in through a phased programme of implementation.210 The practical reality of 
embedding a system in a consistent and reliable manner has been the subject of continuing 
concern and remains under review. 
 
A range of measures designed to address the 78 recommendations set out in the Speaking 
Up for Justice Report211 were enacted in Part II of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999. These measures herald a new era of a more comprehensive and systematic 
provision of support and appropriate treatment for children and other vulnerable or 
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intimidated witnesses. However, the initial simplicity in the categorisation of witnesses 
entitled to a special measures direction belies the complexity of the detail in the 
application of the procedures. The provisions allow for a departure from the traditional 
trial procedure and modify how certain witnesses will provide testimony to the court. 
 
Royal Assent was granted in 1999 and the programme of implementation rolled out across 
both Magistrates’ and Crown Courts. The Act covers a wide range of matters including the 
definition of a vulnerable or intimidated witness; a test for those eligible; the spectrum of 
special measures to provide a supportive environment in which testimony can be given; 
special recognition of the child as a witness; an absolute prohibition on the cross-
examination of complainants in sexual cases and prescribed child witnesses by the 
defendant and a discretionary prohibition in other cases; limitations on the questioning of 
victims of sexual offences about sexual history and restrictions on press coverage. The Act 
also introduces a new test for competence, providing a different emphasis in the attitude 
towards the level of sophistication required before a witness is regarded as capable of 
providing testimony. 
 
While these provisions appear laudable in meeting the majority of the recommendations 
of the Speaking Up for Justice Report, they are seen as lacking in four major respects.212 
The regime introduced is regarded by commentators as unnecessary in its level of 
complexity. Secondly, the distinction made between those children giving testimony in 
sexual offence cases and those involved in offences of physical violence is seen as crude 
and inflexible. Thirdly, the failure to bring in the provision allowing for cross-examination 
to be pre-recorded213 thwarts one of the main objectives of the Pigot Report, which was 
to keep the child away from the court and is referred to as the ‘half Pigot’.214 Fourthly, 
more could have been achieved in the bringing in of the YJCEA to ensure witnesses in need 
of special measures were identified and assessed and that all initial interviews were 
recorded in a suitable friendly environment as a matter of course. This, together with 
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tighter controls on those advocates using the trial process to trick the witness with difficult 
and inappropriate questioning,215 would have met the objectives set out by Pigot at a much 
earlier stage. It can be seen that Pigot sought to move away from the principle of orality, 
but ultimately the reforms that were to follow have been caught up by its constraints. 
 
To consider the burden of the principle of orality within the reforms, it is necessary to look 
at the regime that was implemented to overcome its worst effects. A starting point is to 
identify whether the witness is vulnerable or intimated as set out in sections 16 and 17 of 
the Act.216 
 
A vulnerable witness is defined at section 16 as one who is under 18 years old217 or a person 
whose evidence is likely to be of diminished quality arising from a mental disorder or a 
significant impairment of intelligence and social functioning or a physical disability or 
disorder. In determining the extent to which a witness suffers from a physical disability or 
is suffering from a physical disorder, consideration will be given by the court to the views 
expressed by the witness. 
 
Section 16 refers to the quality of the evidence, and this is to be considered in terms of its 
completeness; coherence and accuracy. Coherence is assessed by reference to the ability 
the witness displays in testifying and the giving of answers which address the questions 
asked and which are capable of being understood. 
 
Section 17 defines an intimidated witness as one in respect of whom the court is satisfied 
that the quality of evidence given by the witness is likely to be diminished because of fear 
or distress on the part of the witness in connection with testifying in the proceedings. 
 
To determine if a witness comes within section 17, the court takes account of the nature 
and alleged circumstances of the offence in question and the age of the witnesses. Account 
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is also taken of other matters which appear to the court to be relevant, which are social 
and cultural background and ethnicity; circumstances relating to employment and 
domestic circumstances; religion and politics and notably the attitude of the accused 
towards the victim or the behaviour of anyone associated with the accused. The witness is 
entitled to have his or her opinion taken into account. Automatic eligibility is given to 
witnesses who are also victims of sexual offences although the victim remains entitled to 
decline special measures. Section 17(5) is an addition made by the Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009218 allowing for similar provision, with an opt out at the request of the witness, for 
automatic eligibility where the offence is specified as a relevant offence relating to 
offences involving the use of guns or knives. 
 
If any of the criteria in sections 16 or 17 are satisfied, it follows that the witness can be the 
subject of a special measures direction. 
 
Once a determination has been made in respect of the criteria for consideration in sections 
16 and 17, the court must then have regard to the eligibility criteria set out in section 19. 
On the application of the party calling the witness, or of its own motion, the court may 
make an order if it considers that a special measure or combination of special measures 
would be likely to improve the quality of the evidence given by the witness. The task then 
falls to the court to determine which single measure or combination of measures would 
best serve the interests of allowing the witness to give evidence in a manner acceptable to 
the needs of that witness. The court will need to consider how to obtain the best evidence 
in all the circumstances taking account of the views of the witness but also having regard 
to the extent to which the measures reduce the testing of that evidence.219 While the court 
has discretion in deciding on whether special measures may serve to improve the likely 
quality of the evidence, having reached that decision, there is no remaining discretion, and 
the appropriate order must then be made. Once in place, the special measures will apply 
throughout the proceedings.220 
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There are eight special measures set out in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
each with its own, sometimes almost impenetrable, criteria which must be considered in 
conjunction with any issues relating to eligibility. 
 
Looking at the measures in turn and in particular considering the impact of the principle of 
orality. 
 
The provision of screens to shield the witness is set out in section 23. This measure reduces 
the obvious stress associated with the witness faced with confronting the accused. The 
stress inherent in confrontation generally is sufficiently difficult and for that confrontation 
to take place in the formal and alien surroundings of the court serves to make the situation 
worse. Having regard to the special considerations applying to child witnesses, it is unlikely 
that the special measure of a screen will feature to any significant extent. However, its 
place in the range of special measures demonstrates the particular issues arising in the 
assumption that giving evidence in open court is the starting point from which the process 
incrementally withdraws. It may have limited application in those situations where the 
child has indicated a preference to give evidence in open court, and this measure is 
considered a suitable alternative to the live TV link. More likely, this measure will be used 
in situations where adult witnesses have been assessed as eligible for special measures. 
The screen should be erected in such a way as to allow the participants in the trial process, 
other than the accused, to view the witness. The purpose of the screen is to facilitate the 
giving of evidence and not to prevent its evaluation by the judge, jury and advocates. It is 
a shield for the vulnerable rather than a device to avoid scrutiny. The question is why such 
a shield for the vulnerable is necessary and whether a re-evaluation of the system at a 
more fundamental level is the issue. 
 
Evidence by live link is set out in section 24. The concept of remote evidence via a live TV 
link was one of the earliest measures to become available in previous legislation.221 The 
 
 




link is set up to facilitate the giving of evidence during a live trial so that, while the witness 
is within the precincts of the court and the giving of evidence is contemporaneous with 
the proceedings, the environment is less intimidating, and the austere nature of the court 
layout avoided. Having regard to the primary rule that child witnesses give evidence 
outside the courtroom,222 it will be only in exceptional circumstances that the child will be 
brought to face the giving of evidence in open court. The view expressed that giving 
evidence in open court should be considered the norm for witnesses223 has been 
superseded by the special measures now in place as the standard default position for the 
eligible vulnerable witness. However, that ‘norm’ rather than having been replaced has 
again been modified.  
 
A new section 33A224 allows for the use of a link for defendants under 18 and those over 
18 affected by a mental disorder. The conditions for the use of links for an accused in this 
way has been mirrored to a large extent by the new section 33B which allows the use of 
intermediaries as a special  measure to assist certain defendants. 
 
Evidence in private (clearing the court in sexual cases or where there has been or may be 
intimidation) is set out in section 25. This provision allows for the court to allow only those 
participants necessary in the trial process to remain and the normal open court 
arrangement to be restricted. This means that only the defendant together with the judge; 
jury; legal representatives; interpreter or assistant (where appropriate) and limited media 
would be permitted. The departure from the normal open court arrangement would be 
for the duration of the evidence provided by the witness in respect of whom this special 
measure is made. Given this approach of clearing the court is a departure from the normal 
principle of open justice and enshrined as a right within the ECHR its use is limited so as 
not to infringe the right to a fair trial.225 The provision is therefore available for the trial of 
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Removal of wigs and gowns is set out in section 26. This measure has long been available 
within the inherent jurisdiction of the court and is now set out on a statutory footing. It 
has no record of controversy in its use. There is little or no scope to argue its 
implementation will infringe the right to a fair trial. It is a minimal approach to reducing 
the formality of the court setting to set an eligible witness at greater ease. The removal of 
wigs and gowns does little more than to change the tone of the proceedings and assist in 
removing aspects of austerity and solemnity, which may unsettle the vulnerable witness. 
 
Video recorded evidence-in-chief is set out in section 27. s32A of the Criminal Justice Act 
1988 as inserted by s54 Criminal Justice Act 1991 provided the original statutory basis for 
the introduction of this flagship of special measures. Initially limited to child witnesses, it 
was extended to all criminal proceedings and all eligible witnesses. Perhaps more than any 
other, this provision changed the landscape in departing, for the first time, from the 
orthodox trial process in allowing some of the evidence to be video recorded in advance 
and delivered without the witness being in the courtroom. A plethora of technical 
difficulties soon became apparent in gathering evidence in this manner. An early 
‘memorandum of good practice’ provided guidance and has now been updated to provide 
detailed and comprehensive coverage of the various issues to be addressed. While a non-
statutory code, the memorandum is accepted as the normal standard in the way in which 
this evidence is prepared. The guidance, updated in 2011, Achieving Best Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings, is published by the Crown Prosecution Service. The video recorded 
evidence serves to replace the examination-in-chief of the witness and stands as evidence 
of its content in exactly the way that live direct testimony would.226 Given the nature of 
showing evidence which is not contemporaneous with the proceedings, power exists to 
limit its use in the interests of justice.227 The collection of oral testimony away from the 
normal intervention from the opponent’s legal representative and the judge may well 
result in the inclusion of a range of otherwise inadmissible matters. There is nothing in the 
advance recording of evidence-in-chief which removes the normal considerations of 
prejudice to the accused by references to otherwise inadmissible material, such as bad 
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character. The very nature of evidence from a vulnerable witness is such that some 
prejudicial material is likely to be included and the decision as to whether to use the 
recording, in whole or in part, will be determined by reference to the interests of justice. 
It is a question of balancing the probative value against the risk of prejudice to the accused. 
The manner in which the recording was obtained, such as the avoidance of leading 
questions as detailed in the guidance on achieving best evidence, will be considered in 
determining that balance.  
 
The test for the admissibility of the video-recorded evidence was whether a 
reasonable jury properly directed could be sure that the witness had given a credible 
and accurate account on the videotape, notwithstanding any breaches of the 
guidelines. The reliability of the evidence would normally be assessed by reference 
to the interview itself, the conditions under which it had been held, the age of the 
child, and the nature and extent of any breach of the guidelines.228 
 
An additional consideration created by collecting evidence in this pre-recorded format is 
the preparation of a transcript and the use that may be made of that document during the 
proceedings. ‘Achieving Best Evidence’ (the guidance) sets out the process for the 
preparation of a transcript and the various uses to which it may be put both in preparation 
for and during the proceedings. The transcript may be an exhibit or may replace the normal 
full witness statement. In whatever form it appears the witness may refer to it prior to 
attending court for cross-examination via a live TV link. To do otherwise would be to treat 
the vulnerable witness in a way less favourable than other witnesses who can read their 
earlier statements before giving oral testimony.229 A more controversial aspect is whether 
the jury or justices should be allowed to have copies of the transcript while watching the 
video recorded examination-in-chief. The technical difficulties in obtaining clearly audible 
testimony from a young child or an otherwise vulnerable witness are apparent and 
recognised in the guidance. As such, the transcript would obviously be of assistance to the 
jury in ensuring correct interpretation of the evidence and ensuring the best evidence is 
 
 
228 R v K 2006 EWCA 




received in a situation where the witness cannot be asked to speak up or repeat a point, 
as would be the case with live oral testimony given during the trial. However, given the 
jury see the evidence presented in a different format by comparison with other witnesses 
of fact then it is important a judicial direction is given to the effect that the evidence is the 
content of the video clip and not the transcript itself. A failure in this regard may well result 
in a successful appeal: 
 
that although the judge could not be criticized for having permitted the jury to see 
the video evidence, he had failed to give them any warning about the risks of 
attaching undue weight to the transcript of that evidence230 
 
A more difficult point is whether it may be permissible to allow the recording to be viewed 
more than once. This would be a significant departure from live oral testimony when it 
would be very unlikely that a witness is recalled to give evidence more than once. Even if 
that were to be the case, it would relate to a new issue rather than a reiteration of previous 
testimony. It is clear that a second viewing should only be allowed exceptionally231 and in 
the presence of the judge and advocates with an appropriate warning as to its weight 
(above). 
 
Another important argument was in relation to the right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR. 
This matter was settled in R. (on the application of D) v Camberwell Green Youth Court 
[2005]232 when the issue was considered and determined clearly in favour of the use of 
pre-recorded testimony. 
 
Video recorded cross-examination or re-examination is set out in section 28. The thrust of 
the Pigot report was to keep children away from the court and to have the whole of the 
process of giving oral testimony pre-recorded. This would represent the most striking and 
radical departure from the principle of orality. In that way, the stress of the proceedings 
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could be minimised and the evidence in its entirety available in advance. The enactment 
of section 28 would appear to complete the process in accommodating the ‘full Pigot’. The 
completion of the three-stage process of oral testimony would be in accordance with the 
requirement that cross-examination and re-examination would be with the legal 
representative and the judge, but not the accused, present and able to communicate with 
the makers of the recording. The accused, whilst not present at the recording, would be 
able to observe the cross-examination and to communicate with legal representatives. 
Similarly to examination-in-chief the recording would stand as direct oral testimony, and 
no further questions would be allowed without additional directions. In this way, the 
witness need not be present at all during the trial. The right to a fair trial is not infringed in 
that the accused has the opportunity to test the evidence. It has been established in R. (on 
the application of D) v Camberwell Green Youth Court 2005 that there is no right to 
physical confrontation in the right to a fair trial under Art. 6 of the ECHR. The sticking point 
with section 28 is its lack of implementation with decades passing from its initial proposal 
with no real prospect of it becoming normal practice in trials. There were, however, initial 
pilot studies233 followed by an expansion with effect from 3 June 2019.234 It remains to be 
seen if this very radical departure from the principle of orality, having been waiting in the 
wings for more than two decades, will eventually be established as a norm.  
 
Examination of witness through an intermediary is set out in section 29. The concept that 
those for whom English is not a first language and therefore require the assistance of an 
interpreter in the giving of oral testimony has long been accepted practice. However, the 
idea of the intermediary as introduced in section 29 was an innovation serving an entirely 
different purpose in the facilitation of the giving of evidence by children and other 
vulnerable witnesses defined under section 16. The innovative aspect is that this type of 
intermediary will be able to interpret the questions and answers in the situation where the 
narrower function of the interpreter to translate literally does not allow for effective 
communication. The judge and the jury must be able to see and hear the intermediary 
(with the exception of pre-recorded examination-in-chief) as must the legal 
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representatives. It is argued that by providing a conduit between the witness and the 
court, the intermediary facilitates the giving of testimony by allowing more effective 
communication.235 
 
The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act has an extension of this provision236 in s33BA 
to enable this measure to be used to assist the giving of testimony by defendants under 
18 and adults whose level of social functioning or intellectual impairment or mental 
disorder (within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983) and when the use of an 
intermediary is in the interests of justice. For those defendants under the age of 18, the 
court must determine that the giving of evidence will be compromised and that the use of 
an intermediary will allow for more effective participation. The court gives reasons for its 
decision whether to make a direction under s33BA and must be satisfied than an 
intermediary is required to meet the right of the defendant to receive a fair trial. 
 
Aids to communication are set out in section 30. A witness eligible to receive assistance by 
way of a special measures direction under s16, who is vulnerable, rather than intimidated, 
may be provided with a device to assist in communication. It may be that the ability to 
express through speech, for example, following a stroke, does not allow the witness to give 
the evidence through the normal means of oral communication. The witness in that 
situation may be able to give high quality evidence expressed through an aid to 
communication such as a specially prepared book allowing the witness to point to a symbol 
or answer from a selection available. This means that any disability or other impairment 
should not prevent the witness giving evidence (either in the court or elsewhere) when an 
aid to communication can be provided to assist in overcoming the obstacle the witness 
encounters in communicating orally. 
 
Intermediaries and communication aids are only available for vulnerable witnesses within 
the meaning of s16. However, the normal rules concerning foreign language interpreters 
and those providing signing for the deaf remain as before. As such, the special measures 
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in ss29-30 serve to enhance the normal provisions for those eligible while leaving the 
provisions for other witnesses intact. 
 
In respect of a child witness, the eligibility criteria must be considered with additional 
considerations set out in section 21. The child must normally be given a special measures 
direction allowing for evidence-in-chief to be pre-recorded and for cross-examinational 
and re-examination to be via a live television link.237 This is known as the primary rule. If 
the court considers that compliance with this would not be likely to maximise the quality 
of the evidence of the child or the child has requested this does not apply consideration 
will be given to other special measures which may be appropriate and acceptable to the 
child. This may be appropriate where the child is a teenager, and the court is satisfied that 
giving evidence in open court will not diminish the quality of the evidence having regard 
to a range of factors including age; maturity; any relationship with the accused and cultural 
and social issues. In this situation a screen would normally be considered an appropriate 
alternative.  
 
Other measures introduced to compliment the special measures and facilitate the giving 
of evidence by witnesses for whom the traditional open court principle of orality is 
unacceptable demonstrate the extent to which, together with the range of special 
measures considered above, the current trend to modify and adjust the standard format 
for the receipt of evidence tinkers with a formula when a more radical review of the 
suitability of the system, with its origins from the time of Henry II, is required to meet the 
needs of current day fact finding. 
 
Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act implemented reforms to the 
much criticised238 provisions restricting the questioning of victims of sexual offences found 
at common law and latterly in s 2 of the Sexual Offence (Amendment) Act 1976. The 
starting point is the recognition that questioning regarding sexual behaviour is not 
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considered acceptable, and the general ban on such questioning or evidence within the 
legislation is set out in s41(1). 
 
This general ban must not infringe the defendant’s right to a fair trial and thus contravene 
art.6 of the ECHR. It follows that the ban is general, rather than absolute, with tight 
limitations placed on exceptions. The accused is still able to ask questions (via a legal 
representative) and adduce evidence relating to the event in question. Otherwise leave 
may be given to pursue matters relating to sexual behaviour only if the conditions set out 
in s41(2) are met. These conditions are very limited and apply where otherwise any 
conviction may be unsafe. This departure from the standard procedure for cross-
examination again highlights a hybrid version of the principle of orality within a system of 
special measures already providing for a modified system. Surely taking a fresh starting 
point to the evaluation of the best means by which such sensitive matters may be 
determined is more logical and appropriate than continuing to amend a system plainly 
unsuited to such proceedings. 
 
The court’s inherent jurisdiction was stretched to the limit in a notorious case239 during 
which the accused subjected his victim on an allegation of rape to hours of personal cross-
examination while dressed as he was when the alleged offence occurred. The humiliating 
and abusive nature of such an event is apparent and could not be allowed to stand 
unaddressed. The Court of Appeal in the case indicated it would be unlikely to interfere 
with the decision of a judge to limit such grotesque abuse of the complainant and section 
35 followed to set a prohibition on such questioning in a statutory framework. 
 
Section 34 is an absolute prohibition on the accused personally carrying out cross-
examination of the complainant. Complimentary provisions are set out in section 35, 
imposing a similar prohibition in respect of child witnesses in a wider range of offences. 
Section 36 allows for a prosecution application (or the court may consider this of its own 
motion) to prohibit questioning by the accused personally in circumstances outside the 
 
 




scope of ss34-35 where such questioning by the accused in person is likely to diminish the 
quality of testimony. There is a familiar interests of justice test to be applied in balancing 
the quality of the evidence against the right to a fair trial for the accused. As regards a fair 
trial, it is essential that the accused should be given the right to test the evidence and may 
refuse to accept legal representation. To meet this eventuality, the court has power in 
section 38 to appoint a representative to be paid from central funds and without the 
normal responsibility to the accused. The final aspect of these provisions is in section 39, 
which provides for a warning in indictable offences so that the judge will direct the jury 
that no prejudicial inference should be drawn from these arrangements. 
 
The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 forms the basis of the provisions, and 
subsequent legislation contains important measures in facilitating the oral testimony of 
vulnerable or intimidated witnesses.  
 
One of the more notable provisions relates to witness anonymity. Given the factors leading 
to the designation of a witness as intimidated within the 1999 Act, it is clear that on 
occasion there will be a strong argument for anonymity. It has long been possible to give 
evidence in a hearsay format with more recent provision in the Criminal Justice Act 2003240 
to accommodate those in fear. However, this does not meet the need of the more serious 
incidents of witness intimidation arising, for example, in cases of organised violent crime. 
Another consideration is that if a statement is used in a hearsay format, the court is 
deprived of the opportunity of hearing the oral testimony and the accused of the 
opportunity to test that evidence through cross-examination. In addition the use of a 
statement does not protect the accused from threats and possible violence away from the 
court setting.  
 
Until the case of R v Davis,241 it was assumed that the inherent power of the court to adjust 
the format of the trial would suffice. Davis brought this practice in respect of witness 








the defence witness in Davis did not allow a fair trial and breached art 6 of the ECHR. The 
speedy response to this decision by the government resulted in The Criminal Evidence 
Witness Anonymity Act 2008. Given the hasty nature of the legislation, it contained a 
sunset clause242 which would result in its automatic repeal unless extended. The Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009 superseded the 2008 Act and provided almost identical replacement 
provisions. The replacement provisions came into force on 1st January 2010. The use of 
anonymity orders will be sparing and governed by provisions setting out parameters for 
their use. In this regard Guidance to Crown Prosecutors243 recognises the need to have 
regard to the decision of the Court of Appeal R v Mayers.244 It is a very significant departure 
from the norms of the trial process to allow a witness anonymity and very strict 
considerations both in terms of the application and the disclosure obligations apply. The 
court must take account of the normal right of the accused to know the identity of the 
witness and to be able to test the evidence. This, of course, emanates from the traditional 
Anglo-American trial system. Clearly, if credibility is an issue, the identity of the witness is 
crucial in allowing for effective cross-examination. It will therefore be vital to identify the 
difference between arguments relating to reliability and those genuinely grounded on 
issues of credibility.  
 
Another very significant consideration in determining an application is the extent to which 
the witness is the sole or determining evidence in the prosecution case. In those situations, 
the difficulty in conducting an effective defence in the face of an anonymity order should 
be taken into account. Consideration must also be given to factors relating to the potential 
dishonesty of the witness and any relationship between the witness and the accused or 
the accused’s associates. Having regard to the deprival of the accused of the normal 
information relating to witness identity disclosure on the part of the prosecution must be 
full and enable the arguments to be properly considered by the defence. At trial, the judge 
must warn the jury against drawing any prejudicial inference against the defendant based 
on the anonymised testimony. In the words of the Director of Public Prosecutions: 
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the use of an anonymous witness should only be considered where it is justified 
under the 2009 Act and where such a course is consistent with a fair trial. 
Applications should be made only in those cases where it is absolutely necessary.245 
 
A question remaining following the significant reforms considered was the admission of 
video recorded examination-in-chief for witnesses falling outside the scope of the 1999 
Act. The Auld review246 considered a broad range of issues in the operation of the courts 
amongst which was the use of video recorded examination-in-chief for those witnesses to 
serious crimes on similar lines to s27 of the YJCEA 1999. The hope was to reduce the stress 
for these witnesses in a way already demonstrated by a special measures direction under 
s27 and to preserve evidence at a time when it was much more likely to be accurately 
recalled. As with s27 concerns regarding the leading of witnesses in gathering evidence in 
this format were considered and met with similar arguments, that is guidance on the 
recording process and the fact that any leading would be obvious on viewing. Clearly, 
witnesses entitled to measures under section 27 may also fall within this proposal and in 
such circumstances would be dealt with under established provisions. This 
recommendation from Lord Justice Auld’s review found its way into the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 at s137. However, s137 is yet to be brought into force, and there is no proposed 
timeframe for its introduction. If in force, it would enable the court to make a direction 
that the witness to an offence triable only on indictment or a prescribed either way offence 
could give evidence-in-chief through a video-taped account. The account would have to be 
at a time when events were fresh in the memory and, as with a special measures direction 
under s27 of the 1999 Act, would stand in place of direct oral testimony. A number of 
matters to assure the fairness of the use of such evidence are set out in the legislation,247 
such as the time between the event and the account given; reliability of the witness and 
the quality of the recording. Account must also be taken of the risk of prejudice to the 
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accused and considerations relating to the overall interests of justice in the use of pre-
recorded testimony.  
 
The special measures introduced under the YJCEA brought a range of features to enhance 
the experience of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses on a previously unseen scale. 
However, while there can be no doubt the special measures introduced went a long way 
towards achieving a better landscape in the adversarial process, equally, there is no doubt 
that difficulties were soon identified. Initial reaction to the reforms proved a cautious 
welcome. As far back as 1991,248 Professor Jennifer Tempkin, a member of the Pigot 
Committee, commented on the progress made towards achieving the central 
recommendations arising from the report of the Pigot Advisory Group.  
 
The real ambition of the report was, in so far as possible, to keep the child away from that 
part of the adversarial process conducted within the precincts of the court. The idea that 
all the evidence could be considered at an early stage without the presence of either the 
jury or any press reporting was the recommendation and aim of the group. The hope was 
that all the information that needed to be considered at such a preliminary hearing could 
be obtained in a way which would feel very different from the conventional courtroom 
experience. The surroundings for such a hearing, it was hoped, would be more comfortable 
and homely in style with none of the intimidating formality of the court setting. Those 
present would be limited to the judge, advocates for each side and a supporter for the 
child. It was proposed that the defendant would not be excluded but be able to view the 
process through a video link and be able to communicate with his counsel via an audio link. 
All that was captured in the video could then be used to replace the whole of the testimony 
with no further need for the child witness to participate in the process at trial.249 None of 
these hopes were realised in early legislation nor did the Youth Justice and Criminal Justice 
Act 1999 address these aspirations know as the ‘full Pigot’. The compromise that followed 
coined the much used term ‘half Pigot’ for the special measures finally introduced. 
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Following the ‘Speaking up for Justice’250 report, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act sought to address much of the early concerns in the gathering and presenting of 
evidence from vulnerable witnesses. However, the hope for a trial process conducted in 
such a way as to give a voice to all witnesses was overshadowed by concerns relating to 
the unduly complex wording of the 1999 Act and practical difficulties with implementation 
on a national scale.251 In December 2004, a review of the system was announced, and the 
review Group produced its consultation paper ‘Improving the Criminal Trial Process for 
Young Witnesses’. The consultation paper was finally published in June 2007 with a 
response from the Government in 2009. 
 
The early commentary identified those elements creating cause for concern252 and while 
numerous issues were raised by no means all were satisfactorily dealt with through the 
later consultation process. The initial reaction to the special measures in the YJCEA tended 
to focus on the methods used to collect evidence from children and the inherent 
difficulties posed in obtaining and using pre-recorded testimony. Questions were raised on 
the likely impact on the jury of removing the child from the court and the possibility that 
an environment in which the child was at a distance and not seen ‘in the flesh’ would 
desensitise the jury from the reality of the abused child. The constraints of working with 
the principle of orality seemed all too apparent. The issue of adequacy of training and the 
need for a sea change in the approach to the handling of trials in which special measures 
may be applicable were recognised as being in their infancy. Stevenson and Sood note:  
 
it almost smacks of running before walking. Reforms are no doubt necessary but only 
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An important feature of the reforms introduced in the YJCEA was to extend the ambit of 
the measures beyond young witnesses to a wider class of vulnerable witness,254 thereby 
opening up the opportunity to prosecute in such cases. The particular hurdles to be 
overcome in furthering such cases is clear when the only or main evidence is from a witness 
with learning difficulties and those witnesses find themselves in the adversarial process. 
Even with pre-recorded testimony witnesses whose condition results in a lack of 
engagement with the jury will continue to present, sometimes insurmountable, problems 
in the pursuit of a conviction. Lawyers are trained to be advocates and tend to exploit any 
perceived weakness to further the party by whom they are instructed. This zealous 
advocacy is at the core of the system of party control in the adversarial trial system. While 
lawyers owe a duty to the court, this duty does not extend to an obligation to understand 
and accommodate the needs of an opponent’s witness. Questions asked of vulnerable 
witnesses are recognised as frequently inappropriate,255 and this is made all the more 
apparent by the wide range of physical and learning conditions seen in witnesses with a 
varied ability to cope with questions asked in court. It is not difficult to understand the 
reluctance of those involved in the criminal justice system whose role is reporting and 
investigating such offences. When witnesses may not be perceived as ‘normal’ by the jury, 
the decision to pursue these allegations is likely to be a very difficult line to follow.  
 
Birch256 recognises this issue and suggests that if the system of special measures is to serve 
those for whom it was intended then educating the jury should be considered as a means 
of dealing with a lack of understanding. How this could be achieved, it is suggested, is by 
way of expert evidence. The recognition that all the difficulty in getting the testimony of 
the vulnerable witness before the court may do little more than to postpone the stage at 
which the witness will be disbelieved is a cause for considerable and understandable 
concern. Not only would the witness have endured the process of investigation and telling 
the story for a pre-recording of evidence-in-chief but may be left with the knowledge that 
what they said had proved inadequate. Birch accepts the importance of not influencing 
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the jury with expert evidence in such a way as to prejudice a fair trial but highlights the 
lack of a level playing field in the use of the traditional adversarial system to exploit the 
lack of sophistication vulnerable witnesses display. R v Robinson [1994]257 highlights the 
arguments arising in the use of expert evidence. In this case the complainant, a fifteen-
year-old with learning difficulties, alleged that a babysitter had abused her. The babysitter, 
who was in an intermittent relationship with the complainant’s mother, categorically 
denied the allegations. At the trial, an expert was used to assist in determining the 
competence of the witness to give testimony. The defence objected on the basis that this 
would lend credibility to the witness and subsequently appealed along those lines. The 
appeal was allowed: 
 
 evidence from a psychiatrist or psychologist may be admissible to show that a 
witness is unreliable or a confession is unreliable. But Mr Jones points out that there 
is no case in which psychiatric or psychological evidence has been admitted to boost, 
bolster or enhance the evidence of a witness for the Crown or indeed of any 
witness258 
 
The 1999 Act allows for assistance to be provided by expert evidence only for those 
matters requiring a decision from the judge rather than the fact finding role carried out by 
the jury. Those matters include the test for competence and the appropriate special 
measures and, as such, are not matters for consideration by the jury. 
 
The difficulty in understanding the particular disabilities faced by those giving evidence is 
made all the more difficult by the role of cross-examination in the traditional trial system. 
Cross-examination is aimed not only at testing the evidence but also aims to shake 
credibility; highlight inconsistency and insofar as possible establish an opposing position. 
While the inherent power of the court to deal with the trial in a way considered 
appropriate and fair may go some way towards reducing the worst type of questioning the 
judiciary can only go so far. Might a special measure to allow for expert evidence on 
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credibility have served a useful purpose in ensuring a level playing field and potentially give 
vulnerable complainants a voice which could be understood and interpreted by a jury? 
Birch suggests that expert evidence combined with judicial direction would have been a 
possible extension of the provisions. 
 
Birch is not entirely scathing in her analysis of the Act. While inadequacies and missed 
opportunities are highlighted there is a welcome for the bringing together of complex 
provisions within one umbrella Act. Much of the provision is a drawing together of previous 
statutory and common law principles with the only new measure being that of pre-
recorded cross-examination set out in s28. A source of continuing debate is that the only 
new concept within the 1999 Act remains to be brought into full operation and bars the 
way to achieving a complete implementation of the recommendations in the Pigot report. 
 
Another early analysis of the special measures brought together by the 1999 Act can be 
found in Laura Hoyano’s article ‘Variations on a theme by Pigot: special measures 
directions for child witnesses’.259 The early identification of the lack of implementation of 
many of the recommendations by Pigot has proved an enduring theme and cast a 
continuing shadow over progress made. The legislation has pre-recorded examination-in-
chief as a central plank to reduce trauma for those vulnerable and intimidated witnesses 
eligible for assistance in a special measures direction. However, Pigot envisaged a system 
in which the child would not need to recount the events in a separate court hearing but in 
which the video could deal with all matters. This would have been a very significant 
reduction in the impact of the principle of orality and certainly serves to highlight the issues 
inherent in the adherence to its process.  Pigot also recommended that the video could be 
used as partial testimony with supplementation as necessary by live testimony to complete 
the evidence-in-chief. The 1999 Act works on the premise that the whole of the video will 
be used, where admissible, and stand as evidence-in-chief with very limited exception. The 
measures within the 1999 Act did not allow the use of a TV link or screen as of right but by 
way of judicial leave. The lack of a third party to relay questions was not enacted as had 
 
 




been recommended by a majority of the committee. As with other commentary on the 
Act, the lack of simplicity in the rules relating to eligibility was recognised by Hoyano.  
 
The complex web of rules served to create uncertainty over the use of pre-recorded 
examination-in-chief and prove daunting to those charged with its implementation. A 
particular source of concern arose from the inflexibility of the pre-recorded examination-
in-chief once obtained. Even with the benefit of subsequent amendment,260 the emphasis 
is on the use of the video to replace examination-in-chief, and the inflexibility of this 
approach requires prosecutors to view the recording as either acceptable to stand as 
testimony or not. Hanayo cites the approach of Canada261 and New Zealand262 in 
permitting a free choice in the use of similar pre-recorded material to stand towards, 
rather than replace in its entirety, the examination-in-chief. This does not mean to say that 
the child will always be called upon to supplement pre-recorded evidence so that if the 
recording adequately deals with those matters the prosecution seeks to establish it stands, 
and may replace, the whole of the examination-in-chief. However, a more flexible 
approach facilitates the possibility of taking the witness through more effective and 
compelling oral testimony. Interviewers would not be under such pressure to capture all 
that is necessary in the initial recording, and the witness could be brought to the stage of 
cross-examination with less pressure. Given the very limited scope for supplementary 
questions under the amended YJCEA those involved in deciding the viability of a 
prospective prosecution are more limited.  
 
The precursor to the 1999 Act the ‘Speaking up for Justice’ report of the Home Office 
acknowledged difficulties in communication for vulnerable witnesses. Hanayo comments 
that much is expected of the provision in s29 to allow the use of intermediaries. This is 
particularly the case for the very young who would otherwise not be able to respond to 
questioning. Pigot anticipated the use of more appropriate childcare specialists to act as a 
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conduit between the questioner and the child. Section 29 provides for the use of 
intermediaries and has been met with another cautious welcome.263 This special measure 
in allowing for the use of an intermediary, discussed earlier, was seen as a means by which 
the rather complex and most technical language of the lawyer could be interpreted and 
thereby set in a more accessible context for the witness. The intermediary would equally 
facilitate the understanding of answers given and explain those responses given by the 
witness in a way that could be understood by the court.  
 
However, it is not the role of the intermediary to put a ‘spin’ on the language of either side, 
and the intermediary must not add to the role of the questioner by second guessing or 
interpreting the line of questioning. The role of the intermediary is therefore akin to that 
of the interpreter, and any intervention is largely limited to enabling understanding of the 
dialogue rather than any enhancement of it. They cannot fully resolve the difficulties 
encountered by witnesses in following the language of the lawyer has been recognised in 
numerous studies.264 The use of legalistic language, combined with the rigours, during 
cross-examination, has been recognised as the source of much difficulty in achieving an 
adversarial process capable of hearing the voice of the vulnerable witness:  
 
The resultant gulf between the linguistic capacity of the witness and the demands of 
the cross-examination questions has been shown to have a significant adverse effect 
of the ability of witnesses to provide accurate and coherent testimony.265 
 
Children and those with learning difficulties respond in a very different way than do their 
adult counterparts in the giving of oral testimony. Such witnesses find multi-faceted 
questions and questions posed simultaneously very difficult to interpret and can give 
answers to only one aspect of that which is asked rather than responding to each aspect 
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of the questions posed.266 This can lead to the jury misinterpreting the answers given by 
the witness. To a significant extent, this may be because the jury members do not possess 
the requisite knowledge and understanding of the vulnerable witness to interpret properly 
the meaning conveyed in the answers given. 
 
The very nature of cross-examination will often result in inappropriate treatment of the 
vulnerable witness. A frequently used strategic device within cross-examination is to lull 
the witness into a false sense of security by appearing to agree with the witness in order 
to disarm the witness before moving to a more challenging phase of questioning. This 
unfamiliar process will unnerve the most sophisticated witness and can only serve to 
undermine the ability of those less capable of providing evidence. For the vulnerable, 
understand nothing of such techniques, this line of questioning may well serve to confuse 
and frighten.267 It follows that while the role of the interpreter allows for some aspects of 
communication to be dealt with, a fuller understanding of the language and approach to 
questioning required to achieve a more empathetic approach towards the vulnerable 
witness is some way off. The fundamental elements of the adversarial system, and in 
particular the training of advocates to achieve a result for the party on whose behalf they 
are instructed, stand in the way of developing techniques of questioning aimed at helping 
vulnerable witnesses find a means of telling their version of events. 
 
Focusing on the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence in child abuse prosecutions early 
home office research looked at issues arising in the gathering of evidence and the 
particular concerns arising from the ‘half Pigot’.268 The research looked at why so many 
prosecutions in cases involving allegations of sexual or physical abuse of children proved 
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Key points in the research were the difficulties associated with the witness interview 
serving more than one purpose; the lack of guidance available for the police; the 
perception amongst prosecutors that achieving a conviction based on a child’s unclear 
testimony is very difficult; the technical difficulties associated with the reforms (including 
issues relating to cross-examination) and the innovations seen in other jurisdictions. 
 
The first Memorandum of Good Practice269 provided the precursor to the later, far more 
detailed, Achieving Best Evidence270 guidance on interviewing victims and witnesses and 
using special measures. The 1992 Memorandum was an important starting point in dealing 
with appropriate methodology in obtaining children’s testimony. At the investigation 
stage, the interview was often an incoherent account with a huge amount of difficulty 
encountered by those involved in this early stage of investigation. The technical structure 
of examination-in-chief in the trial setting was difficult to manage and the avoidance of 
leading questions, prohibited in examination-in-chief, extremely difficult to achieve. Often 
interviewers were faced with obtaining an interview without a clear view of the case and 
the charges that may ensue. In terms of the decision to commence a prosecution, the 
Crown Prosecution Service lawyers said that while helpful, the tapes were too time 
consuming to review.271 The whole process was perceived as fraught with difficulty, and a 
particular concern was the time taken to reach trial. The delay to the completion of the 
process of testimony by allowing the live (via TV link) cross-examination could damage the 
integrity of the evidence with issues such as contamination of evidence arising. The 
research clearly identified the problems with live cross-examination at this very early stage 
in the implementation of special measures: 
 
Prosecuting counsel felt they had to rely on the trial judge to intervene where cross-
examination was intimidating or unfair or where improper attacks were made on the 
complainant’s credibility during the defence’s address to the jury. However, it 
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appeared that some trial judges were reluctant to intervene. These relatively few 
cases in which children were treated harshly loomed large in police and CPS 
consciousness.272 
 
This early home office research also considered a comparative study with its focus on 
Canada; the US; Australia; New Zealand and Scotland. Practice in Canada and New Zealand 
allowed for much greater flexibility in the use of pre-recorded testimony with 
supplementary testimony acceptable and normal. Variations on the ‘full Pigot’ are seen in 
the above jurisdictions and were generally perceived to be working well. This early 
research drew conclusions that would come to be reconsidered, with attempts at further 
reform, by the later review ‘Improving the Criminal Trial Process for Young Witnesses’273 
and included recommendations for standardised training; review of the Memorandum of 
Good Practice; specialist prosecutors; designated judges and greater flexibility in the use 
of pre-recorded testimony. 
 
In 2006 the Home Office Online Report 01/06274 published research into the question of 
whether special measures for vulnerable and intimidated witnesses were working. The 
report considered the implementation and effectiveness of the special measures. The 
conclusion was drawn that, while much had been achieved to encourage vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses to give evidence in a way which sought to reduce and if possible 
eliminate the associated stress and trauma of testimony, more remained to be done.  
 
Surveys and court observations showed that there was difficulty in identifying, recording 
and tracking vulnerable and intimidated witnesses by both the police and the Crown 
Prosecution Service. The police more readily identified the needs of child witnesses, but 
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vulnerable or intimidated witnesses in less obvious situations. The research in the report 
was conducted in two phases. The first phase was conducted prior to the implementation 
of special measures in 2000/01 and phase two falling after the bringing into operation of 
measures in 2003/04. During the first phase, about half of police forces thought they fell 
below satisfactory levels in the identification of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses 
whereas this had fallen to about a quarter in the second phase. The Crown Prosecution 
Service tended to see the fault in failing to identify witnesses potentially in need of special 
measures as lying with the police. In contrast, some judges considered the problem to lie, 
to some extent at least, with the Prosecution Service.275 The court Witness Service was 
also identified as having shortcomings both in terms of witness identification and 
communication with the various agencies. 
 
The adequacy of pre-trial support was considered by this report and improvements 
between phases one and two of the research acknowledged. However, the provision of 
appropriate levels of support at the trial stage was not matched by the support at the early 
investigative and pre-trial stage. This would create a situation in which, no matter how 
effective special measure may be to support the giving of testimony, a case would fail at a 
much earlier stage because of a lack of initial support. 
 
It was clear from the responses to the study that the various agencies perceived the 
reforms as providing significant assistance in the support of vulnerable or intimidated 
witnesses. It was also clear that witness dissatisfaction arose from those measures either 
not available or not provided when requested. 
 
Several problems were not addressed in the Speaking up for Justice Report.276 A difficult 
aspect was the separation of the defendant from prosecution witnesses in the precincts of 
the court. Even if separate entrances were available the inevitable meeting in, for example, 
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the toilets in shared areas outside the courtroom posed understandable concerns for 
vulnerable and, perhaps even more so, for intimidated witnesses. However, witnesses did 
not wish to be perceived as being segregated or as in some way hiding from the defendant. 
Nor could the court, a neutral element in the criminal justice system, be seen to be 
inferring anything adverse about the defendant or the defendant’s entourage from such 
segregation.277 
 
In evaluating effectiveness, the report considered effectiveness to mean encouraging 
witnesses who would not otherwise give evidence; to allow for the effective giving of that 
evidence by victims and vulnerable witnesses and to thereby minimise the stress and 
trauma associated with testimony. The pre-trial process is shown by surveys of all those 
both involved in the giving of evidence and the facilitation of it to be crucial and under 
resourced. Also, judicial attitudes with a leaning towards live as opposed to pre-recorded 
testimony were noted:278 
 
This research has shown that effort must now be directed at the investigation and 
pre-trial processes as much as at the court processes, for more of these court cases 
to be successful.279 
 
An evaluative view of this Home Office research was necessary to shed further light on the 
issue of whether the special measures directions in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999 had done as was hoped in reducing the disadvantages of the adversarial system 
for those least able to cope with the orthodox trial system. Cleary the research showed the 
need for critical appraisal of the measures and suggestions for more effective practical 
application of the provisions within the criminal justice system. This evaluation followed 
swiftly on the heels of the Home Office Research in a number of publications the first of 
which was deft in its appraisal of the status quo and suggestions for further steps to 
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improve those problems identified.280 Burton et al. identified the crux of the problem in 
asking the question of whether what had been enacted and introduced in practice to date 
could do the job of supporting the vulnerable or intimidated witness without further 
legislative change. The compelling arguments of the need to have measures in place in the 
pre-trial and investigative stage as much as during the trial itself were apparent from the 
outcome of the Home Office research. This need to address all stages of the criminal justice 
system was reiterated by Burton et al. While the experiences of vulnerable or intimidated 
witnesses appears to have improved to a significant level by the introduction and 
implementation of special measures is the real problem the traditional adversarial process 
itself?  
 
Might the more radical overhaul of the orthodox trial process be the way forward with a 
move towards the inquisitorial system seen in European countries?281 However, the 
measures to assist vulnerable or intimidated witnesses are grounded in the need to for a 
practical and pragmatic stance and as such esoteric arguments aimed at radical 
dismantling of the orthodox trial process are unlikely to gain popular support. The reality 
is that the current trial system is embedded and continuing but does not necessarily need 
to be endured ‘warts and all’. The features most notably giving rise to ‘warts and all’ from 
the point of view of the witness are arguably confrontation between witnesses and the 
accused (together with the accused’s entourage); the witness statement and the three 
stage test of that statement with the particular rigours to be endured through the final 
stage of that process: cross-examination. The principle of orality can be identified as the 
centrepiece of these issues. 
 
Burton et al recognised the improbability of radical reform and in drawing conclusions on 
the efficacy of the special measures commented: 
 
On the assumption that procedural revolution is highly unlikely, at least for the 
foreseeable future, we have examined how effective the measures introduced by the 
 
 
280 Burton,M Evans,R Sanders,A (2007) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 




YJCEA and accompanying administrative and practical developments have been in 
mitigating the deleterious effects of the adversarial system.282 
 
Burton et al conclude that the processes for identifying vulnerable or intimidated 
witnesses need to be addressed with an approach taken to accommodate the individual 
rather than a ‘one size fits all’ ethos. To achieve an outcome tailored to the needs of the 
individual, the views of that individual must be sought. It follows that a greater hands on 
approach is required with the various agencies engaging in direct discussion with an 
emphasis on early preliminary meetings to assess appropriate strategy. Vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses should not be categorised in a broad sense and subsequently 
labelled as needing a type of measure but assessed and supported individually. It is crucial 
that the witness is listened to and participates to enable the process to work most 
effectively.283 It follows that an improvement in identifying such witnesses is necessary 
with more effective procedures to identify the needs of each witness. It is suggested that 
consideration be given to the visual recording of all initial interviews which would then 
reduce the pressures faced by witnesses in preparing and understanding the witness 
statement to be used to support the anticipated testimony.  
 
An overlooked issue in the prevalence of the principle of orality is to acknowledge the 
prevalence of functional illiteracy among the general population and to consider the 
development of measures to support those witnesses with this disadvantage. The 
adversarial trial system assumes a robust witness capable of testing. In a system where 
credibility and reliability are frequently assessed by reference to such abilities in 
statements provided prior to the giving of oral testimony, surprisingly, such issues were 
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The final point to be addressed by Burton et al. is the insidious nature of cross-
examination and the lack of regulation of the private bar in its aggressive approach 
to this final stage of the examination process.  
 
However, we recognise that aggressive cross-examination lies at the heart of the 
adversary system, and that curbs will never go far enough to put nervous witnesses 
on a level playing field with ‘normal’ ones. To this extent, there is no doubt that 
adversarialism will always be an obstacle to some witnesses giving best evidence.285 
 
The difficulties remaining to be addressed in the nature and format of cross-examination 
are significant and extensive. It is clear that the adversarial system and the part played by 
cross-examination poses particular concerns for the vulnerable or intimidated witness (as 
it does for the ‘normal’ witness) and as such are considered further in Chapters 5 and 6 of 
this thesis. The principle of orality however underpins the training of barristers and results 
in the inculcation of a mindset which then requires amelioration through further training 
rather than addressing fact finding from a different standpoint. This point has been 
recognised and training framed to modify the effects of the adversarial emphasis. The Inns 
of Court College of Advocacy, produced its own training based on empirical research, 
Raising the Bar,286 and considers the particular concerns faced by the most vulnerable 
witness: 
 
The Working Group (WG) heard a large volume of evidence in a period of 20 months3 
from a wide range of experts and individuals with first hand experience of vulnerable 
witnesses, victims and defendants: 
HM Court Service (Chapter 3), Child/ Adolescent Psychiatrist (Chapter 4), Judges 
(Chapter 5), Adult Learning Advisors (Chapter 6), Practitioners at the Bar (Chapter 7), 
CPS Trainer (Chapter 8), Police (Chapter 9), Respond UK4 (Chapter 10), Social 
 
 
285 Burton, M Evans, R Sanders, A Are special measures for vulnerable and intimidated witnesses working? 
Home Office 2006 





Workers (Chapter 11), Intermediaries (Chapter 12), Witness Support (Chapter 13) 
and the Nuffield Foundation/ NSPCC (Chapter 14). 
Their evidence was revealing. It provided a host of invaluable insights into the fears, 
problems and difficulties experienced by vulnerable people when in the Court 
system, whether as witnesses, victims or defendants. In addition, it demonstrated 
the challenges that understanding and handling such vulnerable people present, if 
they are to be dealt with fairly and sensitively, and in a manner that will achieve ‘best 
evidence’ (Chapters 3-14).287   
 
A broader category of vulnerable or intimidated witness now has access to special 
measures. However, the Pigot advisory group considered young witnesses, and it was the 
particular plight of the child in the criminal justice system which gave rise to the greatest 
concern and sparked the debate over possible reforms over two decades ago.  
 
The publication of In Their Own Words288 spurred the government into a review of child 
evidence and a subsequent consultation process.289 The review group noted areas of 
concern appropriate for consultation and identified particular issues for consideration. 
These issues included recognition that young witnesses would often prefer greater choice 
in the process of giving evidence rather than be faced with the presumption that evidence 
should be given via a link rather than in court. The group suggested the possibility of 
enhancement of existing special measures and the use of advances in technology to 
improve the process. The need for measures to cover the early stages of the criminal 
process, rather than just the experience of the trial itself, was identified as important. To 
take a case forward, an initial assessment of individual needs rather than assumed 
measures based on broad categorisation should be considered. The provision of 
appropriate pre-trial support and therapy was also regarded as important. In all, the 
measures were reviewed to identify the most effective means by which the child might 
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participate in the system of criminal justice. The consultation process focused on these 
issues and, while no commitment was given to the implementation of outcomes arising 
from consultation, a detailed and broad ranging exercise was undertaken. Respondents 
were sought from the various agencies engaged in the criminal justice process as well as 
practicing professionals and the academic community.290 
 
 
4.3 The Effect of the Principle of Orality in Delays and Court Process 
 
A particular concern was the delays seen in the system and the damage done to the child 
witness while waiting. Delays are experienced both in waiting for the case to be listed for 
trial but perhaps more damaging for the young witness is experiencing delays on the day 
of the trial itself.291 If it were possible to keep the child away from the court process 
altogether this would not be so great an issue. The current position is not likely to achieve 
this aspiration so the experience of the ‘day in court’ must be addressed. The build-up to 
the trial inevitably causes stress to witnesses, and the child witness will be all the more 
vulnerable to this. That stress is then made all the worse by long waits within the precincts 
of the court at the trial itself to complete the process of giving evidence.  It is no surprise 
that on review, it was felt important by the child review group to reduce waiting 
experienced on the day of the trial itself. One approach is to list trials involving children to 
start in the afternoon which then allows for all the time consuming processes such as jury 
swearing in, opening speeches and legal arguments to be dealt with during that afternoon 
with the child brought the following morning at a point in the trial when the time for the 
giving of evidence can be more accurately managed. 
 
The consultation included a recommendation related to the strong view of the child review 
group that young witnesses should receive appropriate pre-trial support and therapy to 
enhance the prospects of that witness giving the best evidence possible. The Office for 
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Criminal Justice Reform was engaged in evaluating existing provision for the support of 
witnesses to bring best practice to the support of child witnesses. This was considered very 
important in improving the experience of the criminal justice system for the child and to 
enhance the conviction rate by enabling best evidence to be given. At the time of the 
consultation in 2007, 165 Witness Care Units were operating and provided a single point 
of contact for witnesses from charge to trial. While these units helped identify and meet 
the basic needs of the witness, the Review Group expressed greater interest in a Witness 
Support, Preparation and Profiling scheme in Liverpool. This scheme dealt with some of 
the most vulnerable adult witnesses giving evidence locally. Significantly the scheme did 
not limit involvement to the basic assessment of needs but conducted a more individual 
analysis of the likelihood of a witness being capable of giving persuasive evidence at trial. 
The scheme earned a recommendation of good practice from the CPS Inspectorate292 given 
the success of the scheme and the sharing of outcomes with the CPS to improve good 
practice and avoid bad practice.  
  
The Ministry of Justice heralded its response to the consultation via a news release with 
the headline ‘Improved Care for young, vulnerable witnesses’ in which the Justice Minister 
said: 
Giving evidence in court can be a frightening experience for children and other 
vulnerable young people. Over the past ten years we have made significant 
improvements to the way are treated– but does not mean we could not do better.293  
A rather simplistic statement does little to convey the lengths pursued to delve into the 
principle of orality and somehow find a way through for the vulnerable. The statement is 
commendable in accepting a level of responsibility for the continued monitoring and 
improvement of the support services available but the question to be considered is the 
adequacy of the commitment in practical terms. The principle of orality has been 
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addressed in these important measures, but radical fresh systematic thinking continues to 
hamper the fundamental nature of the administration of justice. 
 
 
4.4 Work in Progress 
 
The following chapter continues by considering developments in trial procedure and the 
future of the principle of orality. However, the impact of the work in progress to modify 
the way vulnerable and intimidated witnesses meet the considerable hurdles of the 
traditional adversarial trial system continue to demonstrate how the embedded process 
through the receipt of oral testimony must remain under review. While the very significant 
improvements brought about through the introduction of special measures directions 
should not be underestimated continuing modification of the system must monitor to 
ensure a response in respect of those areas where the experience of vulnerable or 
intimidated witnesses is plainly lacking. Laura Hoyano identifies the need for continuing 
reform in the adversarial trial system for vulnerable witnesses and defendants: 
 
Notwithstanding these laudable reforms, there is disconcerting evidence that 
vulnerable witnesses and defendants still fall through cracks in the current 
protective regime, due to operational failure and organisational culture.294 
 
So, while further empirical work to capture a more up-to-date picture of the experience 
for those witnesses in receipt of special measures is to be recommended.295 Furthermore, 
radical reforms have been mooted as necessary to make progress. Much of what is 
suggested by Laura Hoyano focuses on the particular issues arising on cross-examination. 
In terms of the principle of orality, cross-examination illustrates the most significant 
departure from any previously experienced norm of enquiry for most witnesses. It is cross-
examination which gives rise to the greatest controversy and insurmountable issues in 
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establishing more complete reform. It is this part of the fact-finding process which has 
given rise to the greatest difficulty in implementing the Pigott report296 and continues to 
be the source of the most radical suggestions for reform by Laura Hoyano. One suggestion 
is to remove the role of cross-examination from the advocate seeking to test the witness’s 
testimony. 
 
A proposal apparently gaining traction with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) is to 
confiscate from council the function of cross-examining the vulnerable 
witness. Various replacement cross examiner’s been suggested – all, it is 
assumed, capable of performing a more competent and fair cross-
examination that the most highly trained barrister and a close judicial 
supervision.297 
 
The range of radical suggestions include examination by a police interviewer, utilising an 
intermediary, replacing advocates with the trial judge as cross-examiner, combining cross-
examination with the achieving best evidence interview, requiring approval in advance for 
questions to be asked in cross-examination, and allowing independent legal 
representation for complainants. Of these proposals, one had been recognised as a way 
forward in 2014 when the former director of public prosecutions Sir Keir Starmer in an 
interview with the BBC. He said the combative atmosphere of court cross-examination had 
obvious downsides for some witnesses, adding: "Perhaps judges should be given the task 
of questioning young and vulnerable witnesses?”298 
 
In Taking Trauma Seriously: Critical Reflections on the Criminal Justice Process,299 the 
trauma associated with becoming a victim of crime is considered. A particular area for 
concern is the impact of participating in the trial process that may serve to embed the 
impact of trauma rather than provide a therapeutic process of achieving justice: 
 
 
296 Cooper D, ‘Pigot Unfulfilled: Video recorded cross-examination under section 28 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act 1999’, 2005 Crim LR 456 
297 Hoyano L, ‘Reforming the adversarial trial for vulnerable witnesses and defendants.’ Crim. L.R.2015, 2, at 
p112 
298 Keir Starmer: Victims face 'unacceptable court ordeal' BBC News 7 April 2014 





the ways in which criminal procedure—including its adversarial structure, timescales 
for trial processing and distrust of therapeutic interventions—may entrench and 
augment the vulnerabilities of traumatised witnesses.300 
 
The whole swath of issues considered in relation to the trial process, in particular the place 
of the principle of orality, serve to create stress but the effect of cross-examination stands 
out as a force for generating anxiety: 
 
Of all the sources of anxiety that weigh on the mind of a complainant as they proceed 
through the criminal justice process, the prospect of undergoing cross-examination 
is paramount (Hunter et al., 2013; Rock, 1993). In an adversarial system, such 
questioning may involve an attack on a witness's character in order to undermine her 
credibility and/or an interrogation of highly personal aspects of her private life. It is 
widely acknowledged that the experience of cross-examination can be a highly 
stressful one, even for professional witnesses (e.g. police officers and experts).301 
 
The principle of orality is entrenched, and there is clear recognition that special measures 
are required to ameliorate the worst of its effects for vulnerable or intimidated witnesses. 
Research is limited into the impact of cross-examination on those witnesses with 
intellectual disabilities (ID) who are bound to face difficulty navigating the adversarial 
process. Again, only those modifications available to support witnesses through special 
measures enable the giving of evidence by those with such issues brought to face the court 
system: 
 
There is a dearth of research into actual court cases and the lived experiences 
of the cross-examination process and communication challenges faced by 
people with ID. This systematic review, which to our knowledge is the first of 
its kind, has also highlighted the need for further research in some key areas: 
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confabulation; mental age of adults and performance indication; using 
multiple-choice questions with and without pictures for enhanced recall and 
accuracy; witness understanding of court language; and research that takes 
into consideration other factors beyond IQ levels. Intellectual disabilities are 
diverse and complex and any research into the communication challenges 
people with ID face during cross-examination can only give a generalised 
overview. Witnesses are all individualistic, therefore any intervention to 
support and enhance communication during cross-examination needs to be 
person-centred to the individual witness.302 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Right of the Child (CRC) entered into force on 2 
September 1990303 and sought to enshrine the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the 
United Nations in embedding the dignity and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family as being the foundation of justice and peace in the world.304 The chid is 
recognised as being in a special category and "the child, by reason of his physical and 
mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal 
protection, before as well as after birth305". 
 
The articles of greatest import in relation to an international perspective with potential to 
reinforce the arguments in this thesis in terms of court process are articles 5 and 12: 
 
Article 5 
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where 
applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local 
custom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a 
 
 
302 Morrison J, Forester-Jones R, Bradshaw J, Murphy G, Communication and cross-examination in court for 
children and adults with intellectual disabilities: A systematic review October 2019 IJEP 23 4 (366) 
303 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1577 





manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and 
guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention. 
 
Article 12 
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views 
the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the 
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in 
any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of 
national law. 
 
Through Article 5 children ought to be able to develop and as they build competence 
acquire an ability to participate in decisions with the support and guidance of their parents 
or guardians306 and this feature of developing towards autonomy ties closely with the right 
to be heard in court proceedings. Chapter 5 of this thesis considers the role of a 
determination of competence enabling children to have their evidence received. Although 
domestic law does not specifically reflect article 5 a lack of adherence to this concept in 
domestic legislation would plainly give rise to a failure to meet this principle.  
 
As children develop they will evolve in their capacity and as such when taken together with 
Article 12 (the right to be heard) children have a right to participate in matters affecting 
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The ‘right to be heard’ enshrined in Article 12 (1) of the UN convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) is possibly the most discussed and certainly the most controversial principle in 
the arena of children’s rights308  
 
In terms of linking the principle of ‘the right to be heard’ with current domestic legislation 
on testing competence in court proceedings section 53 of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act seeks to facilitate the giving of evidence based on an ability to understand 
questions and provide answers which can be understood309. As such the idea that a child 
must be a particular age is not at the fore, rather the stage of development is the 
determining factor and to that extent this concept ties with the principles set out in the 
CRC.  
 
Although the international context falls outside the scope of this thesis there are plainly 
parallels and implications to be drawn if UK process does not meet the principles 
enshrined in Articles 5 and 12. Illustrations in developing case law demonstrate that the 
courts of England and Wales do not operate in a vacuum and as such the principle of 
orality and its predetermined starting point should not impede these principles. In ZH 
(Tanzania) v SSHD310 two children aged 12 and 9 at the point of the judgment who, having 
been born in the UK to a British citizen father and a Tanzanian national mother, were said 
by the Court of Appeal could reasonably follow their mother to Tanzania. The Supreme 
Court judgment was unanimous in finding the best interests of the chid must be a 
paramount consideration: 
 
It is a universal theme of the various international and domestic instruments to which Lady 
Hale has referred that, in reaching decisions that will affect a child, a primacy of 
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In terms of addressing the implications for court process a failure to move in the most 
appropriate way to gather evidence without taking account of the best interests of the 
child is flawed. Adherence to the principle of orality as a starting point hinders movement 
toward a system best suited to the needs of the child in the litigation landscape. 
 
In considering the impact of a refusal to allow a child to give oral evidence and the effect 
of Article 12 the judgment of the Court of Appeal in CRC P-S (Children)312is illuminating. A 
15 year old who was the subject of care proceedings wished to give evidence to support a 
desire to be returned to the care of his mother. The impact of Article 12 pervades the 
judgment and the ‘right to be heard’ was considered by the court in determining the 
appropriateness of the desire of the child to achieve that by giving oral testimony. In the 
instant case the Court of Appeal decided that the particular case at hand did not require 
oral testimony to be the means by which the child should be heard given the preference to 
be returned to the care of the mother had been clearly conveyed by the Guardian and 
counsel. However this case shows the implications for the development of systems 
facilitating the principles enshrined in Article 12 CRC. The best way to ensure compliance 
with the CRC may be through a procedural pallet unhindered in its development by the 
principle of orality as an archaic starting point. Article 12 CRC defends 21st century  rights 
and fresh thinking in relation to how best it should be met is arguably preferable.  
 
Child friendly justice guidelines can also be seen developing in the Council of Europe.313  
 
Child-friendly justice is justice that is: 
• accessible; 
• age appropriate; 
• speedy; 
• diligent; 
• adapted to and focused on the needs of the child; 
• respecting the right to due process; 
• respecting the right to participate in and to understand the proceedings; 
• respecting the right to private and family life; 
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• respecting the right to integrity and dignity.314 
A catalyst for the change addressed in these guidelines was the case of T and V v The 
United Kingdom315 in which the applicants (aged 10 at the time of the offence) alleged 
violations of the European Convention on Human Rights. This was based on the process 
used at trial which, at the time, differed little from that of an adult. The criticism levelled at 
the UK trial system in relation to its treatment of child defendants illustrates that a 
traditional starting point for the running of trials will not be acceptable and process must 
be developed to reflect the expectations of the principles of child friendly justice. 
 
Children in conflict with the law have the right to be processed through a separate juvenile 
justice system tailored to their special situation and should never be subjected to public 
criminal trials. Article 37 of the CRC also specifies that detention should only be used as a 
matter of last resort for child offenders and for the shortest period of time possible, and 
Article 40 requires that States design juvenile justice systems with the “desirability of 
promoting the child's reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role in society” 
in mind. It is difficult to see how an indeterminate sentence with no defined end point 
could meet these standards, and CRIN believes that potentially lifelong sentences of 




4.5 Conclusion  
 
The foregoing chapter analyses this particularly persuasive area for reform. The special 
measures considered have followed close scrutiny of the effect of adherence to the 
principle of orality. A revised template to allow for the provision of a forum in which all 
witnesses may be heard is demonstrably hard won. Together with the critique of 
developing trial processes in Chapter 5, the argument is built to demonstrate that the 
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developments over decades could have been achieved more efficiently by policy 
unconstrained by the weight of tradition.  
 
Chapter 5 considers the future of the adversarial trial system. The taking of a holistic view 
to reform with the change of emphasis on the appropriateness of procedure rather than 
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The previous chapter illustrates the extent to which the principle of orality has impacted 
on procedural considerations governing the receipt of testimony from particular 
categories of witness. Other aspects of the adversarial system impact on the ability of the 
witness to engage in the trial process. Closely linked with the procedures whereby 
evidence is received is the issue of competence. Whether or not a witness is competent is 
the very starting point for the principle of orality. Unless a witness satisfies requirements 
for competence in the process of receiving oral testimony from that witness cannot occur.  
 
While the test for competence is vital in the process, its link with the principle of orality 
has created another hurdle for those witnesses who are vulnerable. This can be 
demonstrated in previous opinions towards the ability of young children to give evidence 
and the test imposed to assess competence. In a study of attitudes towards the 
competence of child witnesses Judy Cashmore and Kay Bussey317 highlighted an issue 
which, unless addressed, may undermine any number of special measures set in place: 
 
It is not only children's abilities and their reliability as witnesses that are important; 
so too are the perceptions and the competencies of the adults who deal  
with them. Even if children are capable of giving accurate evidence, their evidence  
will be of limited value unless they are perceived as credible witnesses by those  
dealing with them: lawyers, prosecutors, police, judges, and juries. Additionally, 
children's competence is not simply a function of their abilities. It also depends on 
the competence of the adults with whom they interact (Melton & Thompson, 1987). 
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Lawyers need to be able to communicate effectively with children; judges and 
magistrates need to ensure that children are comfortable and able to testify 
effectively; and jurors need to be able to draw proper inferences from children's 
testimony.318 
 
Adults all too often fail to understand how children express themselves. This is a significant 
issue when those deciding the facts perceive the demeanour of the witness in court as 
crucial. The jury may well take clues from the way in which a witness behaves to try to 
draw conclusions as to the reliability and, perhaps most importantly, credibility of the 
testimony. The extent to which these assumptions about human nature have any basis in 
fact have been subject to scrutiny and doubt. This is pivotal to the principle of orality. The 
trial procedure is seen as a ceremony capable of providing a forum suitable to test such 
evidence, but there is argument that this view of the ‘impressive witness’ and the capacity 
of such a witness to withstand the test of court scrutiny is a myth.319 Prior to the reforms 
introduced in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, the test for competence 
could be seen as a particular hurdle imposed on children and other vulnerable witnesses 
in a way not faced by adults and other ‘normal’ witnesses.  
 
 
5.2 Testing Competence 
 
Until the reforms introduced by the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 the 
evidence of children under 14 could be given unsworn if the child was capable of giving 
intelligible testimony.320 It followed that the child was subjected to an assessment of that 
requirement to meet competence in a way adult witnesses were not. Also, this provision 
resulted in those over the age of 14 being prevented from giving testimony at all unless 
they satisfied the test for giving sworn evidence. The test for sworn evidence was such that 
the witness should demonstrate a sufficient appreciation of the seriousness of the 
occasion and the special duty to tell the truth under oath before the evidence could be 
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received.321 Very significant improvement in the assessment of competence and the use 
of sworn testimony was enacted in the YJCEA 99. 
 
The current provisions are set out in ss53-57 of the Act and apply to all witnesses rather 
than specifically selecting children for scrutiny. The test for competence is contained in 
section 53: 
 
Competence of witnesses to give evidence: 
(1) At every stage in criminal proceedings all persons are (whatever their age) 
competent to give evidence. 
(2) Subsection (1) has effect subject to subsections (3) and (4). 
(3) A person is not competent to give evidence in criminal proceedings if it 
appears to the court that he is not a person who is able to— 
(a) understand questions put to him as a witness, and 
(b) give answers to them which can be understood. 
 
The test introduced by section 53 is to be welcomed in setting out a general test for 
competence without the age of the witness being a factor. It follows that unless the judge 
assesses a witness as able to understand the questions put and give answers which the 
court can understand they will not reach the threshold of competence. While it is for the 
party tendering the witness to satisfy the court as to competence, there is a presumption 
that witnesses do not fall into the category of ‘incompetence’ unless there is a patent need 
to enter into enquiry on the point, and this will not be simply because the witness is a child. 
Diane Birch in her review of the legislation in 2000 comments: 
 
Section 53's formula leaves less room for interpretation than the intelligibility test. It 
is intended to ensure “that as many people as possible are able to give evidence at 
trial”  and that no “unfair hurdles”  are set for them. Although the burden of proof 
 
 




remains with the party tendering the witness, the Act leans as far as possible in 
favour of competence by requiring the issue to be determined as though the witness 
had the benefit of any “special measures direction”  which the court is minded to 
give.322 
 
The assessment of competence is very much assisted by the assumption that the witness 
will have the benefit of any special measures direction that the court has or may give to 
enable the threshold to be met.323 The important decision of Barker324 illustrates the 
importance of looking at the individual witness in the assessment of competence without 
holding views as to the credibility of child witnesses, or any other particular category of 
witness, which would result in different scrutiny by comparison with ‘normal’ adult 
counterparts. It is a matter of law for the judge whether the test for competence is satisfied 
and not one for the exercise of a general discretion. To satisfy the test, the child does not 
have to show an ability to deal with every question and to supply an answer capable of 
being understood in response to every one of those questions. Such a high hurdle may 
cause capable adults to fall and should not be imposed simply because it is a child whose 
competence is to be assessed. Clearly, the Barker case recognized the importance of the 
age of the child in the assessment of competence and it must be accepted that, while age 
is not a determining factor, there does come a point when age will preclude the very young 
from satisfying the formula laid down in section 53. 
 
In particular, although the chronological age of the child will inevitably help to inform 
the judicial decision about competency, in the end the decision is a decision about 
the individual child and his or her competence to give evidence in the particular 
trial.325 
 
The background to Barker is particularly poignant as the child concerned was the sister of 
‘Baby P’ who was so tragically killed at the hands of his mother and her partner, Stephen 
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Barker. In terms of the reformed test of competence in section 53, Barker is important in 
emphasizing the importance of treating children appropriately. What is so compelling in 
the Barker case is the young age of the little girl giving evidenced. The child was only two 
and a half at the time of the commission of the offence; three on the first revelation of the 
offence to her foster mother and four and a half at the time her testimony came to be 
considered. Barker was clear in prescribing the use of the plain words of section 53 without 
any further gloss and confirmed earlier guidance.326 
 
In short, it is not open to the judge to create or impose some additional but non-
statutory criteria based on the approach of earlier generations to the evidence of 
small children.327 
 
Barker is an important decision in confirming that children are to be dealt with following 
the plain intention of Parliament in the use of the statutory formula for assessing 
competence. The enactment of section 53 acknowledges a general consensus that children 
are able to give accurate and truthful accounts and is indicative of a more appropriate 
approach than simply to say the child may be ‘telling tales’. It is notable that given the child 
in Barker provided evidence crucial in the finding of guilt that without her evidence the 
accused would have been able to commit this most serious sexual assault on a very young 
child with impunity. An issue that remains following Barker is the trauma undergone by 
the witness in such circumstances. It is a welcome advance that the reformed test of 
competency allows the witness to be heard. However, the very young child in a case such 
as this, which remains disputed, must then still undergo the daunting test of live cross-
examination. The lack of a general implementation of section 28 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act means that, where a very young child has provided pre-recorded 
examination-in-chief, further delay must be faced together with further court attendance 
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Once it has been ascertained that the witness is competent to give evidence in accordance 
with the test set out in section 53 the question as to whether that evidence will be sworn 
is very much more straightforward under the revised provisions of the YJCEA 99.  
Section 55 states:  
 
(1) Any question whether a witness in criminal proceedings may be sworn for the 
purpose of giving evidence on oath, whether raised—  
(a) by a party to the proceedings, or 
(b) by the court of its own motion, 
shall be determined by the court in accordance with this section.  
(2) The witness may not be sworn for that purpose unless—  
  (a) he has attained the age of 14, and 
(b) he has a sufficient appreciation of the solemnity of the occasion and of 
the particular responsibility to tell the truth which is involved in taking an 
oath. 
 
(3) The witness shall, if he is able to give intelligible testimony, be presumed to have 
a sufficient appreciation of those matters if no evidence tending to show the 
contrary is adduced (by any party) 
 
The common law test set out by the Court of Appeal in Hayes328 is reflected in section 55. 
This states that that for a witness to give evidence on oath there should be a sufficient 
appreciation of the solemnity of the occasion and an understanding that the duty to speak 
the truth in court is higher than that duty in everyday life. The decision in Hayes 
acknowledged that a secular approach should replace any concept of religious attitudes 
towards the test to be applied. There is a rebuttable presumption that any witness 
satisfying the test for competence should be taken to satisfy the test for sworn evidence. 
However, it may well become apparent that the assessment of competence at the early 
stage of the process of testimony turns out to be doubtful as the testimony progresses. 
 
 




For example, a case when a young child or vulnerable witness unravels during testimony 
and cannot continue to understand questions or give answers capable of being 
understood. In a situation where the test for competence has been a balanced 
consideration, such as with a young child, the judge ought to keep the question of 
competence under review.329 If the child is not able to continue to achieve the test for 
competence during the process of testimony, the judge may consider exclusion of the 
testimony under the general discretion to exclude evidence if to include it may result in an 
unfair trial.330 This approach was considered in Barker:  
 
If the child witness has been unable to provide intelligible answers to questions in 
cross-examination or a meaningful cross-examination was impossible the first 
competency decision will not have produced a fair trial, and… could reasonably be 
excluded under section 78 of the 1984 Act.331 
 
These issues relating to the test for witness competence must be considered in conjunction 
with any reform of the principle of orality. The two are inextricably linked, and the issues 
must be considered together. 
 
 
5.3 Achieving Best Evidence 
 
The principle of orality, with its resultant link with oral testimony, does not stand in a 
vacuum. All evidence stems from investigation and any reforms to the principle of orality 
must be considered in that context. While reforms may be applied more broadly the 
particular impact on vulnerable witnesses highlights the need to achieve best evidence 
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Of course, it is of utmost importance that the equilibrium between testing witness 
veracity and obtaining accurate reports from the witness is maintained. Accordingly, 
the pre-trial process needs to ensure that witnesses are aware of what is expected 
of them in the courtroom; that is, they should be given information about the 
procedure, be offered the opportunity to ask questions, and be placed at ease. 
Indeed, the significance of clear guidelines to encourage accurate testimony in court 
seems essential332 
 
Much has been done to improve the lot of the child and other vulnerable witnesses by the 
modification of the trial process in the making of special measures directions. However, 
unless the initial stage of investigation is conducted appropriately not only may the case 
fail to reach trial but even when it does the flaws in the way in which the evidence has 
been compiled may seriously undermine the effectiveness of any testimony received. The 
non-statutory code Achieving Best Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Guidance for 
Vulnerable or Intimidated Witnesses updated in 2011 produced on behalf of the Home 
Office and available from the Crown Prosecution Service was considered in Chapter 4. To 
formalise the procedures used to prepare for and obtain an interview capable of standing 
as pre-recorded evidence-in-chief, the guidance provides detail to ensure the practice and 
procedures result in an ‘achieving best evidence’ (ABE) interview. The guidance is designed 
to enhance the reforms made in the improvement of the trial process through the 
availability of special measures directions and to achieve a consistent approach towards 
the obtaining of interviews. 
 
The guidance, while advisory and as such not a legally enforceable code of conduct, does 
carry considerable persuasive force in arguments as to the admissibility of pre-recorded 
evidence-in-chief. Departing from the guidelines will not of itself render the pre-recorded 
interview inadmissible.333 Still, it may give grounds for an argument that the interview 
should be excluded either in whole or in part: 
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The test for the admissibility of the video-recorded evidence was whether a 
reasonable jury properly directed could be sure that the witness had given a credible 
and accurate account on the videotape, notwithstanding any breaches of the 
guidelines.334 
 
Other evidence in the case may well suffice to show that, while there have been breaches 
in the code, the credibility and reliability of the evidence are sufficiently unaffected to 
safely allow the interview to be admitted. Even in the absence of other evidence, the 
recording may be received if to do so would not prejudice the fairness of the trial from the 
point of view of the accused. 
 
 
5.4 A Case for Balance: A Fair Trial for the Accused  
 
Any reconsideration of the validity of the principle of orality as a starting point must take 
account of the need to achieve a fair trial. In the drive to achieve fairness for the child or 
otherwise vulnerable witness, it is of great importance to ensure a fair trial for the accused. 
To be wrongly convicted of any offence has grave repercussions and in considering the 
reforms to the principle of orality cases of the type often seen in the courts against children 
involving sexual or physical abuse must surely be the most harrowing of miscarriages of 
justice. Any prejudice to the defendant must be considered and a balance of the prejudice 
to the accused against the probative value of the evidence conducted in any argument as 
to admissibility. This balance regarding the use of pre-recorded examination-in-chief is 
clearly addressed in section 27 YJCEA 99 which considers the power of the court to decline 
to allow the whole of or part of the recording if it would not be in the interests of justice 








the court must consider whether any prejudice to the accused which might result 
from that part being so admitted is outweighed by the desirability of showing the 
whole, or substantially the whole, of the recorded interview.335 
 
Is it fair to allow a transcript of the recording to be used by the jury? This would be a 
departure from the principle of orality. In the course of live oral testimony it would not be 
the case that any such transcript would be available and the question is whether fairness 
to the accused is compromised in allowing a transcript when the evidence is pre-recorded. 
While an ABE interview conducted under the guidance will help towards providing a 
recording of sufficient quality to be followed, it is inevitable that the witnesses will often 
be difficult to understand owing to the quality of sound and pictures that can be achieved 
with a young child or vulnerable witness. In that situation, the judge may allow a transcript 
to enable the jury to follow the testimony rather than to enhance its weight and thereby 
lend inappropriate persuasive quality. This was the situation considered in Springer336 
where a child of nine gave evidence about a sexual assault alleged to have been committed 
when she was four. The argument to exclude was based on the premise that the child’s 
evidence amounted to hearsay being an account provided to her by her mother. This legal 
argument in itself illustrates the prevalence of the principle of orality in basing the 
argument squarely on the need for first hand oral testimony. However, that argument 
failed, and the jury was provided with a transcript of the recording of her examination-in-
chief to use during the viewing of the video. The judge did not give a direction on the value 
of the transcript to the evidence. An appeal was allowed with a re-trial on the basis that 
having properly allowed the recording to be admitted the judge had fallen short of the 
requirements to ensure a fair trial for the accused in not having given an appropriate 
direction on the use of the transcript. It is crucial that the jury understands that the 
evidence upon which they base findings of fact is the content of the recording with no 








Similarly, only with the consent of the defence should the jury be allowed to retire to 
deliberate with the transcript.337 It would be most unusual for any witness to be re-called 
to give evidence. Even on the rare occasion when they might the purpose would not be to 
reiterate all that had been said before but to supplement and clarify on issues which had 
arisen unexpectedly. The question on a request from the jury to have the video replayed 
is whether this can ever be fair to the defendant when it amounts to the hearing of 
prosecution evidence twice. It is easy to understand why a jury may want a second viewing 
to enable them to follow how the child spoke and to gauge better the content of the 
testimony. Given the clear arguments on prejudice to the accused the Court of Appeal has 
given guidance that a replay should be allowed only in exceptional circumstances. In 
Mullen,338 the playing of the video twice was recognised as a departure from the normal 
trial process. While appropriate to replay the video only in exceptional circumstances, it 
would be appropriate where the jury requested a replay to observe demeanour rather 
than to reassess the content of the testimony. This is permissible only when the conditions 
set out in Mullen are met. Those are that the judge should give an appropriate warning to 
balance the prejudice that may be caused to the defendant. It may render the trial unfair 
if the judge does not give an appropriate warning and should also allow the representatives 




5.5 Article 6 of the ECHR – The Right to a Fair Trial 
 
In R. (on the application of D) v Camberwell Green Youth Court340 the question of whether 
the use of special measures could give rise to an argument under Art 6 ECHR, the right to 
a fair trial, was clearly dealt with. It was held that the special measure allowing the use of 
pre-recorded testimony did not breach the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Art 6 requires 
that all evidence should be produced in the presence of the accused but that the 
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modification of the normal trial process is a legitimate aim for the protection of 
witnesses.341 In Camberwell Green, it was held that the use of the recording did not prevent 
the testing of the evidence and the recording was available for full consideration with the 
possibility of excluding it in whole or in part. It was clear that the court would not be in 
breach of Art. 6 by allowing special measures342 and that the YJCEA 99 was compliant with 
the ECHR. It follows, therefore that the protection of the vulnerable or intimidated witness 
through available special measures directions is a legitimate aim and justifies the 
departure from Art 6 to an extent. The accused remains able to test the evidence and as 
such, the right to a fair trial is maintained to an acceptable standard. The mere fact that 
the cross-examination may take place at a later stage in the proceedings does not 
undermine the effectiveness of the process from the point of view of an accused wishing 
to challenge the testimony of a witness. The witness is merely enabled in the giving of 
testimony rather than the accused being barred from a proper test of its reliability and 
credibility. The fact that the witness must still be available for cross-examination if the pre-
recorded examination-in-chief is to stand satisfies any Art 6 argument as confirmed in the 
Camberwell Green case.  
 
The impact of the adversarial trial system and the principle of orality concerning all these 
considerations is clear. The entrenchment of the principle of orality and the constraints on 
the manner in which evidence may be obtained are pervasive throughout trial procedures. 
Numerous aspects of trial procedures have modifications to fix the unacceptable aspects 
which would otherwise result in insurmountable difficulties for some witnesses. 
 
 
5.6 The Jeffrey Review 
 
In May 2014 Sir Bill Jeffrey published his final report into criminal advocacy in the 
adversarial system of criminal justice343 recognising that given advocacy is at the heart of 
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our system and its quality of pivotal importance. Considering the importance of the 
principle of orality in such a review of the whole premise of advocacy is based upon the 
three-stage process of testing live oral testimony. It is essential to understand the quality 
of advocacy is inextricably linked with the principle of orality and as such drives the trial 
system in its traditional format. The review recognises that the quality of advocacy in the 
English and Welsh criminal courts is of very significant interest to both government and 
the public. While commissioned by the Justice Secretary, its findings are of significance 
much more broadly across the profession. This is recognised in the Jeffrey report: 
 
If hard facts about advocacy in the criminal justice system are difficult to come by, 
reliable information about its quality is even more elusive. There is remarkably little 
research evidence.344 
 
Sir Bill Jeffrey considered the earlier 2009 quality assurance scheme for advocates research 
pilot345 compiled by professors Richard Moorhead and Ed Cape. The troubling aspect of 
this research was that it found certain categories of cases in which advocacy skills were 
lacking. As a response to this, the quality assurance scheme for advocates was established 
(QASA) providing recognition of the level at which any adequate was competent practice. 
The scheme was supported by regulators and appeared popular with the profession.346 An 
explanation for this is closely linked to the principle of orality and the adversarial nature of 
the traditional Anglo-American trial system. Sir Bill Jeffrey established that criminal 
barristers, together with some solicitor advocates, found themselves in the difficulty 
created by the traditional Anglo-American trial system and its adversarial nature in, on the 
one hand, meeting their clients’ objectives, and on the other, conducting advocacy 
appropriate to the circumstances. This included cases in which victims of sexual offences 
and other vulnerable or intimidated witnesses may be involved. The Jeffrey review 
acknowledges the wide diversity of training amongst the different branches of the 
profession. Taking account of the requirements for the Bar Professional Training Course, 
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the Legal Practice Course and the Chartered Legal Executives (CILEX) the differences in 
training requirements for the various branches of the profession are such that no common 
standard is currently being set. The Jeffrey review recommends a common training 
expectation for all those practising as advocates in the Crown Court.347  
 
The effect of varying standards of those practising advocacy in demanding cases 
recognised in the Jeffrey review serves only to compound those issues highlighted by the 
Pigot report.348 The lack of full implementation of the recommendations set out in the 
Pigot report link closely with adversarial trial practice. When considering a lack of 
implementation of all the recommendations set out in the Pigot report, it is notable that 
commentary to date does not appear to review the place of the principle of orality 
amongst the conclusions relating to the success of special measures. The impact of the 
principle of orality must surely fall to be considered having regard to the process of 
advocacy and the particular concerns relating to a lack of pre-recorded cross-examination 
in the years following initial reform. 
 
5.7 Pigot Unfulfilled 
Following on from the initial success of special measures in dealing with the worst effects 
meted out on those most tested by the adversarial trial system, the anticipated conclusion 
of the process remained out of reach. After more than a decade it became increasingly 
apparent that the pre-recording of cross-examination was a fading hope in achieving a ‘full’ 
Pigot. Debbie Cooper349  undertook a thorough review of the position in ‘Pigot Unfulfilled: 
video recorded cross-examination under section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1999’. While recognising the value of all that special measures directions 
achieve the lack of implementation of section 28 is identified as particularly problematic 
in any move towards a better trial system. The problem is not simply the lack of an 
infrastructure, either in terms of training or technical support, to pre-record cross-
examination but that without the bringing into force of section 28 the final piece in the 
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jigsaw, which would offer the prospect of a ‘full’ Pigot, is missing. A ‘full’ Pigot could be 
achieved with the implementation of section 28 in removing altogether the need to bring 
the vulnerable witness to the trial itself by having captured the full testimony, rather than 
the half available in examination-in-chief, at a preliminary hearing away from the court. 
The existence of section 28 in the YJCEA 99 stood as a tantalizing opportunity to reach a 
stage when the worst of the trial experience could be avoided for those witnesses most in 
need of protection. The prospects for section 28 did not appear good in 2005 and, although 
never abandoned altogether, the section remains without a date for full implementation.  
Initial pilot schemes have been run,350 and a larger roll-out351 proved workable resulting in 
encouraging  judicial guidance, setting out detail for its use.352 The guidance covers pre-
trial planning so that before the case reaches court complainants who are eligible for 
special measures under s28 can be identified and appropriate monitoring and supervision 
set up353 putting the use of pre-recording is in the frame before the ground rules 
hearing.354 Debbie Cooper certainly found the position in 2005 disappointing and the slow 
but eventual roll out of pilot schemes has raised a more realistic expectation that 
significant progress is on the horizon.  
 
It must be recognised that the bringing into operational force of section 28 does not of 
itself ensure a panacea for the ills of court procedures as experienced by the vulnerable or 
intimidated witness. Even a confident adult witness would be hard pressed to deal with all 
that may arise in terms of the content of testimony at an early preliminary stage. It is 
inevitable that those vulnerable witnesses who have pre-recorded testimony will, on 
occasion, need to deal with supplementary questions by the time the trial is reached.  The 
difficulty with this is that the adversarial trial system does not embrace the acquisition of 
testimony on a piecemeal basis. However, to develop properly a system of special 
measures which would allow the pre-recording of testimony, including cross-examination, 
 
 
350 Section 28 Pilot HM courts and tribunal’s service 28th of July 2014 
351 Extending the roll out to Leeds, Liverpool and Kinston Crown Courts 
352 Courts and Tribunal Service Guidance on the use of s.28 YJCEA 1999; pre-recording of cross-examination 
and re-examination for witnesses captured by s17(4) YJCEA 1999 30 September 2019 
353 ibid at para 4 
354 Courts case management powers Criminal Practice Direction V Evidence 18E Criminal Practice Directions 




there would need to be a system whereby the evidence could be added to on a 
supplementary basis. This concept is entirely at odds with the principle of orality. Rather 
than questioning why the principle must be adhered to from the outset constructing 
something entirely more appropriate for the 21st-century system of fact finding, 
modifications continue but without having achieved any satisfactory conclusion in almost 
30 years. 
Another significant problem in leaving section 28 without full implementation is the time 
delay between the pre-recorded examination-in-chief and the cross-examination taking 
place at the time of the trial. Debbie Cooper acknowledges the serious issue of vulnerable 
witnesses facing the trauma of cross-examination cold at the time of the live trial some 
considerable time after the pre-recording of examination-in-chief: 
 
When video-recorded evidence-in-chief was first introduced, one of the main 
criticisms voiced by practitioners was that the child was required to go into cross-
examination without the benefit of a “friendly warm-up” from prosecuting 
counsel.355  
 
Debbie Cooper also recognises that to remove the final stage of testimony from the court 
room to a time much closer to the events in question would serve to improve reliability. 
However, while achieving more credible and reliable evidence is a legitimate aim, the clear 
winner in removing the process of cross-examination from the live trial in court to a 
procedure undertaken at a much earlier stage in a less traumatic and stressful 
environment would be the vulnerable witness. While recognising the compelling argument 
to move away from the recognised system of testing evidence, Debbie Cooper does not 
advocate more fundamental review of why adherence to the principle of orality is the best 
way forward. It is all very well to recognise that reform is necessary. A more fundamental 
review of the place of the principle of orality across the litigation landscape may be asking 
too much of a system entrenched to the extent seen currently. Fixing the problems within 
the structure rather than rebuilding the structure has been the focus. 
 
 





This approach was seen in the child witness review, which was announced by the 
Government in 1984 but only produced a consultation paper in June 2007.356 The specific 
issues relating to pre-recorded cross-examination stand out as the most controversial. 
Numerous pilot schemes were announced and then withdrawn,357 and the Government 
announced that the section would not be implemented in its current form but would be 
reviewed in the consultation process. This decision was taken based on the Birch Report,358 
which concluded that having regard to the increasingly more complex disclosure regime 
within criminal procedure it would be difficult to conduct cross-examination a long time 
before the trial. The Birch Report tended towards removing delays within the system of 
criminal justice to bring cases involving children to court swiftly and thereby reducing 
trauma without the need for pre-trial cross-examination. However, the conclusion of the 
Birch Report has been criticised in underestimating the benefits of pre-trial cross-
examination and perhaps in having assessed the difficulties in overcoming procedural 
problems to be greater than they would be in reality.359  The experience of other 
jurisdictions such as Australia and the USA suggests that procedural problems can be met 
and the pre-recording of cross-examination serve the purpose envisaged by Pigot et al in 
reducing the trauma for vulnerable witnesses while maintaining a fair trial process:360 
 
It is deeply regrettable that the extensive experience of Australian and American 
jurisdictions with pre-trial cross-examination was not tapped by the Birch Report nor 
by the Review Group. The change in legal culture necessary to make “full-Pigot”  work 
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As long ago as 2009, the Government Response to the Improving the Criminal Trial Process 
for Young Witness Consultation362 gave answers to the questions posed in the consultation 
exercise, the first of which was: 
 
“Do you agree that section 28 should be retained and implemented for the cross-
examination of the most vulnerable witnesses if this is the only way in which they 
would be able to give evidence?” 
 
The overwhelming response to the consultation exercise was that section 28 should be 
retained, but it was recognised that very significant hurdles would need to be overcome 
for implementation to occur. Amongst the particular difficulties identified were ensuring 
sufficient disclosure to allow early cross-examination; practical issues of having the parties 
available and appropriate arrangements for the defendant and other witnesses together 
with the need for supplementary issues arising later to be dealt with. Solutions were 
suggested, including the early appointment of a trial judge to take control and clear 
guidance in the form of protocols supported by appropriate training. While the Bar 
Association and some academics expressed reservations on the use of pre-recorded cross-
examination it was considered appropriate to draw to some extent on the experience of 
other jurisdictions. Most notably Western Australia, where the difficulties had been 
overcome and pre-recording used to good effect.363  
 
However, section 28 remains in the frame and is progressing, if, at a slow rate given the 
intervening years, Laura Hoyano’s comment on its position in 2007 sums up the progress 
made at that earlier stage: 
 
whilst the recommendation to retain the availability of pre-trial cross-examination in 
extreme circumstances is preferable to wholesale repeal, it is very likely that s.28 will 
remain an aspiration rather than an achievement in accommodating the most 
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The value of continuing pilot cases in a movement towards a possible roll out of s28 was 
illustrated in R v RL365 in which appeal was refused on the point of the extent to which a 
judge could restrict nature of questioning in relation to children. This particular case 
involved a registered intermediary; however, the value of moving away from the 
traditional adversarial trial system towards more suitable mechanisms for obtaining 
evidence was illustrated to good effect. The judge, partially by reference to a toolkit issued 
by the bar training Council,366 significantly reduced questions considered to be 
unnecessary and repetitious. The value of such careful consideration of the impact of the 
adversarial trial system is clearly important in that a continued evaluation of its place in 





 5.8 A Fair Test 
Standards of cross-examination are intrinsic to the principle of orality. They must be 
considered in any evaluation of adjustments made to accommodate the needs of the 
vulnerable or intimidated witness in the common law adversarial system. The accepted 
norm is that cross-examination is how the veracity; reliability and credibility of the witness 
can be checked. Inconsistencies are highlighted and the opposing arguments put to the 
witness through this medium. The advocate has a duty to represent the interests of the 
party on whose behalf instructions have been given. The problem of the role of the 
advocate was recognized in the findings of Home Office research presented in the 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof: 
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The Code of the Bar Council of England and Wales contains an inherent conflict 
between the barrister's duty to her client and to the court, limiting the Code's 
effectiveness in this respect.367  
 
It has long been acknowledged that judges must take steps to intervene when a witness 
needs to be protected368 from inappropriate questioning. Still, the reality of the orthodox 
trial system is that any interventions may be open to appeal: 
 
judges rightly fear that if they over-step the mark, defendants will successfully appeal 
against conviction on the grounds that the jury was denied the right to hear the 
prosecution witness adequately put to the test.369 
 
It would appear that a significant area of concern is not just the lack of pre-recorded cross-
examination across the board but a system in which key principles in the testing of 
evidence involve a standard of questioning unsuitable in the context of vulnerable and 
intimidated witnesses. The extent to which the suitability of the approach can be modified 
is open to debate. However, unless tackled, special measures directions alone cannot 
create a climate that will enable the giving of evidence by those witnesses least able to 
withstand the techniques employed in traditional cross-examination aimed at discrediting 
and casting doubt on veracity.  
 
 
5.9 No Way to Speak to a Child: Ensuring Appropriate Questioning at Court 
 
Standards of cross-examination have been seen as an issue for vulnerable witnesses and 
highlighted as in need of reform in numerous empirical studies.370 
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The Measuring Up report371 highlighted how frequently young people felt unable to cope 
with difficult cross-examination. Of those young people interviewed for the Measuring Up 
report forty-nine per cent were not able to understand questions in cross-examination; 65 
percent found the questions too fast, and complex to follow and 20 percent felt they had 
been unable to tell the court all that they wanted to say. Overall, those surveyed found 
words were put into their mouths, and that questioning was repetitive and lacked a logical 
order. It is not that the Bar Council and Criminal Bar association have failed to make 
training available in the handling of vulnerable witnesses. Great efforts have been made 
by the Bar and Crown Prosecution Service to improve the situation in the training of those 
counsel likely to be involved in such cases.372 The earlier efforts were recognised in the 
child witness review,373 and the Inns of Court College of Advocacy continue to publish 
guidance with a series of toolkits linked to the ‘Raising the Bar’ report. The earlier 
observations suggested much remained to be done,374 and the continued development of 
professional standards is key. 
 
Public awareness of the distressing circumstances of the ‘Baby P’ related case of Barker375 
prompted a critical evaluation of the process of cross-examination in the Times “Sarcastic, 
Rude: is this the way to question child witnesses?”376 Published in July 2009, years after 
numerous papers and articles highlighting the problem, the case brought the matter to the 
attention of a wider public in the most graphic terms imaginable. The young girl, still two 
at the time of her horrendous sexual assault and the youngest victim to give evidence, at 
age four, was said to look distressed and perplexed under cross-examination, finally 
lapsing into silence. The Times article undertook a brief review of important studies, such 
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One way to keep children out of the courtroom would be through pre-recorded 
cross-examination, recommended 20 years ago by the Pigot Report and included in 
the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.  
This conclusion certainly accords with earlier evaluation of the importance of section 28 in 
the bringing in of pre-recorded cross-examination. Still, it does take a rather simplistic 
approach to the ease with which it suggests this may be achieved. Similarly, the difficult 
issue of standards of cross-examination is dealt with in a manner designed to simplify the 
really very complex practical and ethical issues at stake in changing attitudes and 
approaches to cross-examination: 
Defence barristers are duty-bound to put their client’s case and you have to employ 
the legitimate tools of cross-examination, such as seeking to contradict a witness or 
catch them out.” But, he accepts, barristers should avoid bad practices. “Cross-
examination is not the art of asking questions crossly.377 
A more erudite analysis of the Barker case can be found in J.R Spencer’s case comment378 
in which the upholding of the conviction by the Court of Appeal of a man’s anal rape of the 
very young victim is considered. A startling aspect of the conviction was that the evidence 
boiled down to the little girl’s own account told some time later to those charged with her 
care. That a conviction was secured, and subsequently upheld, based on the evidence of 
one so young is to be celebrated in the drive towards achieving justice for vulnerable 
victims so often unable to meet the challenges of giving evidence. However, the standard 
of questioning observed in the case is not to be celebrated. Spencer observers: 
when viewed in its broader context the decision also shows that 
there is still much amiss in the way the criminal justice system deals with little 
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It seems that when a child is called to undergo cross-examination that it is this stage of the 
whole process that may be the most difficult to bear. The question most in need of 
consideration is, why is this stage so fundamentally entrenched? This is the question 
addressed from the outset of this thesis. The traditional view that witnesses lack credibility 
unless they have satisfactorily performed in a live oral rendition of their perception of the 
events at issue in the case forms a central question in the analysis of the place of the 
principle of orality in the traditional adversarial trial system. In this instance, the human 
effect of that principle can be seen in that the witness is forced to relive the horrendous 
events about which they have already spoken in the obtaining of pre-recorded 
examination-in-chief. In this respect, the modifications of the principle of orality seen in the 
special measures directions may serve to intensify rather than ameliorate the process of 
testing based so firmly on the adversarial trial process. The fresh and quite radical approach 
proposed by the Pigot report that all this information should be obtained outside the 
constraints of the trial setting has not been realised. Arguably the half measures brought 
into effect over the following two decades, while serving to improve many aspects of the 




5.10 Testing not Trickery 
 
Considerable progress was made in the guidance produced in conjunction with the Crown 
Prosecution Service by the NSPCC in its publication ‘Good practice guidance in managing 
young witness cases and questioning children’.380 The guidance sets out common sense 
approaches to the questioning techniques most suitable for use with children. It is clear 
that the growing recognition of the different needs of children is making a real impression, 
and there is a growing expectation that advocates will moderate the traditional approach 
accordingly. The Inns of Court College of Advocacy promote these standards and have 
been acknowledged in October 2018 by the Ministry of Justice in the updated Victims 
 
 




Strategy as having exceeded previous expectations.381 It is marked progress when 
considering that in June 2010 Woolfson and Plotnikoff commented382 on the issues 
discussed at a young witness seminar chaired by Lord Hooper. The tension between the 
techniques used to achieve the aims of cross-examination and the needs of vulnerable 
witnesses was accepted. Concepts such as ‘putting the case to the witness’ are the norm 
in offering the witness the opportunity to address issues forming the case of the opposing 
party. Such concepts do not work well with children, and the guidance is clear in stating 
that phrases commonly used in the adversarial system such as “I suggest to you” are not 
suitable for use with children. The seminar raised the issue that testing evidence so as to 
ensure a fair trial does not mean trickery and the move towards developing appropriate 
questioning provides a way forward.  
 
The need for training across the range of professional advocates is clear. Recognition of 
the issues, and the publication of clear guidance, is to be strongly encouraged the lack of 
implementation of the ‘full’ Pigot across all courts endures as a bar to a real alternative to 
the current system. Woolfson and Plotnikoff conclude that the introduction of pre-
recorded interviews by the bringing into force of section 28 would be the most expedient 
means by which a better alternative could be established. The contention is plainly put 
that the evidence could be taken in advance in a manner that is compliant with the right 
to a fair trial under Art 6. Issues with disclosure can be overcome, and cross-examination 
supplemented at a later stage should the need arise.383 Should the aspirations of Woolfson 
and Plotnikoff be realised, the prospect of a ‘full’ Pigot may finally emerge from the current 
pilot run out. 
 
 
The special measures introduced under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
brought a range of features to enhance the experience of vulnerable and intimidated 
witnesses on a previously unseen scale. However, while there can be no doubt the special 
measures introduced went a long way towards achieving a better landscape in the 
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adversarial process, equally, there is no doubt that difficulties were soon identified. These 
difficulties link to the entrenchment of the principle of orality and the difficulty of 
addressing such a fundamental aspect of truth finding. 
 
Initial reaction to the reforms proved a cautious welcome. As far back as 1991,384 Professor 
Jennifer Tempkin, a member of the Pigot Committee, commented on the progress made 
towards achieving the central recommendations arising from the report of the Pigot 
advisory group.  
 
Tempkin summarises the approach of the government clearly and succinctly: 
 
The Government's rejection of the idea of the preliminary hearing has been greeted 
with dismay by psychiatrists, social workers, police and crown prosecutors who 
regularly deal with child abuse cases. Child witnesses in sexual abuse trials are all too 
often put through the mill and doubly traumatised.385 
 
While much has been recognised in the context of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses 
by following the thread of the principle of orality through civil litigation and the place of 
experts in the general litigious landscape, the continuing impact of a system anchored by 
tradition can be demonstrated. The reason why the impact of the principle of orality is 
considered in so much detail in relation to this particular category of witness is because 
the extent of human damage has resulted in pressing calls for continuing reform. Following 
the ‘Speaking up for Justice’386 report, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act sought 
to address much of the early concerns in the gathering and presenting of evidence from 
vulnerable witnesses. However, the hope for a trial process conducted in such a way as to 
give a voice to all witnesses was overshadowed by concerns relating to the unduly complex 
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wording of the 1999 Act and practical difficulties with implementation on a national 
scale.387  
 
In a continuing process to address concerns voiced by those participating in the justice 
system, criminal practice directions have been reviewed and updated to reflect the need 
to deal with children and other vulnerable witnesses more sympathetically. In fact, the 
need to enable all witnesses to give best evidence they can has been recognised in the 
rules.388 This follows on from the guidance provided by the earlier Judicial College Bench 
checklist: Young Witness Cases389 which deals with the appropriate steps to be taken at an 
early stage to ensure proper case management both in the magistrates’ court and in the 
Crown Court. In determining how evidence can best be given matters such as the child’s 
ability to give evidence having regard to general health and the ability to deal with complex 
questions will be considered. It is seen as important to establish an appropriate a set of 
‘ground rules’ for the running of proceedings from the outset. These principles have been 
developed and appear in the criminal practice directions at paragraph 18E: 
 
18E. It is particularly important in the case of a child witness to keep a question short 
and simple, and even more important than it is with an adult witness to avoid 
questions which are rolled up and contain, inadvertently two or three questions at 
once. It is generally recognised that, particularly with child witnesses, short and 
untagged questions are best at eliciting the evidence. By untagged we mean 
questions that do not contain a statement of the answer which is sought. That said, 
when it comes to directly contradicting a particular statement and inviting the 
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5.11 The Approach of the Bar 
 
The Bar is the profession with the greatest vested interest in the future of the adversarial 
trial system across all aspects of litigation. Counsel are recognised as those advocates 
formally trained and called to the Bar of England and Wales, reporting to the Council of 
the Inns of Court.391 The inculcation of an understanding of the limitations of the 
adversarial trial system based on the principle of orality from the outset and on a 
continuing basis has been acknowledged as an invaluable way forward in bringing about 
reform and improvements to the trial process.392 The improvements that have been made 
in the training of barristers shed light on those issues which continue to be dealt with by 
modification and reform rather than a more fundamental restructuring of the system. 
However, this acknowledgement and strategy to improve the process needs to be 
considered in any analysis of the current system.  
 
The Advocacy Training Council acknowledges the pre-eminence of the principle of orality, 
and its importance in the current system sets the tone in its training literature: 
 
The first-hand account of what a witness saw, heard and experienced is vital in all 
fact-finding hearings – be it in court, tribunal or panel. Direct oral evidence gives a 
legitimacy to legal proceedings that can be delivered in no other way. The effective 
testing of that evidence is an essential part of the proper administration of justice, 
and crucial to a fair trial.393 
 
Over the past 20 years or so, an increasing number of cases have reached the courts 
which in the past would have failed either to generate an actionable complaint to the 
police, or to satisfy the prosecuting authorities that there was a realistic prospect of 
a conviction. This welcome advance is in part the result of a change in legislative and 
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procedural provisions enabling vulnerable witnesses to give evidence by the use of 
special measures.394 
 
Inherent in the process of questioning of witnesses is cross-examination. Cross-
examination is seen as pivotal in the advocates as this is how credibility, or the lack of it, 
as demonstrated. In the drive to achieve the best outcome for those instructing on the 
matter, barristers are at risk of overlooking the importance of recognising the needs of 
vulnerable and intimidated witnesses. It is of recognised importance to the 
professionalism of the bar that misconceptions about the work of advocates are met: 
 
A growing body of work is being undertaken to assess and improve the lot of 
vulnerable witnesses and defendants, particularly in enabling them to give evidence 
to the best of their ability . Whilst this work deserves wider dissemination, some 
research may not be easily accessible, or readily absorbed into an advocate’s practice 
- particularly without an understanding of both its underlying rationale and its 
practical impact. Misconceptions both within and about the Bar by those engaged in 
these issues must be challenged.395 
 
The whole premise of the adversarial trial system may appear to be about seeking an 
advantage for the side represented and from whom instructions are received. However, 
while this may have been the prevailing drive of the profession historically, its current code 
of conduct emphasises the importance of the duty to act in the interests of justice. 
Aggressive advocacy ought not to have a place in meeting the objectives of the 
underpinning framework concerning the conduct of practising barristers:  
 
302 A barrister has an overriding duty to the Court to act with independence in the 
interests of justice: he must assist the Court in the administration of justice and must 
not deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the Court. 
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303 A barrister:- (a) must promote and protect fearlessly and by all proper and lawful 
means the lay client’s best interests and do so without regard to his own interests or 
to any consequences to himself or to any other person (including any professional 
client or other intermediary or another barrister);  
307 A barrister must not: (c) compromise his professional standards in order to 
please his client, the Court or a third party, including any mediator.396 
 
It follows that advocates ought not seek to gain an advantage by exploiting the 
vulnerability of witnesses but ought to adjust their practice to meet the requirements of 
proper assistance to the court in the administration of justice. The establishment of the 
vulnerable witnesses and defendants handling working group by the advocacy training 
Council in 2009 sought to bring about change in the training of barristers. Again, the 
principle of orality is acknowledged in the report, Raising the Bar, and links closely with the 
task of the working group: 
 
the friction between the philosophy of those seeking to protect vulnerable people 
from questioning which undermines and challenges their evidence, and the need in 
an adversarial system for controversial parts of that evidence to be effectively tested 
in the interests of a fair trial.397 
 
In a litigious landscape, the principle of orality continues to shape the evolution of the trial 
system. Increasing complexity and modifications have resulted in the need to acknowledge 
and adjust training patterns for advocates. The very complex issues arising in specialist 
trials have changed the role of the judge whose pivotal position in the running of the 
adversarial trial system cannot be underestimated. Notwithstanding the training given to 
those more junior members of the advocates profession, judicial training must maintain 
pace to ensure that the modifications to how evidence is received work in the interests of 
justice. It is recognised that judges will be required to play a more interventionist role 
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taking steps to ensure a fair trial for all parties, including victims, other witnesses and 
defendants. The role of the judiciary to ensure fair and proper access to justice requires a 
range of skills, including an understanding of current society.398 The judge should not 
assume a juror’s understanding of modern British society and work on the basis that the 
disparate nature of those finding themselves within an archaic, historically-based system 
is not readily understood.399 It has long been acknowledged that judges must take steps to 
intervene when a witness needs to be protected400 from inappropriate questioning. 
However, the reality of the orthodox trial system is that any interventions may be open to 
appeal: 
 
judges rightly fear that if they over-step the mark, defendants will successfully appeal 
against conviction on the grounds that the jury was denied the right to hear the 
prosecution witness adequately put to the test.401 
 
It would appear that a significant area of concern is not just the lack of pre-recorded cross-
examination but a system in which key principles in the testing of evidence involve a 
standard of questioning unsuitable in the context of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses. 
The extent to which the suitability of the approach can be modified is open to debate. 
However, unless tackled, special measures directions alone cannot create a climate that 
will enable the giving of evidence by those witnesses least able to withstand the techniques 
employed in traditional cross-examination aimed at discrediting and casting doubt on 
veracity. The Bar Training Council has done much to address the situation in the provision 
of Toolkits, brought in as part of the 2011 Raising the Bar Report, and updated in December 
2015. Following on from Raising the Bar in 2011, the rapidity with which the Advocacy 
Training Council has developed and sought to address professional practice through its 
Advocate’s Gateway402 demonstrates growing recognition by the key players engaged in 
its output (inter-alia the Criminal Bar Association, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Law 
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Society, Judiciary of England and Wales) that there is a movement towards significant 
improvement in the training of those at the forefront of advocacy. There are currently 18 
toolkits produced in response to the recommendations of the Advocacy Training Council 
providing advocates with guidance on good practice in their preparation for trial in 
specialist areas involving witnesses with particular requirements in terms of 
communication needs. Standards of cross-examination have been seen as an issue for 
vulnerable witnesses and highlighted as in need of reform in numerous empirical studies403 
on the development of specialist toolkits to support and guide those most closely involved 
in the process. This is a positive development. However, what is not addressed by changing 
training is the fundamental premise that the receipt of oral testimony through the 
traditional embedded means is the best starting point. 
 
 
5.12 The Broader Legal Community 
  
The approach of the Bar to the training requirements relating to the questioning of 
vulnerable witnesses has been picked up in the broader legal community. Solicitor 
advocates may also question vulnerable witnesses in court during criminal trials and, 
together with their counterparts at the bar, undertook bespoke training from 2018:404 
 
Victims and witnesses who feel secure in the court room or more likely to 
communicate vital evidence effectively.405 
 
It is self-evident that mandatory training for publicly funded advocates questioning 
vulnerable witnesses participating in trials for serious sex offences can only be a positive 
step. However, there is no acknowledgement of the failure to implement all the proposals 
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in the Pigot report with the focus continuing to be a modification of the principle of orality 
rather than the fresh starting point proposed by Pigot three decades earlier.406 There is a 
clear acknowledgement of the progress made in the treatment of vulnerable witnesses but 
no question whatsoever as to the appropriateness of the system. The approach to the plight 
of vulnerable witnesses from the Law Society and Bar Training Council appears to be found 
in modifications to the experience in court through the training of advocates. The suitability 
of the approach through the receipt of oral evidence consistent with the principle of orality 
does not appear to be at the heart of the professional debate: 
 
While significant progress has been made over the past 2 decades to support 
vulnerable witnesses during a trial, more can be done. That is why the Law Society is 
committed to supporting a consistent level of high-quality advocacy. Stress can affect 
the ability of a witness to tell their story in a court room. This training program 
ensures that solicitor advocates and barristers play their part in helping witnesses so 
they are best able to communicate their evidence. We look forward to working with 
the bar Council to develop and deliver this training.407 
 
5.13 Conclusion  
 
Taken together with Chapter 4, the issues considered above look at the following research 
aims: 
 
• To identify the continued effectiveness of the principle of orality as the most 
appropriate means for defining and safeguarding a fair trial. 
• To propose continuing review of a model for effective receipt of testimony, 
together with continuing evolution of the trial system in coming years. 
 
The reforms considered demonstrate an emphasis on developing fairness in continuing 
reform. It is not contended that those reforms and modified mechanisms be abandoned. 
Rather the developments form part of a framework when considering the most 
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appropriate methods for receipt of evidence. The principle of orality remains part of those 
methods. It is contended that in moving forward a model allowing for systems built to 
match 21st century fact finding become less hampered by the principle that the starting 
point is the receipt of oral testimony contemporaneous with the trial. This does not shift to 
an entirely inquisitorial approach but allows for adversarialism as a means to achieve a fair 
outcome rather than requiring those engaged in the system to achieve an outcome 
favourable to the instructing party at all costs. This is not a new notion and was 
acknowledged following the introduction of the 1836 Prisoner's Counsel Act which 
introduced the right of the accused to a defence team: 
 
The recurring criticisms in the press of forensic morality prompted an examination 
in legal literature of the duties of counsel. Some lawyers, particularly Lord 
Brougham, advocated an uncompromisingly adversarial conception of the duties of 
counsel which made commitment to the client the first forensic virtue and 
demanded that counsel exploit all expedient means to obtain the verdict. The 
predominant view was that there were moral qualifications on counsel's duty to his 
client, but the limits of adversarialism under this view were difficult to identify with 
precision.408 
 
The aims identified in these chapters support the research objective; is the principle of 
orality the most appropriate means for defining and safeguarding a fair trial in the context 
of particular categories of witness? Chapter 6 draws conclusions to support the proposal 
that systematic reform can be achieved with policy and bold movement towards 
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS  
 
The previous chapters consider the impact of the principle of orality across both civil and 
criminal proceedings. In terms of the research question and aims of this thesis, the 
concluding chapter will draw the common threads together to demonstrate the effect of 
adherence to the principles underpinning trial procedures. The drivers of change are 
demonstrably dependent on the nature of the proceedings. This thesis considers the broad 
swathe of issues arising across the litigation landscape with each ‘fix’ being developed to 
address problems as they are identified rather than emanating from a systematic and 
planned review of the overall means by which evidence is received. This thesis draws the 
research question and aims409 through considering each in relation to a key aspect of the 
litigation process: 
 
(1) To determine the original purpose/remit of the principle of orality. 
(2) To establish the potential consequences of the modifications of that 
principle. 
(3) To identify the approach of the English adversarial trial system and any 
change to the approach over time. 
(4) To consider the legitimacy and effect of any change in the approach to the 
principle of orality. 
(5) To identify the continued effectiveness of the principle of orality as the most 
appropriate means for defining and safeguarding a fair trial. 
(6) To propose continuing review of a model for effective receipt of testimony, 













6.1 The Original Purpose of the Principle of Orality 
 
The pre-eminence of the principle of orality as the cornerstone of the trial process is 
considered in Chapter 1. The justification for the prominence placed upon oral evidence 
was found to be in part because of historical factors and the perception, created to some 
extent by popular culture, that the oral performance of witnesses and lawyers is decisive. 
Given that background, combined with a legal profession that has been schooled in the 
same thinking and immersed in a system reinforcing those views, it is unsurprising that 
challenges to oral evidence as the decisive factor have sometimes struggled to gain 
ground. 
 
Having regard to the long-standing significance of the receipt of oral testimony, any move 
away from the traditional approach of testing in open court to date has been hard won. 
But attitudes have begun to shift. While it may be that people still view a legitimate system 
as one that emphasizes oral testimony, the underlying reason is a belief in that process as 
the ‘best’ way of finding the truth in most situations. As it becomes increasing apparent 
that such a belief is open to challenge, so too are views on just how legitimate significant 
reliance on oral evidence is. Even in popular culture, so prominent has coverage of the true 
impact become that television dramas now emphasise the impact of hard questioning, 
vulnerability of some people, and how witnesses, both expert and lay, may either be overly 
relied upon or ignored simply because of their confidence and ability to perform.  
 
The crucial role afforded in the past to oral testimony in trial proceedings failed to 
recognise the experience of the witness, the court time necessary to play out the full 
process of questioning and, most notably in civil proceedings, the associated financial cost. 
The historical roots of the system410 lead to the primacy of oral evidence owing to the 
nature of adversarial proceedings. The triers of fact are not given advance documentation 
to form a view but must come to the proceedings cold and draw all conclusions from that 
 
 




which is placed before them. This lack of a preliminary document base for those deciding 
the facts differentiates the traditional Anglo-American trial system from its inquisitorial 
counterparts. The greatest departure from the adversarial system towards increased 
inquisitorial decision making can be seen in the civil litigation landscape. The advent of the 
civil procedure rules411 drove through significant modifications but not a complete 
departure from the principle of orality. The continuing effect of modification will be 
considered at 6.2 below. 
 
The preceding chapters analyse the initial starting point for the determining of facts and 
consider how reforms have affected the pre-eminence of long embedded values. This 
thesis illustrates how the slow process of modification is making an impact in civil 
proceedings,412 the place of expertise in providing an opinion to the triers of fact from 
which a conclusion may be drawn413 and most notably concerning vulnerable witnesses.414 
 
 




In considering to what extent the potential consequences of the modifications of the 
principle of orality affect the administration of justice, the greatest dismantling of the 
traditional trial system can be seen in civil proceedings.415 However, while those reforms 
have brought a much greater emphasis on proportionality and corresponding case 
management through track allocation,416 a far greater departure from the principle of 
orality is planned.417 Lord Justice Briggs preceded the publication of his final report, Civil 
Courts Structure Review: Final Report Lord Justice Briggs July 2016, with articles delivered 
to practitioner journals418 setting out radical proposals for an online court. It is clear that a 
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rethink of civil proceedings has been prompted by the virtual removal of legal aid so that 
for most people, including those engaged in small business concerns, access to civil justice 
is an unattainable luxury: 
 
However, the main theme of my report is the shocking fact that following the 
virtual withdrawal of legal aid civil justice is quite simply not available to the 
majority of ordinary individuals (or small businesses) in relation to disputes which, 
although moderate or small in money terms, are of course extremely important to 
them. is because the legal costs which have to be incurred and risked are 
disproportionate to the value at risk, and because the culture and procedure of our 
civil courts makes litigating without lawyers very difficult, and potentially unfair 
when the opponent is legally represented.419 
 
The particular problems posed by a rise in the number of litigants in person is addressed 
in the civil courts structure review final report420 at Chapter 6, which considered proposals 
for an online court. The concept of the online court is set out in the final report and is 
proposed as a new court primarily for those requiring minimal assistance from legal 
advisers. It would seem the displacement of the principle of orality in this proposal is aimed 
at moving towards a compulsory system in which the traditional Anglo-American trial 
system and its associated reliance on the principle of orality would be replaced to a very 
significant extent in order to afford access to justice in a radically different way. The driver, 
in this case, is not the plight of vulnerable witnesses, or the particular concerns associated 
with the use of experts, but the rather pressing realisation that, without funding, the 
traditional Anglo-American trial system ceases to function. Litigants in person are simply 
unable to deal with the principle of orality given the process for the receipt of oral 
testimony. Therefore, the most radical deconstruction of that system is proposed. Case 
officers would assist litigants, and it would not be anticipated that the traditional process 
would be used except in the most complex and important cases for those matters valued 








orality in civil proceedings? In respect of those reforms already in place,421 administrative 
expediency has driven limited change whereas an acceptance that funding for mainstream 
litigation involving cases of £25,000 or less appears to be the driver for future wholesale 
deconstruction. The system continues to develop and may well prove how civil justice is 
delivered.422 The risks of excluding those most in need of access to justice, and issues 
around access and fairness are identified and acknowledged by the Ministry of Justice: 
 
HMCTS have committed to (i) facilitating an overarching evaluation of the impact of 
reform on ‘access to, and the fairness of the justice system, particularly in relation 
to those who are vulnerable’ and (ii) ongoing evaluation and iteration of reformed 
services in light of insights gathered from data, including using data on the 
demographic and protected characteristics of users of the justice system to inform 
service design and identify and tackle disproportionalities.423 
 
Dr Natalie Byrom, Director of Research at the Legal Education Foundation, reviews the 
issue of protecting access in a shift towards the online court for civil matters.424 It is clear 
that for such a departure from the traditional trial system minimum standards must be 
recognised: 
 
an irreducible minimum standard of ‘access to justice’ under English law, which is 
capable of acting as an empirical standard for the purposes of iterating reformed 
services and evaluating the impact of court reform. The components of this 
irreducible minimum standard are: (i) access to the formal legal system, (ii) access 
to an effective hearing, (iii) access to a decision in accordance with substantive law, 
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6.3 A Plethora of Approaches to Expert Evidence 
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis explores issues arising from the use of experts in both civil and 
criminal proceedings. It can be seen that the place of experts in the litigious environment 
is driven largely by costs and expediency in civil litigation.426 However, the criminal forum, 
by no means immune to the pressure of costs, strives to ensure that expert evidence is 
scrutinised and tested through live oral testimony to contain the worst outcomes of trials 
in which experts initially accepted as reliable have in fact been shown to be anything but.427 
 
This plethora of approaches to the receipt of crucial, often pivotal, expert opinion is 
considered in detail in Chapter 3, and in particular the 2016 practice direction428 illustrates 
the issues to be addressed to ensure continuing vigilance in testing the reliability of expert 
based testimony.429  
 
The modifications to the principle of orality arguably undermine confidence in the 
determinative role of the expert’s evidence when there is no consistent approach across 
the breadth of matters to be determined. On the one hand, a single joint expert will be all 
that is permitted in a civil claim of relatively modest value430 and on the other concern that 
reliability based testing of experts in criminal cases with a continued value placed on the 
principle of orality. 
 
When comparisons are drawn between the different drivers in civil and criminal cases the 
principle of orality is seemingly superfluous in certain matters such as the small claims 
track431 and in others has been seen as of such import432 it is difficult to reconcile the place 
of the principle of orality and, in relation to experts, reconcile differences between venues.  
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6.4 Evolution or Revolution? More Variations on a Theme 
 
In terms of considering the place of the principle of orality in the pursuit of a fair trial much 
has been done to seek to justify its modification, almost to the extent of its removal, in 
certain categories of civil matters433 whereas on the other hand seeking to justify its 
necessity in the slow evolution of special measures to support witnesses in criminal 
matters allowing almost three decades to elapse without a full implementation of the 
radical reforms proposed.434 The consequences of those changes does not appear to have 
undermined perceptions of a justice. In comparison, criminal has somewhat lagged. 
Chapter 4 explored how, instead, less than satisfactory reforms have been made to try and 
mitigate some of the worst impacts of oral evidence.  But, as that chapter concluded, none 
as effective as allowing a judge more flexibility in selected the best approach to the 
presentation of evidence. 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis sets out the context in which an understanding of the embedded 
nature of the idea that orality is inextricably linked to the perception of a fair trial. The 
sense that truth finding depends to an extent on open court challenge is hard to change. 
The idea of fair play in the determination of truth resting on the idea of confrontation in 
the Anglo-American trial is considered from U.S perspective by Louise Ellison in a 
monograph on the adversarial process and the child witness: 
  
Peoples sense of fairness is disturbed by the use of protective procedures such as 
screens and television links within criminal proceedings. People generally, it is 
maintained, accord innate value to face to face encounters, as expressed in 
commonly held notions about fair play and decent treatment of others in social and 
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Civil litigation, in its move towards an online court as discussed in paragraph 6.2 above, 
demonstrates the most radical move away from the idea that a trial is the way to 
determine truth. Civil litigation has moved away from the focus of truth finding towards a 
system of dispute resolution. The emphasis has moved to resolution, irrespective of a 
determination of truth, which minimises the need for adversarialism. Procedures aimed at 
promoting truth finding are reserved for those cases in which the parties are not able to 
achieve a settlement. At all key stages of civil litigation, parties are directed to 
demonstrating why a resolution cannot be achieved rather than focusing on whose version 
of events should be preferred. Prior to the issue of proceedings, it is necessary to 
demonstrate all steps have been taken and that litigation is necessary: 
 
8. Litigation should be a last resort. As part of a relevant pre-action protocol or this 
Practice Direction, the parties should consider whether negotiation or some other 
form of ADR might enable them to settle their dispute without commencing 
proceedings. 
9. Parties should continue to consider the possibility of reaching a settlement at all 
times, including after proceedings have been started. Part 36 offers may be made 
before proceedings are issued.436 
 
 
Once proceedings are issued, the parties must continue to demonstrate that the litigation 
needs to proceed towards resolution by final hearing rather than settlement without a trial 
of the facts taking place: 
 
If proceedings are issued, the parties may be required by the court to provide 
evidence that ADR has been considered. A party’s silence in response to an 
invitation to participate or a refusal to participate in ADR might be considered 
unreasonable by the court and could lead to the court ordering that party to pay 
additional court costs.437 
 
 






It would appear that in the civil forum, there has been a real move away from the fact 
finding trial process as the central focus of proceedings. However, once all attempts to 
settle have been exhausted Chapter 2 of this thesis demonstrates that a return to the 
principle of orality, with its modifications largely dependent on the value of the claim, 
continues to be the basis for the final decision. Despite the radical rethink of the process 
brought about through the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules,438 the process 
continues to reach a final stage in which the principle of orality remains the basis for 
decisions. 
 
6.5 The Continuing Need for Fundamental Review in the Receipt of Evidence 
from Vulnerable and Intimidated Witnesses 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis consider the very significant issues relating to vulnerable 
and intimidated witnesses with particular emphasis on the plight of children in the criminal 
adversarial trial system. The range of special measures now embedded in the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 implements reform first recommended almost three 
decades ago in the seminal report from Judge Pigot.439 
 
Those reforms have generated a wealth of empirical studies and critical analysis but 
rather than showing signs of reaching completion continue to raise difficult issues. 
Suggestions for the reform of cross-examination, seen as the means by which oral 
testimony is tested, continue to question the traditional format of adversarialism as the 
way to determine guilt. Cross-examination is one of the central planks of the principle of 
orality and radical suggestions for continued reform serve to illustrate the continuing grip 
of the principle of orality as the bedrock of witness testimony. Laura Hoyano’s article 
Reforming the adversarial trial for vulnerable witnesses and defendants440 considered in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis in relation to cross-examination moves to a critical analysis of 
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how preserving the adversarial mode of trial and protecting witnesses could be achieved. 
It is interesting to note that all the suggestions made continue to result in a modification 
of the principle of orality rather than its replacement to any significant extent. One 
suggestion is the ‘ticketing’ of advocates so that only those considered to have an 
appropriate level of specialist skill should be permitted to participate: 
 
Ticketing of advocates along the lines of the ‘sex tickets’ for Crown Court and 
district judges, and the barristers instructed by the CPS, was recognised by the 
Advocacy Training Council in 2011. It was reiterated by Lord Carlisle’s 2014 inquiry 
into the operation of the Youth Courts, which decried the practice of sending 
inexperienced advocates there to cut their teeth by dealing with child defendants 
(and other child witnesses). Sir Bill Jeffrey’s 2014 review of independent criminal 
advocacy also recommended the ticketing of defence advocates in rape and sexual 




6.6 Truth Matters  
 
The effect of the principle of orality in modern litigation is plainly different dependent on 
the nature of the proceedings. In civil litigation, although the embedding of the principle 
of orality remains for the foreseeable future, reforms have been bolder. The imperative to 
find different models having regard to the sea change in civil litigation funding has provided 
the drive towards the most radical proposals seen in the Briggs report.442 The justification 
for changes in civil litigation is not that truth does not matter but that fundamentally 
seeking a resolution to disputes takes priority. Expediency; cost effectiveness and 
procedural efficiencies have led to the testing of significantly different processes than has 
been the case in criminal litigation. However, as can be seen with previous areas of 
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controversial evidence,443 civil litigation is a safer testing ground for reform and tried and 
tested alterations to the receipt of evidence inform subsequent modifications in the 
criminal forum. For example, earlier tried and tested legislation dealing with the 
admissibility of hearsay in civil proceedings444 is echoed in the revised approach set out in 
criminal proceedings.445 
 
The different approach in criminal litigation is attributable to the objectives in criminal 
trials. Expediency and trial efficiency together with cost savings are a factor in criminal 
trials, but truth matters and the truth finding process is prioritised. Whatever the reforms 
necessary to ensure best evidence in the most appropriate setting using special measures 
to facilitate the needs of vulnerable and intimidated witnesses the necessity to achieve a 
fair trial in which truth matters cannot be underestimated. Of course, criminal trials do not 
require a determination of truth in respect of each piece of evidence considered, but in 
reaching a verdict in which the jury must be sure that the prosecution has discharged the 
burden of proof and introduced evidence so that guilt is beyond reasonable doubt requires 
scrutiny of witness evidence. How can that scrutiny be achieved? The basis for the 
adversarial trial system is considered in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Its historic roots and place 
in society makes radical reform, such as that emerging in the civil trial system, challenging 
when this is perceived as risking a fair trial. However, reform proposed at the time of the 
Pigot report446 was considered radical and is now accepted as the norm. Recognition that 
the traditional adversarial trial system with the principle of orality as its bedrock can be 
reconsidered and more radically re-constructed could give rise to reforms facilitating a 
more appropriate means for the receipt of testimony without compromising fairness.  
 
It is not the argument of this thesis that, at this point, an adversarial approach must be 
altogether abandoned. Although that may be a consideration as understanding of the best 
approach to the legitimate aim of a procedure that secures truth as far as possible evolves. 
For now, an already radical reform would be removing the use of oral evidence as the 
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foundational aspect of trials. Empowering judges to make choices from a procedural pallet, 
containing a range of options as a starting point, would be an important step forward in 
allowing the best suited approach for the particular proceedings selected at the outset. 
Judges already act as a critical safeguard against some of the worst dangers of oral 
evidence, removing the outdated barrier of the starting across point being orality would 
represent an important step-forward.   
 
 
6.7 The Way Forward 
 
To consider if a review of the place of the principle of orality may result in a more 
appropriate model for effective receipt of testimony, together with continuing evolution 
of the trial system in coming years. 
 
A new approach to procedural frameworks appears justified. Procedures starting with a 
focus on suitability, rather than modification, may be more effective, giving the ability to 
plan for purpose rather than simply address problems in the traditional framework. The 
way forward is to match process with purpose. So by adopting a different starting point, 
rather than continuing with modifications and hybrids, working systems can be devised 
with no preconceptions.   
 
As considered in the introduction a key area with sparse consideration in the literature is 
a systematic approach to the link across civil and criminal matters. Such as in the 
development of the hearsay rule,447 in which the reassessment of the principle of orality 
was tested inititally in the Civil Evidence Act 1968 before its principles for a movement 
away from the need to bring first hand live oral testimony were restructured and set within 
a modified criminal framework in the Criminal Justice Act 2003.448 The delay of over 30 
years in the recognition of the argument for the receipt of compelling, but otherwise 
excluded evidence owing to the strictures of the hearsay rule as applied in criminal 
proceedings, demonstrates that in this pivotal area of evidence the effect of the reliance 
on modification and a lack of a procedural pallet results in lumbering change. By taking the 
 
 





starting point as purpose and building rules to achieve procedural efficacy, decades of slow 
incremental refom may be avoided. In reviewing a break from tradition, Louise Ellison 
considers the practice of importing trial process across fora: 
 
Inspiration for procedural reform is frequently drawn from trial arrangements as 
practised in civil law jurisdictions. However, it is unrealistic to expect that procedural 
rules can he isolated and imported directly into domestic law449  
 
Drawing from civil frameworks enables tried and tested process to inform advances in the 
methods for fact finding and resultant trial outcomes. However, this strategy remains 
reliant on modification of entrenched policy. Facilitating ground up process building, 
informed by exisiting and new developments elsewhere, but not limited by it, allows for 
genuinely innovative strides. New frameworks may then focus, for example, on gathering 
evidence by capturing complete oral testimony in advance of the trial and thereby follow 
the radical suggestions made over three decades ago450 which have borne fruit only after 
a tortuous path to acceptance. Taking the view that these measures could have been 
implemented as the most appropriate means of receiving testimony from the outset would 
have enabled suitable testimony to be collated from an early stage. The question is 
whether it is preferable, and feasible, to construct a more appropriate means for the 
determination of disputed factual issues. 
 
 
What may be suitable for civil litigation may not be for criminal litigation. A procedural 
pallet enabling dispute resolution may look quite different. An honest rethink of why we 
receive oral testimony in its traditional format for some civil claims and not others, 
preferring a full three stage questioning process for corporate and government litigants 





449 Ellison L, The Adversarial Process and the Vulnerable Witness, OUP, 2001 at p154 




As considered in Chapter 2, a fundamental review of the principle of orality and its place 
in a civil forum may well assist the overall aim of cost saving451 while providing a more 
logical format matching the objective of dispute resolution. An acknowledgement of the 
different aims in various proceedings facilitates best systems; the principle of orality 
applied for all purposes is not the best fit in all cases.  
 
A common thread linking both civil and criminal matters is the giving of opinion evidence 
on matters outside the knowledge of the triers of fact. The issues relating to receipt of 
opinion evidence from those experts whose role it is to provide reliable evidence on 
matters the court cannot resolve based on witnesses of fact is a strong illustration of the 
continuing impact of the cross over between civil and criminal matters. This bridge 
connecting fora is key in the contention that the need for revision and review of the 
adversarial trial model will be best served by fresh thinking and effective process. The 
contention is that structural change, rather than piecemeal modification, is the way 
forward. This bridge is as an underpinning justification in addressing the research question 
(Chapter 3). 
This type of evidence is illustrative of how models can be built to deliver the requisite 
expertise. It can be seen that the traditional approach results in experts giving testimony 
individually rather than forming a consensus to enable a way forward based on specialist 
knowledge in the field. Experts instructed on a partisan basis will have their opinions 
considered as part of adversarialism, even though modified in accordance with the practice 
rules.452 However, receiving expert evidence on a concurrent basis facilitates open debate 
and experts assist one another in the drawing of proper conclusions and may also 
challenge one another on the spot. As considered in Chapter 3, fresh starting points may 
facilitate best process: 
Even expert tribunal members will often only have sufficient expertise to better 
understand the dispute because their expertise will be related to the discipline 
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generally rather than the particular aspect been placed under the microscope. Expert 
tribunal members who do fully understand the expert issues will be better able, by 
training and experience, to put aside any concluded views and take a fresh look453 
A radical approach to the abandonment of the principle of orality may be achieved by 
seeking a process for resolution rather than a physical space (the courtroom). This method 
of progressing litigation could be adopted more broadly in both civil and criminal matters. 
The possibility of moving away from the principle of orality by modification has been 
tested, and the resultant reforms support the idea that such novel ideas ought to be 
considered. The testing of witness evidence via the principle of orality may remain an 
important tool within a procedural pallet, but systems allowing for different processes 
could be developed. This approach would remove the necessity of reliance on evolution 
from a difficult starting point. 
The most compelling driver for change arose from the plight of vulnerable and intimidated 
witnesses. The impact of those changes, and the long incremental road to reform, is 
considered in Chapters 4 and 5. 
When a witness is unable to give the best evidence they are capable of giving, the 
only interest served is those of guilty defenedants, whether the witnesses be for the 
prosecution or the defence. The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 
laudably aims to assist vulnerable and intimidated witnesses to give more complete, 
coherent and accurate testimony in criminal proceedings and to strike a better 
balance between the various interests of those who enter the criminal process as 
defendants, complainants and witnesses454 
 It was necessary to draw those issues affecting vulnerable and intimidated witnesses 
through to demonstrate that without fresh, radical reform, vulnerable witnesses lack the 
means to be heard. Reliance has been placed on hybrid systems, whereas with an 
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acceptance of fresh thinking so much more could have been achieved three decades 
sooner.455  
What has emerged inter alia... are the limitations of an accommodation approach to 
the problems facing vulnerable and intimidated witnesses. The measures which 
deviate least from the adversarial model and cling to conventional methods of fact 
finding, albeit in modified form, have been shown to be the least effective both in 
terms of alleviating the stress associated with giving evidence and for securing access 
to the best evidence potentially available456 
The approach suggested by Pigot has been demonstrably right, allowing the development 
of special measures and the early capture of effective and compelling oral testimony. The 
diminution in credibility as evidence grows stale should be avoided. The task of the jury is 
to focus on assessing contemporaneous capture followed by close real time proximity for 
follow up issues, rather than stretching the elasticity of recollection to the trial itself. As 
considered in Chapter 5, jurors may find themselves treating credibility as the ultimate 
issue rather than focussing on the testimony that could have been captured with clarity at, 
or very close to, the time events occurred. The test ought not to be recollection but 
contemporaneous accounts and description. For those witnesses with disabilities the late 
challenges to their evidence at trial gives rise to questions around reasonable doubt. The 
focus shifts to whether the jury members are able to discern the difference between what 
arises from fractured memory and an inability to express with clarity in the alien 
environment of the trial and the truth. Rather than face the courtroom the acceptance as 
a norm that the whole testimony would be through provision of an account in more 
familiar settings at the time events occurred has still to be fully implemented. Trial tactics 
are considered in Chapter 5 and the training for advocates who must modify adversarialism 
to avoid badgering witnesses acknowledged. However, the long-standing objective of 
undermining the witness so that intimidatory, if softened, interrogation remains an 
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undercurrent is hard to eradicate. The idea that the cross-examined witness may produce 
‘answers that do not represent his knowledge on the subject’457 prevails. 
The recognition that by having the witness present and allowing the jury to observe 
demeanor in the full glare of the open court room has been acknowledged as flawed. 
 
It appears that although there are physical signs of the truthfulness of a speaker, 
they are not the signs which are commonly assumed to denote a liar. A sizeable body 
of research indicates that the physical signs which people often think are indicators 
that a person is telling lies are really signs of stress; and as a witness may be stressed 
because he finds it uncomfortable to tell a lie, or because she finds it uncomfortable 
to tell the truth, the chances of an observer correctly guessing that someone is lying 
from his or her “demeanour” are little better than the chance of doing so by tossing 
a coin458 
 
In determining the original purpose and remit of the principle of orality it is clear there is a 
place for court room receipt of testimony but that it is plainly not the most appropriate 
method in all circumstanaces. In establishing the potential consequences of the 
modifications of that principle, in both civil and criminal proceedings, much has been 
achieved by reform but incremental change, rather than fresh building, hampers the 
introduction of appropriate systems. By identifying the approach of the English adversarial 
trial system and change to the approach over time the possibility of moving from the day in 
court as being the final determination to a system of  fact finding through process is seen as 
possible and effective. The on-line court is moving to fruition as an early indication of how a 
system, rather than place, for disupute resolution may operate. Decades of change in the 
way vulnerable and intimidated witnesses are viewed and their testimony handled 
illustrates the legitimacy and effect of any change in the approach to the principle of orality. 
This, together with the evolving recognition that opinion evidence from experts may be 
 
 
457 Wigmore, J.H, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 3rd edn. 
(1940),Boston: Little,Brown) vol.5. 
458 Law Commission for England and Wales, Criminal Law: Evidence in Criminal Proceedings Hearsay and 




received using alternative methods, identifies how recognition of new systems adds to the  
effectiveness of the principle of orality as a means for defining and safeguarding a fair trial. 
 
In proposing continuing review of a model for effective receipt of testimony, together with 
the ongoing evolution of the trial system in the coming years rather than questioning why 
the principle must be adhered to from the outset, constructing process entirely more 
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